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Over the last century, customers have become increasingly uncertain about how to be satisfied 
because of the growing complexity of their own needs. On the one hand, most of standardized 
needs have been satisfied, on the other hand, worldwide demand for intrinsically complex needs 
(such as health care and long-term care) has increased especially because of population ageing. 
On the provider side, producing on the basis of a foreseen demand has become increasingly 
difficult and customer uncertainty has become a source of inefficiency for the organization. 
Nevertheless, in the theories of the firm so far developed, the customer is still a missing player, 
confined in the position of a ‘rational agent’. 
This research discusses whether and how organizational efficiency is impacted by 
customer’s uncertainty in taking consumption decisions when the need to satisfy is complex. The 
central issue is to understand when it is efficient for the organization to involve the uncertain 
customer in the production process and, accordingly, which organizational form is the most 
effective in managing such involvement. Today, the lack of clarity on this theoretical issue has 
permitted, or even backed, in important sectors, an incautious adoption of mass-customization, 
that is the possibility for customers to choose exclusively among standardized options, without 
suitable consideration for both need complexity and the organizational form. My dissertation is 
organized in three chapters. In the first chapter I propose a theoretical framework on the basis of 
the Modularity Theory of the Firm (Langlois and Robertson 1995; Langlois 2002, 2006; Baldwin 
and Clark, 2003; 2006), which allows identification of the most effective organizational types to 
face customer’s uncertainty. In the second chapter, I study what is the most efficient way to 
design and manage production processes in the presence of uncertain customer needs, implying 
the necessity to involve customers themselves in the production process. The focus here also is on 
the design and management of long term care (LTC) services. In the third chapter, by adopting 
theory building from case study methods (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin 2003), I analyse five LTC 
organizations belonging to different categories of modularity and characterized by different 
governance forms in order to investigate the relationship between organizational and production 
efficiency.  
Summarizing results, the thesis firstly theorizes that cooperative governance (internal 
organization of labour based on inclusion, participation and horizontal relations) is the most 
effective in minimizing dynamic transaction costs and the related unexpected production costs 
(damages, errors, waste of time, legal actions) thanks to developing capabilities related to how to 
satisfy customers’ complex needs. Particularly, workers’ accountability supports a learning by 
doing process that allows lifelong learning and the necessary flexibility to adequately meet 
customers’ needs. Secondly, the study proposes a blueprinting approach to service design and 
management, which allows front office/back office separation to improve management efficiency. 
This structure is particularly suited at supporting decision-making processes in a flat organizational 
structure (such as the cooperative one), as it makes clear the workflows’ processes and who is 
responsible for what. Thirdly, it empirically applies the theoretical results to situations of long-
term care with customer uncertainty and shows how services should be designed in order to 
maintain a low level of unexpected production costs.  
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 L’agitation et la chasse est proprement de notre gibier, nous ne sommes pas excusables de la conduire mal et 
impertinemment – de faillir à la prise, c’est autre chose. Car nous sommes nés à quêter la vérité, il appartient de la 
posséder à une plus grande puissance. […] Le monde n’est qu’une école d’inquisition1. 
          (Michel de Montaigne) 
 
Une amélioration méthodique de l’organisation sociale suppose au préalable une étude approfondie du mode de 
production, pour chercher à savoir d’une part ce qu’on peut en attendre, dans l’avenir immédiat et lointain, du point de 
vue du rendement, d’autre part quelles formes d’organisation sociale et de culture sont compatibles avec lui, et enfin 
comment il peut être lui-même transformé2.  
(Simone Weil) 
  
The aim of this section is to introduce the readers to the essentialities of this thesis. 
It firstly describes the role of the customer as an important environmental component that affects 
the organizational performance due to the increased complexity of the customer’s needs, with 
also a focus on long term care services. In addition, this section explicates the research gap, aims, 
and purpose of the thesis. Finally, the positioning of the thesis is described and the structure of 
the thesis is presented. 
 
1.1. THE BACKGROUND AND THE RESEARCH GAPS OF THE THESIS 
 
The role of the customer has radically changed since the beginning of the 19th century. In the 
Western countries, long time has passed since the customer was satisfied with standardized and 
anonymous mass products and services. Consumption opportunities have expanded and 
customers’ needs and desires have become so complex that customers have become ‘uncertain’ in 
making consumption decisions. On the provider side, the variety of products and services is largely 
increased in connection with increased competition and the opening up of the markets to the 
globalization phenomenon. Most of the standardized needs have been satisfied and producing on 
the basis of a foreseen demand has become increasingly difficult. Moreover, worldwide demand 
has been growing for intrinsically complex needs such as health care and long-term care because 
                                                      
1 “To hunt after truth is properly our business, and we are inexcusable if we carry on the chase impertinently and ill; to 
fail of seizing it is another thing, for we are born to inquire after truth: it belongs to a greater power to possess it. […] 
The world is but a school of inquisition.” (Michel de Montaigne, The Essays translated by C. Cotton) 
2 “A methodical improvement in social organization presupposes a detailed study of the method of production, in 
order to try to find out on the one hand what we may expect from it, in the immediate or distant future, from the point 
of view of output, and on the other hand what forms of social and cultural organization are compatible with it, and, 
finally, how it may itself be transformed.” (Simone Weil, Reflections concerning the causes of Liberty and Social 
Oppression, translated by A. Wills and J. Petrie) 
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of population ageing; such needs - complex because they involve not well defined cognitive, social 
and psychological components - limit the customer’s ability to understand how to be satisfied. In 
this context, the organizations’ challenge is to involve the customers (in particular their 
idiosyncratic knowledge) in the production process while maintaining the costs under control. To 
this regard, a valuable instrument is modularity insofar as it is used not just to mass-customize 
products and services3 but firstly to efficiently manage customer uncertainty. Thus, in this 
empirical and theoretical context, it is placed our research. The aim is to understand how the 
organization – at governance, service design and management levels – efficiently apply the 
modularity principle in the management of the relationship with the customer who is uncertain 
about how to satisfy his/her own complex needs4. 
 
1.1.1. CUSTOMER UNCERTAINTY (CU) 
Customer uncertainty (CU) related to the satisfaction of complex needs, has received most of 
attention by service management scholars (Bowen and Jones, 1986; Larsson and Bowen, 1989; Pitt 
and Foreman, 1999), has been partially recognized by economists (Lancaster 1971; Stigler and 
Becker 1977), but has been only marginally considered in the organizational literature (Ulwick, 
2002; Cui and Wu, 2016). Despite, it can be regarded as a specific kind of environmental 
uncertainty, its role for organizational (in)efficiency is still an open question. Consumers are 
source of uncertainty as they themselves are uncertain in taking consumption decisions. No longer 
regarded just as a ‘rational agent’ – the customer is not endowed with all the knowledge required 
to maximize his/her own utility (Lancaster 1971; Stigler and Becker 1977) and, hence, needs to 
acquire or develop capabilities to take consumption decisions (Langlois and Cosgel, 1996). 
Confronted with this type of environmental uncertainty, the organization needs to redefine its 
boundaries and its internal structure as the interaction with the customer can affect the 
organization’s economic performance, especially when the client, because of need complexity, 
cannot easily acquire consumption capabilities on the market, but needs to be helped by the 
organization to develop them. Even though in the organizational literature uncertainty is 
                                                      
3 Mass-customization is here regarded as a production strategy that allows to produce a 
customized product/service by mixing and matching standardized modules. Different matchings of 
similar modules generate customized products and services. 
4 Organization modularity concerns the design of the interactions among organizations’ units and 
depends on the repartition of the ownership rights (decision rights, alienation rights, residual 
claims on income) in the same hands (leading to a modular market) or in different hands (leading 
to non-modular firms) (Langlois, 2002). 
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considered a fundamental source of transaction costs (Williamson, 1975), the one related to the 
customer is only marginally faced. Organizational scholars regard the client mainly as potential co-
producer of innovation thanks to the knowledge transferred (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; Ulwick, 
2002; Cui and Wu, 2016). By adopting an evolutionary perspective, the consumer is taken into 
account as potential support to the organization’s survival and not also as source of production 
(in)efficiency and, through that, of organizational (in)efficiency. Because customers are frequently 
present and participate in the production of their own services, this type of uncertainty is a 
variable mainly studied in service marketing.  In particular, several studies have analyzed the 
organizational climate-customer satisfaction link in organizational performance both in a 
theoretical and empirical way (Zeithaml, 2000; Schneider and White, 2004; Schneider et al. 2005), 
but only few scholars have studied how the organizational structure should change in presence of 
customer uncertainty for efficiency reasons (Bowen and Jones, 1986; Larsson and Bowen, 1989; 
Pitt and Foreman, 1999). Moreover, such studies neglect the role of organizational capabilities to 
face customer uncertainty as they adopt a static theoretical framework: non-standardized 
knowledge transfers within the organization and with the customer are not considered as a 
potential source of production and organizational efficiency.  
 
1.1.2. ORGANIZATIONAL MODULARITY TO FACE CU 
The Modularity Theory of the Firm (MTF, Langlois and Robertson 1995; Langlois 2002, 2006; 
Baldwin and Clark, 2003; 2006), based on the dynamic capability approach, provides a 
fundamental framework to understand how the economic organizations can support the customer 
when taking consumption decisions and, hence, efficiently manage customer uncertainty. 
According to the MTF, ownership rights are a fundamental source of modularity that efficiently 
manage uncertainty thanks to information hiding and the encapsulation of non-standardized 
knowledge transfers within non-modular organizations (Langlois, 2002). The non-modular firm and 
loosely coupled networks are more efficient than the modular market to manage non-
standardized knowledge transfers and sustain the development of capabilities required to 
promote innovation activities. In a creative environment, non-standardized knowledge transfers 
may support innovations such as an outstanding fashion design, a new battery technology for a 
mobile phone, an original and cost-effective reorganization of a service (Osterloh and Frey, 2000). 
However, knowledge transfers with the customer and among employees matter also to develop a 
personalized product or service such as a dress or a treatment having at the same time medical, 
 15 
psychological and social characters. However, the MTF does not specifically analyze customer 
uncertainty and, hence, the problem of developing capabilities to help the customer to take 
consumption decisions during the production process. Consequently, also the relationship 
between organization and production efficiency is not adequately investigated. Even if Langlois 
provides the theoretical background to analyze such relation by adopting a functionalist definition 
of organizational efficiency (Langlois 1984), it is unclear how the organization is functionally 
efficient to promote production efficiency. Moreover, the definition of production efficiency is 
based on the concept of allocative efficiency which does not allow to consider that some costs can 
occur ‘unexpectedly’ because of the lack of organizational capabilities. In fact, the assumption 
about given resources and static production function cannot be maintained when production 
cannot be completed without additional and emerging knowledge in the interaction between 
customer and producer.  Consequently, the theory does not identify any indices of production 
efficiency to measure the role of different organizational structures on the efficiency of the 
production process. In fact, even the theoretical papers concerned with the potential efficiency of 
the system in presence of CU (Bowen and Jones, 1986; Larsson and Bowen, 1989; Pitt and 
Foreman, 1999), focus only on the static transaction costs and not on the unexpected production 
costs that different organizational structures may induce by more or less preventing knowledge 
transfers in the interaction with the customer. In a static framework, the problem of identifying 
new productivity measures does not emerge. Nonetheless, many service management studies 
identify, especially on an empirical ground, the existence of a causal relationship between 
customer perceived service quality (implicitly related to the type of knowledge transfer with the 
organization) and financial performance (Zeithaml, 2000; Rodney and Wright, 2004; Vogel et al. 
2008; Liu et al. 2015) suggesting, hence, the use of financial measures, such as revenues, as 
potential candidates to quantitatively measure the relationship between the organizational 
structure and CU. Moreover, since scholars have identified the existence of a causal relationship 
between employee behavior, customer outcomes and organizational performance (Hacket 1989; 
Subramony and Holtom, 2012), other measures such as turnover and absenteeism could be 
eligible indices (Hacket 1989) to understand whether the internal organizational structure has a 
role in the management of knowledge transfers with the customer. To this regard, the support 
given by the system of incentives (expressed by the ownership rights) to the non-standardized 
knowledge transfers among providers to face CU is partly neglected in the MTF. But, as the 
behavioral literature on extrinsic and intrinsic motivations shows (Frey 1997; Osterloh, Frost and 
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Frey 2002) the organization has to provide incentives to intrinsic motivations since employees’ 
contribution in tacit knowledge transfers (and, hence, also in the development of capabilities) 
cannot be measured (problem of asymmetric information). Similarly, in management studies an 
analysis of the link between the internal organizational structure, employee behavior and the 
efficient management of CU still lacks. The only exception is the work of Pitt and Foreman (1999), 
which posits the importance of internal marketing to face customer uncertainty by treating the 
employees as internal customers (Pitt and Foreman, 1999). However, such study, building upon 
the static framework offered by Bowen and Jones (1986), is unable to take into account the 
important role of the knowledge transfers among workers and with the customer for the 
satisfaction of the customer’s complex needs. Finally, unexplored is the relationship between 
organizational modularity and product modularity in case of CU. While Sanchez and Mahoney 
(1996) focuses on the conditions under which product modularity enables organizational 
modularity; within the Modularity Theory, Langlois (2002) highlights that the relation is not 
deterministic and, in particular, that environmental dynamicity (economic change) intervenes in 
defining the modularity level of the production process and, hence, of the organization. However, 
in case of CU, such relation is mediated (and made complex) by the complexity and variety of the 
customers’ need, which – being factor to be integrated in the production of services- may make 
different organizational forms more or less functional to reach production efficiency over time. 
The issue to investigate is not whether and to what extent modular products design modular 
organizations and vice versa, but to what extent need complexity allows to efficiently modularize 
product/services and the organization. 
 
1.1.3. SERVICE DESIGN MODULARITY TO FACE CU 
Service management and marketing literature will help us to investigate service design and 
management levels thanks to their focus on the role of the customer as input and as co-producer 
in the production processes (Bowen and Jones 1986; Larsson and Bowen 1989; Pitt and Foreman 
1999; Ojasalo 2003). Even if customers can be involved in the production process of goods, in 
services the simultaneity of production and consumption necessarily involves at least the 
presence, if not the active involvement, of the customer at the moment of production. Such 
literature, hence, will provide us useful conceptual tools to gain insights into how the service 
system should be designed and managed in order to satisfy customers’ complex needs. The main 
issue is investigating what is the balance between customization and standardization and, in 
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particular, what is the efficient modularization level in service design to satisfy unique customers’ 
needs. As the customer introduces uncertainty in the production process both as input and as co-
producer (Bowen and Jones, 1986; Ojasalo, 2003), it is evaluated as efficient to separate the 
activities between the front-office ones that involve the customer, from those that can be done in 
back-office (Larsson and Bowen, 1989). However, literature on service modularity seems to have 
not accepted such suggestion. At the service design level, the modularity principle – largely 
identifiable with the platform approach (Meyer and de Tore 2001; Meyer et al. 2007; Pekkarinen 
and Ulkuniemi 2008, Baldwin and Woodard, 2008) – identifies only standardized interfaces to 
manage the interaction with the customer. In continuity with product design in manufacturing 
settings, the service modularity principle has been developed in sectors such as logistics, banking, 
ICT, automotive, namely product-related services addressing clearly definable users’ needs 
(Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008; Lin et al.2010, Zhou et al. 2010; Bask et al. 2010; Bask et al. 
2011). In these sectors, the modularity principle is applied to manage complexity, but mainly to 
the purpose of offering mass-customized services, that is a variety of solutions in a cost-effective 
way. It does not consider that customer’s knowledge transfers not always can be managed 
through standardized interfaces. In fact, standardized interfaces do not allow to distinguish the 
type of knowledge (standardized versus idiosyncratic) the customer needs to provide in order to 
be satisfied and, hence, is not able to reduce the unexpected production costs related to CU.  
 
1.1.4. THE MODULARITY PRINCIPLE IN LONG TERM CARE SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
The Modularity approach to service design has been applied not only in sectors such as logistics, 
banking, ICT, but also to satisfy customer’s complex needs, such as health and long-term care 
(Meyer et al., 2007; de Blok et al. 2009, 2010a; Vahatalo, 2016). First, modularity has been applied 
in these sectors to improve care coordination in presence of service fragmentation (Meyer et al., 
2007).  The platform approach identifies a health care path (Meyer et al., 2007; Vahatalo, 2016) 
made by strictly sequential processes whose goal is the fluent implementation of each service 
process (output), more than the general health promotion (outcome). Second, the modularity 
principle has been adopted to provide a joined-up and holistic response to people with cross-
cutting and multiple needs toward the perspective of increasing customer centeredness in a cost-
effective way (de Blok et al. 2009, 2010a). The concept of ‘patient centeredness’ in LTC service 
design– highly supported by public policies and scholars – should be viewed as an implicit answer 
to the problem of customer uncertainty, to be taken into account when applying the modularity 
 18 
principle (Bohmer, 2005). However, the main attempt to consider the ‘human dimension of 
modular care provision’ identifies personalization only as a mean to improve mass-customization 
(de Block, 2013) and not, conversely, modularity as an instrument to support personalization by 
promoting the development of organizational capabilities. In other words, the concept of patient 
centeredness still suffers from a problem of ‘tokenism’ (Beresford and Branfield, 2006), namely 
the organizations are built on the basis of the perspective of policy-makers and managers and not 
on the view and experience of service users (Glasby et al. 2015). In addition, most of studies of 
modularity in LTC sector concern home care services (de Block, 2010b; 2013; 2014), leaving 
unexplored modularity in residential care services, which usually are adopted when patient’s 
social and health conditions worsen. Finally, beyond the literature on LTC modularity, the problem 
of the relationship between organization and production efficiency in presence of CU is not 
addressed in this sector. Specialist studies have focused on particular aspects, such as the 
relationship between the management and service quality (Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 
2014), the importance of trust relationships and workers’ intrinsic motivations for developing 
coordination capabilities among colleagues (for a systematic review, see Okello and Gilson, 2015) 
but not on the role of the governance on production efficiency.  
 
 
1.2. THE AIM AND THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS AND THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to increase the understanding of the role of uncertain customers 
having complex needs on organizational performance. By creating a first bridge between 
organizational and service management literatures, in the light of the Modularity Theory of the 
Firm, I investigate whether and how the organizational structure at governance, service design 
and management level is able to manage customer uncertainty. In addition, the purpose is to 
analyze such issue within the organizations providing health and social services.  
In particular, this thesis attempts to answer three research questions: 
1) How does economic organizations efficiently face customer uncertainty in presence of 
complex needs?  
2) How does the service design and management functions contribute to efficiently manage 
customer uncertainty due to complex needs? 
3) How LTC organizations – through governance, service design and management - promote 
external efficiency (low 𝑈𝑃𝐶) related to customer uncertainty in personal care service? 
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The main research hypothesis is that in case of complex needs, customer uncertainty produces 
production inefficiency, whose level depends on the type of governance, service design and 
management adopted. Below, for each research hypothesis, the relative hypothesis is discussed. 
  
Research question 1 – Building upon the MTF and to a lesser extent on the behavioral literature on 
motivation, the analysis explores the efficiency level of different organizational structures in 
presence of CU by looking at the different systems of standards and incentives offered. The first 
hypothesis is that non-modular and decentralized structures - thanks to their flexibility and ability 
to adequately motivate providers - promote coordination capabilities with customer and providers 
and, hence, an efficient management of customer uncertainty. 
 
Research question 2 – Focusing on the service sector and in the light of the MTF, the thesis 
discusses the efficiency level of different applications of the modularity principle in service design 
and management when the customer intervenes in the production process both as input and as 
co-producer. Here, the hypothesis is that a blueprinting approach to service design and 
management sustains an efficient service modularization mainly by customizing front office 
activities and standardizing back office ones. 
 
Research question 3 –The thesis firstly discusses in the light of the developed theoretical 
framework, the platform and blueprinting approach to service design and management in LTC 
services. Then, on an empirical ground, by using the theory-building from case study approach, it 
hypotheses the existence of a virtuous or a vicious cycle on production efficiency determined by 
the incentives and standards provided by the organizational structure.  
 
 
1.3. THE POSITIONING OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis is positioned in the organizational literature, in particular the MTF, and service 
management studies on customer uncertainty, with the purpose of understanding whether and 
how the organizational structure supports an efficient management of CU.  
 
With respect to the organizational literature, the thesis substitutes the static framework based on 
the Williamson’s transaction cost analysis (Williamson 1985) in favor of the dynamic structure 
offered by the MTF, which is able to recognize a fundamental role to the organization in the 
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development of the capabilities required to manage customer uncertainty. To this purpose, this 
research tries to enlarge the perspective of the MTF towards the study of the relation with the 
customer when he/she is a source of uncertainty because of need complexity. However, in order 
to identify the organizational incentives required to support an efficient management of CU, this 
study requires enlarging the MTF perspective towards the behavioral analysis on extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations.  
 
In addition, the thesis highly contributes to the service management studies on modularity, by 
providing a theoretical framework that lends itself to be especially used in service design. Building 
upon the MTF, the modularity principle is not applied to provide mass-customized services as in 
case of the platform approach (Meyer and de Tore 2001; Meyer et al. 2007; Pekkarinen and 
Ulkuniemi 2008, Baldwin and Woodard, 2008), but in order to have a service design and 
management that is supported by the system of incentives and standards required at governance 
level to manage CU. 
 
Finally, the thesis provides an example in the LTC sector to explicate the role of the organizational 
structure in production efficiency in presence of CU. After having shown that the platform 
approach usually applied for improving coordination in the care path (Meyer et al., 2007; de Blok 
et al. 2009, 2010a) displays some risks for service effectiveness (De Block et al., 2013; Vahatalo 
2016), I propose a first application of the new approach developed on the basis of the enlarged 
MTF framework.  
 
As the figure below shows, the analysis of the customer – front-office provider relationship is 
firstly based on the Modularity Theory of the Firm enlarged to the behavioral studies on 
organizational incentives to intrinsic motivations. The literatures on modularity applied at the 
three organizational levels (governance, service design and management) are jointly analyzed in 
order to understand how to promote an efficient management of customer uncertainty. In 
particular, the MTF framework supports and orient the analysis of modularity at service design 
and management level by defining the system of standards and incentives necessary to support an 
efficient customer – front-office provider relation.  
 








1.4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
 
The thesis is structured in three chapters that constitute three original studies on the analysis of 
customer uncertainty.  
As the figure below shows, the three chapters aim at answering the same research question from 
different perspectives. In particular, Chapter 1 analyses the role of customer uncertainty at 
organizational level in the light of the MTF and posits that non-modular and internally 
decentralized organizations are the most efficient in case of complex needs as they provide the 
adequate system of standards and incentives. Chapter 2 analyses the role of customer uncertainty 
at service design and management levels, also focusing on LTC services. It is argued that service 
activities should be modularized in standardized, mass-customized and customized services on the 
basis of a customer’s need analysis and that the management should sustain front-office 
employees’ intrinsic motivations. Chapter 3, studies –through a theory building case study analysis 
– the role of the organizational structure on production efficiency in residential LTC services. It 
hypothesizes that the organizational structure influences production efficiency, in particular the 











Chapter 1. The Undesired Costs of Not Involving ‘Uncertain’ Customers 
Starting from The Theory of The Firm 
 
Despite the role of customer has radically changed over the last century, in the theories of the firm 
so far developed, the customer is still a missing player, confined in the position of a ‘rational 
agent’. The efficiency of different organizational forms is still not evaluated on the basis of the way 
they coordinate with customers and, hence, sustain production efficiency. Other issues are very 
popular; the provision of incentives (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), asset specificity problems 
(Williamson, 1985) capabilities acquired to face economic change (Langlois 2002). Such theories 
evaluate organizational efficiency by looking at the minimization of the sum of transaction costs 
and production costs, but not on the basis of the organizations’ different ability to create 
production efficiency when customers ask to be involved in the production process. To what 
extent may be efficient for the organization to exclude customers from the organization’s 
boundaries? Is the organizational form directly responsible for production efficiency? Are scale 
and production economies the only source of production efficiency? The lack of adequate studies 
on this argument has created wide confusion among researchers and encouraged firms – 
uncertain about the involvement or exclusion of the customer - to focus on a misleading ‘third 
way’: the mass-customization of products and services, which allows the customers to choose 
among largely standardized options. Indeed, the adoption of flexible technologies has allowed an 
increasing number of firms to involve the customer as ‘co-creator’ at reduced costs. However, not 
all needs can be easily standardized and not always modularization benefits are greater than the 
costs. Over the last decades, management studies have increasingly focused on the benefits of 
modularizing products and services without any consideration both for need complexity and the 
organizational form. The lack of clarity on this theoretical issue has permitted, if not even backed, 
in important sectors, an incautious adoption of modularity in services aimed at satisfying complex 
needs (education, health care, long term care). Thus, in this empirical and theoretical context, it is 
placed our research. The aim is to understand when and how it is efficient to involve the 
customers within the organizational boundaries. In particular, we argue that when needs are 
complex, the customer should be involved for increasing production efficiency and the 
organizational form is directly responsible for the customer’s efficient involvement. The customer 
is a fundamental source of uncertainty for the organization. According to the neoclassical 
perspective, the consumer is an active maximiser of utility just like the producer (Lancaster 1971; 
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Stigler and Becker 1977) as he/she is endowed with all the knowledge required to take 
consumption decisions. However, as Langlois and Cosgel (1996) argue, in the light of the dynamic 
capability approach, consumption decisions require the acquisition or development of 
consumption capabilities (Langlois and Cosgel, 1996). In particular, in case of standardized 
production/services, the customer can easily acquire on the market the capabilities necessary to 
take consumption decisions (Langlois and Cosgel, 1996), but - when the product/service is 
produced to satisfy a complex need – here defined as a need involving not well defined cognitive, 
social and psychological components - I argue that the customer can hardly develop such 
capabilities autonomously: need complexity makes it difficult for the customer to understand how 
to be satisfied. In this case, the only way for the provider to decide which product/service to 
produce in order to satisfy the customer’s need is to involve the customer in the decision course 
occurring during the production process of the product/service. However, with the customers’ 
involvement, their uncertainty becomes a source of radical uncertainty for the organization that 
we call ‘input uncertainty’ as it concerns the production process (in line with the definition of 
Bowen and Jones (1986)) and more specifically because it affects production efficiency. Since the 
production process can no longer be standardized (the customer’s idiosyncratic knowledge is 
involved), also the economic activity coordinated through standardized market interfaces is 
inefficient. What is required is a re-design of the entire system based on production flexibility and 
ability to handle the consumer demands. 
 
In the first part of the chapter, I am going to address the role of input uncertainty for the 
organization in the light of the Modularity Theory of the Firm (Langlois 2002, 2006; Baldwin and 
Clark, 2003; 2006), which – differently from the New Institutional Economics – and in line with the 
dynamic capability approach (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Langlois and Robertson 1995), recognizes to 
radical uncertainty and knowledge creation a central role in defining organizational boundaries; in 
fact, knowledge advancement requires a ‘less explicit coordination’ than that offered by the 
modular market (Langlois 2002). The role of ‘input uncertainty’ and of the related capabilities for 
the organization efficiency has not been addressed, with the exception of Bowen and Jones (1986) 
and Pitt and Foreman (1999). However, such studies are too vague and focused on the NIE 
perspective to recognize in need complexity (and related customer’s uncertainty) the connecting 
link between the organization of production and the organization of the economic activity.  
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In the second part of the chapter, it will be shown that the organization is directly responsible of 
production efficiency to the extent that need complexity increases. Need complexity, in fact, can 
be the result of an organization’s strategic choice (to address a niche market), but also the ‘result’ 
of technological progress, institutions and culture. While in the first case the product/service can 
be standardized and, hence, production efficiency is mainly the result of scale, specialization and 
scope economies; in the second situation, the organization can do very little to reach production 
efficiency by standardizing the product/service, as the customer has to be involved. The reason is 
that by not involving the customer, unexpected production costs may emerge in terms of damages, 
errors, waste of time etc. And the organizational form is directly responsible for their emergence; 
the unexpected production costs (UPC) decrease (increase) over time through the promotion (or 
discouragement) of the capabilities required producing a shared structure of meaning with the 
customer. For this reason, I aim to investigate the role of need complexity for organizational and 
production efficiency; I maintain that when the satisfaction of complex needs is pursued in the 
productive relation customer-provider, the most efficient organizational form is a loosely coupled 
system, such as network; instead, in case of highly complex needs, namely when the satisfaction of 
complex needs requires the involvement of more than one professionals in the production 
process, the most efficient organizational form is a non-modular and decentralized system such as 
a cooperative.  
 
In the third part, in the light of behavioral studies on the role of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
for tacit knowledge transfers (Frey, 1997; Osterloh, Frost and Frey 2002), I argue that non-modular 
organizations are efficient not only because they allow knowledge integration to develop 
capabilities, but also to the extent that they incentivize individuals’ effort to share knowledge. 
DTC, indeed, may partly emerge as lack of intrinsic motivations. In particular, the network of 
professionals incentivizes the development of capabilities to the extent that sustains a 
professional ethics based on cooperation among experts for the sharing of scientific results. 
However, in case of highly complex needs, the firm incentivizes knowledge integration insofar as it 
promotes the emergence of a bottom-up informal governance of the production process based on 
trust, cooperation and reciprocity. 
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1.1. The Modularity Theory of The Firm 
1.1.1. The Building Blocks of the Modularity Theory 
 
Organizational and social structures are complex ‘designed’ systems5 characterized by different 
degrees of modularity. They are necessarily complex because, even if consciously designed, face 
over time unforeseen states of the world and unpredictable effects of human choices6. But their 
complexity can be managed if they evolve or are designed in a modular way, that is if they are 
partitioned into near-decomposable subsystems (Simon 1962); the parts are assigned to 
subsystems (modules) so as to minimize the interdependences between modules and to maximize 
the interdependence within them (Simon 1962; Langlois 2002). Idiosyncratic knowledge is stored 
and evolve within modules, while standardized knowledge enables coordination with the other 
modules of the systems. Thanks to these characteristics, modular systems exhibit important 
properties like greater adaptability and evolvability than systems without modular properties 
(Langlois 2002; Langlois 2006).  
 
According to Baldwin and Clark (1997), a modular organization is obtained by partitioning 
information into visible design rules and hidden design parameters (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). 
Visible design rules (or visible information) consist of three parts: 
• An architecture specifies what modules will be part of the system and what their functions 
will be. 
• Interfaces describe in detail how the modules will interact, including how they fit together 
and communicate. 
 • Standards test a module’s conformity to design rules and measure the module’s performance 
relative to other modules (Baldwin and Clark 1997). 
While Visible design rules need to be widely shared and communicated as they sustain the 
coordination among modules; hidden design parameters - according to Langlois (2002) - not only 
do not need, but also should not be communicated to the other parts of the system (Langlois 
2002). The reason is the possibility offered by encapsulation to generate learning, new knowledge 
and, hence, radical change.  
                                                      
5 According to Simon (1962), a complex system is “one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a non-
simple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, at least in the important pragmatic sense 
that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties 
of the whole” (Simon, 1962). 
6As Hayek argues, organization are ‘the result of human action but not of human design’ (Hayek, 1967). 
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The Modularity Theory of the Firm (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Teece and Pisano, 1994; 
Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Baldwin and Clark, 2003; Langlois, 2002; Langlois 2006) studies how 
modularity may help organizations to efficiently manage uncertainty, and more specifically 
generate, through innovative activities, radical change (Langlois 2002). According to Langlois, it is 
the radical change, indeed, that may be worth the costs of adopting a modular structure7 (Langlois 
2002); thanks to information hiding8 and the encapsulation of non-standardized transfers within 
modules – modules enable learning and production of new knowledge, so that the cost of 
modularity may be more than compensated by the benefits over time of having reduced 
interdependences. In this perspective, the Modularity Theory finds its roots in the dynamic 
capability approach (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Langlois and Robertson 1995) in which productive 
knowledge is the result of learning and the acquisition of capabilities. These can be alternatively 
regarded as the ‘routines’ (as theorized by Nelson and Winter, 1982), that is habitual patterns of 
skill-like behaviors, which are in large part made of tacit knowledge9 (Polanyi, 1958). Economic 
capabilities (an effective repertoire of routines) are required in order to be able not only to 
produce, but also to transact. In fact, the development of production capabilities is sustained by 
coordination capabilities10, which are differently sustained by different levels of organizational 
modularity. Within an evolutionary framework, the Modularity Theory of the Firm (from now on 
‘Modularity Theory’) investigates how the modularity of the economic organizations changes to 
                                                      
7 Benefits and costs of modularity have to be weighted.  Concerning the costs of modularity, Baldwin and Clark 
contend that “modular systems are much more difficult to design than comparable interconnected systems. The 
designers of modular systems must know a great deal about the inner workings of the overall product or process in 
order to develop the visible design rules necessary to make the modules function as a whole. They have to specify 
those rules in advance. And while designs at the modular level are proceeding independently, it may seem that all is 
going well; problems with incomplete or imperfect modularization tend to appear only when the modules come 
together and work poorly as an integrated whole” (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). 
8 The concept of ‘Information hiding’ developed by Parnas (1972) in the computer programming to minimize 
interdependences. With information hiding, every module “is characterized by its knowledge of a design decision 
which it hides from all others. Its interface or definition was chosen to reveal as little as possible about its inner 
workings” (Parnas, 1972). 
9 Tacit knowledge can be regarded as knowledge that cannot be fully articulated but must be acquired through 
observation and practice (Polanyi, 1958). 
10 Loasby (1998) talks about coordination capabilities as “the knowledge of how to get certain things done”. He 
sustains that “just as productive activities require direct capabilities, so transactions depend on indirect capabilities. 
Indirect capabilities are of two different kinds: we may be able to get things done for us either by gaining control of 
other capabilities or by obtaining access to them. […] The obvious application of the distinction within this paper is to 
the contrast between markets, which offer access, and firms, which allow hierarchical control; and the immediate 
conclusion is that control has substantial advantages, but is likely to be costlier than access. We can access more than 
we can control, and therefore should limit our attempts at control to those capabilities which are both crucial and 
manageable”. (Loasby, 1998) 
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efficiently face more or less dynamic contexts and, in particular, sustains the development of 
production capabilities. 
 
The modularity concept is reinterpreted from a property right perspective (Langlois 2002) in a 
fashion that is consistent but, anyway, very different from that developed within the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). What especially matters is the knowledge coordination property of 
the ownership rights rather than their ability to create incentives. The Modularity Theory 
recognizes in ownership rights the real source of modularity (Langlois 2002). In fact, property 
rights, by ensuring the exclusion of non-owners, create “protected spheres of authority”, which in 
turn allow information hiding and the encapsulation of non-standardized transfers of knowledge, 
resources and energy. The existence of a principle of modularity in ownership rights allows 
identifying in the market a perfectly modular system. The market is the place where internal 
transfers become ‘public’ transactions, as they are standardized, counted and compensated 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2003). Standards sustain the emergence of market organization; they are 
social institutions (recurrent patterns of behavior11) that, by aligning the expectations of the 
parties, reduce the transaction costs of coordination (in this case they are called ‘conventions’) 
and by providing a benchmark against which quality and performance can be judged, they reduce 
transaction costs of monitoring (in this case, they are called ‘norms’12) (Langlois and Savage, 1997). 
Thanks to the standards and the relative price as a coordination module13 (Langlois 2006), the 
market minimizes uncertainty in the transactions and, hence, it allows an efficient coordination of 
economic activities. Standardized coordination creates what Langlois and Robertson (1995) call 
‘external economies of scope’, which “allow the makers of components to concentrate their 
capabilities narrowly and deeply and thus to improve their piece of the system independently of 
others” (Langlois and Robertson 1995). However, in this organizational context, knowledge is 
highly decentralized14, and in a changing economic environment (especially when knowledge is 
                                                      
11 In line with Langlois (1986b) and North (1990), they are recurrent pattern of behavior that help to coordinate 
human activity. 
12 Conventions are self-enforcing standards, differently from the norms that require a complex enforcement system 
(monitoring). 
13 According to Langlois, modularity (or better near-decomposability) can be obtained in two ways: ‘The first, for which 
there is no magic formula, is to figure out the best way to assign parts to modules. The second is ensure coordination 
among the (nearly) decomposed modules’ (Langlois 2006). 
14 It may be helpful the Langlois’ citation of Hayek (1945): ‘The whole acts as one market, not because any of its 
members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through 
many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all … The most significant fact about this system is 
the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be 
able to take the right action’ (Hayek 1945). 
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conducive to learning), it can produce high dynamic transaction costs (Langlois 2006). Such costs 
differ from the well-known transaction costs studied by the NIE. While these are fixed (and often 
sunk) costs of establishing and maintaining ownership rights15, dynamic transaction costs (DTC) 
are mundane16 transaction costs (Baldwin and Clark, 2003; Langlois 2006) that emerge “as the 
costs of persuading, negotiating, coordinating, and teaching outside suppliers. Another way to look 
at these transaction costs is as the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need 
them” (Langlois and Robertson, 1995). In other words, DTC emerge because the organization 
prevents the integration of knowledge and, hence, the development of innovative activities. Since 
in the firm, the control of the necessary capabilities is more concentrated than in the market, the 
firm arises as a non-modular answer to the need of coordination17, beyond that possible through 
the interface of the market (Langlois, 2002). In the modular markets, all the ownership rights 
reside in the same hands; instead, in the non-modular firms, ownership rights are partitioned; 
alienation rights, decision rights, and residual claims to income are attributed to different agents 
(Langlois, 2002)18. This is mainly explained by the need of internally facilitating tacit knowledge 
transfers and, hence, sustaining knowledge advancement and innovation. As Langlois (2002) 
argues:  
They [firms] may do so in response to externalities arising from the likes of team 
production or asset specificity. More interestingly, firms may also arise in order 
                                                      
15 Such costs include legal, organizational and technological standards, the fixed costs arising from highly specific 
assets and the bonds and hostages sometimes used to offset those costs. Finally, it includes ordinary fixed capital like 
locks (Langlois 2006). 
16 Mundane transaction costs are frictional costs of trade that limit the extent of the market (Langlois 2006). The first 
type of Mundane transaction costs are transportation costs. However, the extent of the market is limited also by 
coordination costs due to spatial and temporal uncertainty produce and dynamic transaction costs due to the intrinsic 
non-standardized nature of activities that is attributed to innovation and economic change (Langlois 2006). 
17 In fact, as Langlois (2002) argues in line with Jensen and Meckling (1992), not only the market but also the firm is an 
efficient organization in so far as it allows knowledge to be in the hand of those who are able to make decisions. Two 
are the efficient mechanisms; “One is by moving the knowledge to those with the decision rights; the other is by 
moving the decision rights to those with the knowledge” (Jensen and Meckling 1992). In the market, it is the voluntary 
exchange that distributes ownership rights to those with the highest knowledge; conversely in the firm, who has the 
full decision rights (the owner) decides about the use of knowledge, by distributing inferior decision rights, hopefully, 
to those that are able to make the best use of their own knowledge. 
18 As Langlois and Cosgel (1993) sustain, in line with the Knight’s perspective, business people can take decisions in 
presence of radical uncertainty on the basis of ‘judgment’; ‘with judgment we convert our lack of knowledge about the 
classification of outcomes into a form that can be used for action’ (Langlois and Cosgel, 1993). In this perspective, the 
firm arises as a form of ‘cephalization’– rather than centralization -  of the market organization with the assignment of 
certain individuals to leadership positions. In the firm, ‘the owner directs the hired manager and control his or her 
function by using judgment of the manager’s capabilities. Similarly, the manager has other employees whom he or she 
controls using judgment of them, and so on’ (Langlois and Cosgel, 1993). In this perspective, different degrees of 
decision rights are attributed on the basis of different individuals’ knowledge that make individuals at different 
hierarchical levels to make the best use of their knowledge.  
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to generate externalities, that is, to facilitate the communication of rich 
information for purposes of qualitative coordination, innovation, and 
remodularization. (Langlois, 2002) 
 
Among such rights, only the alienation right allows to reach a ‘complete’ modularity; in fact, it is 
the right to sell or to destroy the asset that gives the owners the final say (Langlois 2002). As 
Langlois (2002) contends,  
‘Granting an individual both control and alienability is clearly a more complete 
modularization than granting control alone, since the owner with alienability 
needs to engage in less explicit coordination with others to use the asset 
effectively under all circumstances’.  
The firm represents a case of ‘hard modularization’ that may facilitate modular innovation, namely 
innovation takes place through changes in the module without changing the way the module is 
related to the other parties (Langlois and Robertson 1992). In this context, publicly known 
standards help the development and coordination of internal routines (productive capabilities). 
However, when continuous learning takes place, standardized interfaces are necessarily in flux so 
that other relatively less non-modular organizational forms may represent a more efficient answer 
to coordination problems. As Langlois (2002) argues ‘[…], unpredictable novelty may make any 
hard encapsulation undesirable, calling instead for “loosely coupled19” development teams’ 
(Langlois 2002). Transactions are to some extent encapsulated because the changing technology 
of production does not allow standardizing interfaces among different parties. Thus, instead of 
highly non-modular hierarchical firms, other hybrid organizational forms (ex. joint ventures and 
other collaborative arrangements) may arise characterized by ambiguous boundaries in which 
neither party owns complete (alienable) decisions. These non-modular organizational forms 
provide qualitative coordination of their complementary activities with the subsequent potential 
emergence of innovative activities (Langlois 2002). In this context, the development of 
coordination capabilities20 - in support of qualitative coordination - becomes essential to 
coordinate complementary activities in their experimenting phases (Richardson 1972).  
 
The central role of learning and new knowledge for the ‘efficient’ emergence of non-modular 
organizations sheds light on the innovative technology of production as the main determinant of 
                                                      
19 A precise meaning of the vague term ‘loosely coupled’ may be ‘modular but not fully decomposable’ (Langlois 
2002). 
20 Such argument, according to Langlois, is consistent with the idea of modularization developed by Richardson (1972) 
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the encapsulation of transactions21 (Langlois 2002). Indeed, when learning is taking place, as seen 
above, standards cannot persist and remodularization may be inevitable. In this case, the 
possibility of sustaining over time both modular and systemic innovation22 without being 
completely hindered by the fixed costs of remodularization, depends on the existence of a just-
embedded system (Garud and Jain 1996). A system in which visible design rules (standards) are 
sufficiently fixed and unambiguous to sustain modular and architectural innovation but also 
adequately loose to encourage a systemic technological progress. However, building a just-
embedded system is not at all an easy solution, because it largely depends on path dependency 
(Langlois 2002).  
 
The Modularity theory – thanks to its building blocks - provides a theoretical explanation of the 
history of the organizational modularity over the last century on the basis of different levels of 
mundane transaction costs. With the alternation of highly dynamic periods and relatively more 
static ones - mundane transaction costs have shown to have a secret life cycle (Langlois 2006). In 
dynamic periods DTC are high and, hence, bring about vertical integration. However, in so far as 
the market expands and becomes increasingly predictable, DTC decrease and it becomes 
profitable sustaining the fixed set up costs of standardizing the production system to coordinate it 
through the modular market23. Consequently, when DTC are low, vertical disintegration occurs 
with a reduction of production costs due to the effect of standardization on the subdivision of 
labor24. In this way, Langlois (2006) explains in theoretical terms why division of labor has been 
accompanied by the vertical integration phenomenon described in the Visible Hand (1977) by 
                                                      
21 In this regard, Langlois says that ‘in all cases, the technology of production both causes and shapes the resulting 
nonmodular interconnections’ Langlois (2002). 
22 Modular innovation is the innovation that takes place through change in the modules; while, architectural 
innovation is that in which the parts remain the same but the architecture connecting them changes. It involves 
recombination, but not remodularization (that is a change in the visible design rules). Systemic innovation is the one 
that involves change in the visible design rules.  
23 It is helpful to take into account the distinction made by Langlois and Savage (1997) between standards with 
coordination function (already discussed) and those with an economies-of-scale function. While the first are social 
institutions favoring coordination, the second one, by reducing variety, allows an increase of the market on the basis 
of which economies of scale arise. Such standards are different but interrelated (Langlois and Savage, 1997). 
Coordinating standards, by reducing transaction costs, sustain also the setting of the standards required for 
economies of scale; by regularizing expectations, increase the predictability of the extent of the market, which 
enables the setting of economies-of-scale standards (Langlois and Savage, 1997). 
24 The relation between DTC and mechanization is more complicated. As the market expands still further, it may start 
to pay not to subdivide the tasks further (which would increase further the phenomenon of vertical disintegration) but 
to integrate tasks within a machine, with the effect of turning transaction back into transfers. However, 
mechanization can also turn transfers in transactions when, in presence of coordination costs, the output of 
production is predictable (ex. ATM machines). 
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Chandler and then by the vertical disintegration synthetized in the concept of the Vanishing Hand 
(Langlois 2003).  
 
1.1.2. The central role of uncertainty 
 
Noticeable is the distance of the Modularity theory from the mainstream transaction cost theory 
that goes under the name of the ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) (Williamson 1975, Coase 
1960, Demsetz 1967). Both literatures recognize to property rights a fundamental role for the 
emergence of firms, but, as sketched above, they mainly focus on different functions of such 
rights. While the NIE is mainly interested in the incentive benefits of ownership rights and 
considers the presence of highly specific assets as the main reason for the emergence of firms; the 
MTF focuses on the division of knowledge benefits that allow modularization and, thus, an 
efficient management of uncertainty (Langlois 2002). Indeed, what mainly separates the two 
literatures and brings to different answers about why firms emerge, is the different consideration 
for uncertainty. Whereas in the NIE, uncertainty creates inefficiency along with opportunism 
(Williamson 1985), in the MTF, radical uncertainty is the main source of organizations’ inefficiency, 
as opportunism could not be possible without uncertainty (Langlois 1984). According to the 
author, radical uncertainty is the ultimate real responsible of the ‘hold up’ phenomenon in case of 
investment in specific assets, not opportunism (Langlois 1984). Self-seeking behaviour is just a 
parametric information problem; among all contingencies, there is a state of the world labelled 
‘opportunistic behaviour’. In this case, the real problem is the lack of structural information that 
makes it possible the adoption of that behaviour.  Different, in fact, is uncertainty emerging as a 
lack of structural knowledge from that emerging from a lack of parametric knowledge. Imperfect 
parametric knowledge - characterizing neo-classical theory - is the lack of knowledge about which 
state of the world will occur but implies complete knowledge of the structure of the maximization 
problem. Conversely, imperfect structural knowledge produces radical uncertainty as it represents 
a lack of knowledge about all the possible states of the world and actions and about all the 
possible ways such states and actions relate to the agent’s utility (Langlois 1984). In particular, in 
presence of ex ante competition25, Langlois (1984) maintains that opportunism emerges in two 
cases; at the time of contract renewal and to the extent that one can renege on a contract with 
legal impunity. In both cases the problem is imperfect structural knowledge: in the first case 
                                                      
25 Otherwise, the risk of opportunism does not emerge because of radical uncertainty, but because of ex-ante fewness 
of transaction alternatives (Demsetz, 1968). 
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because all contingencies are not foreseeable in detail and, hence, do not allow a long-term 
contract; in the second case, because specifications cannot be adequately detailed, and so the 
contract cannot protect against opportunism. In line with this perspective, the Modularity Theory 
highlights that what matters is not providing incentives by allocating the claim on residual income 
to one party, but promoting modularization by allocating residual rights of control to those that in 
an uncertain context are able to make a best use of the assets. Indeed, as Langlois (2002) argues, 
“Even if no one is worried about the possibility of “hold-up” or the expropriation of rents, it still 
may be worthwhile to assign to only one of the parties the residual control rights over a package of 
assets if that party has comparative advantage in making the decisions” (Langlois 2002). 
 
Anyway, even if incentives are not considered as the main reason for the emergence of firms, they 
still have an important role. In line with Jensen and Meckling (1992), the author points out that 
the organization has to solve not only the right assignment problem (determining who should 
exercise a decision right), but also the control or the agency problem (how to ensure that self-
interested decision agents exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational 
objective) (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). According to Langlois (2002), the alienability right ‘[…] 
solves both the problem of knowledge decentralization and the problem of incentives: the asset 
may be placed under the control of the person whose knowledge best equips him or her to use it, 
and alienability disciplines the owner’s use of the asset by making its value (to which the owner has 
a residual claim) measurable on a market’ (Langlois 2002). In this perspective, both market and 
hierarchy provide adequate incentives. However, in the case of hierarchy, it is implicitly assumed 
that most of the decision rights can be exerted in a centralized way because the production 
process - highly standardized - is cheaply monitored. When, conversely, the economic activity is 
complex such as in professional services (Langlois and Savage, 1997), the production process 
cannot be standardized but requires human judgment. In this circumstance, Langlois and Savage 
maintain that the network structure results to be more efficient than hierarchy and market; 
thanks to not-too-strict standards, the network overcomes DTC and sustains innovation (solving 
the right assignment problems), while providing the incentives of market competition (solving the 
agency problem)26 (Langlois and Savage, 1997).  
                                                      
26 “By concentrating decision rights at the top, the firm can in principle overcome both the narrowness of knowledge of 
the individual participants and the vestedness of decentralized decision rights. But such centralization of authority 
comes at the cost of misaligned incentives to the extent that it removes decision rights from the hands of those who 
must actually execute the routines of production. In a mature firm of the sort Alfred Chandler (1977) describes, such 
problems of agency are tolerable because operations are typically characterized by repeated, consistent replication of 
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In conclusion, the Modularity Theory focuses on how structural uncertainty – emerging in 
innovative production technology – affects organization modularity and modularization. The 
modular market, thanks to standards, enables external economies of scope and modular 
innovations. However, with economic change, the market faces high DTC, so that transactions are 
encapsulated within non-modular organizations. Firms are not always the most efficient solution; 
when change is particularly high, it is more efficient to share decision rights with other parties in 
loosely coupled structures. Within such ambiguous boundaries a common advancement of 
knowledge and the innovation of complementary activities are sustained. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
known routines. Such routines tend to be measurable at various stages of production, and so lend themselves relatively 
well to formal monitoring schemes, including documentation, accounting trails, and supervision of employees (Barzel 
1982). Clearly, organizations of this sort are not obviously well adapted to the problems of professional production .” 
(Langlois and Savage 1997) 
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1.2. The Co-Productive Role of the Customer and Customer Uncertainty 
 
1.2.1. Customer Uncertainty as the Source of Radical Uncertainty   
 
Recognizing the customer’s uncertainty in consumption decisions is the first step to understand 
how the organization may find a source of inefficiency in the interactions with its customers. In 
this regard, the economic literature has increasingly recognized that the neo-classical customer 
(Lancaster 1971; Stigler and Becker 1977) is not endowed with all the knowledge required to 
maximize his/her own utility and that, hence, he/she is uncertain in taking consumption decisions 
(Langlois and Cosgel, 1996). However, how the customer’s uncertainty may affect organizational 
efficiency is still an open question. Our attempt in this section is to identify the conditions under 
which the customer’s uncertainty becomes a source of radical uncertainty for the organization 
and, hence, to provide a rationale for such analysis within the Modularity Theory of the Firm.  
 
At the end of the last paragraph, we have shown that the complexity of the economic activity may 
play a central role in defining the relative efficiency of modular and non-modular organizations. 
Langlois and Savage (1997) show that professional services are complex and, hence, more 
efficiently organized in the network form than in the hierarchical form. However, what such study 
misses to explicate is the specific role of the customer’s uncertainty in the ‘varying concrete 
circumstances’ the provider has to face (Langlois and Savage 1997) and its consequences on the 
relative efficiency of different organizational forms. In this regard, a few service marketing studies 
explicitly identify customer’s uncertainty as a source of inefficiency for the organization, which 
affects its boundaries (Bowen and Jones 1986) and internal marketing decisions (Pitt and Foreman 
1999). In particular, Bowen and Jones (1986) identify input uncertainty as a form of user’s 
uncertainty that emerges because of the diversity and unpredictability of the demands and 
because of the on-site participation of the user (Bowen and Jones, 1986). When the services are 
highly intangible and complex (as in case of health care and long-term care services), input 
uncertainty is high and the most efficient way to reduce transaction costs27 is to include the 
customer within the boundaries of the organization, in what they call a relational hierarchy. 
However, in such studies ‘complexity’ is a too vague term to understand why some economic 
activities should be differently organized to face customer’s uncertainty. Of course, intangibility of 
                                                      
27 In particular, the authors identify two source of transaction costs: performance ambiguity (due to the high 
intangibility of services and the low standardization of the production mode) and goal incongruence (source of 
opportunism). Both are involved in the “nature” of the service. 
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services makes it more difficult for the customer to take decisions, but also products may be 
complex enough to create uncertainty for the consumer. The issue, hence, is about the real source 
of service/product complexity, namely the complexity of the need to be satisfied, which can create 
different levels of customer’s uncertainty. Moreover, the relation between customer’s uncertainty 
and productive efficiency is largely omitted even if the client's inclusion in the firm boundaries 
reflects nothing but his/her own participation to the production process and, hence, to the 
generation of production costs. In the rest of the section we will address the first issue about the 
characteristics of service complexity that translate customer uncertainty in a source of radical 
uncertainty for the organization. The second issue – the relation between production and 
transaction costs, and customer uncertainty - will be studied in the next paragraph. 
 
In general terms, organizations have to do with real customers, not with the ones theorized by the 
neoclassical approach; since real customers cannot build a well-defined system of preferences nor 
choose the product and services that maximize their own utility, they are to be regarded as 
structurally uncertain. Anyway, consumers usually take consumption decisions; in fact, the more 
the good/service is standardized, the more the customer is able to acquire on the market the 
information and, hence, the consumption capabilities required to take a buy-or-not decision 
(Langlois and Cosgel, 1996). In line with the concept of complexity developed in the first 
paragraph, we consider complex the products and services whose production process involves 
large interdependences due to the transfer of non-standardized knowledge. Despite the great role 
of standardized productions in our economic system, not every complex production can be 
standardized, because not all the customers’ needs can be completely homogenized and, hence, 
satisfied in the same way. Examples are health care, education and the professional needs. For 
instance, health depends on many different factors (medical, psychological and social) so that the 
same symptoms could have been determined by different reasons and, thus, require different 
treatments. Similarly, educational needs change among persons so that not always the same 
educational strategy is able to reach the hoped results. 
In general, their complexity is due to the fact of involving not well defined cognitive, social and 
psychological components; it is promoted by technological progress but also by the culture and 
important institutions like the legal system that in a path dependence perspective do not allow 
neither the provider to orientate the services toward any standardization nor the customer to 
acquire on the market any consumption capability. In this case, the consumer is not able to take 
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any consumption decision because he/she does not clearly know all the characteristics of such 
complex needs and how these should be managed in order to be satisfied. The provider, in turn, 
cannot clearly know which service to produce if not by involving the customer in the production 
process through which he/she may be satisfied. Such participation allows the customer to 
untangle the different facets of his/her own needs and for each facet to orient the provider in 
order to being personally satisfied. For instance, a personalized interaction with students allows 
the teacher to understand if students have any educational gaps or learning difficulties and, thus, 
to define a more effective personalized educational plan. However, personalization of the 
production process – namely the involvement of the customer in the production process - may 
occur also as an organization’s strategical choice of personalizing needs. In this case, needs may be 
regarded as ‘artificially complex’ and the organizations - not only the service organizations but also 
the manufacture ones – have to decide to what extent introduce cognitive and emotional 
dimensions and, hence, involve the customers in the production process28. In this regard, an 
example is the customer’s need for wedding dresses. Many sellers propose a selection of wedding 
dresses among which future spouses can choose. However, there are boutiques with fashion 
designers and tailors able to produce a personalized piece by involving the customer in the design 
and production phases. As it will be better shown in par.1.2.3., when needs are artificially 
complex, the organization can choose which is the most efficient modularization level. 
Independently of the source of need complexity, however, when the customer’s personal and 
idiosyncratic knowledge is required in the production process, the firm faces - what in line with 
Bowen and Jones (1986) we call - ‘input uncertainty’, that is a structural form of uncertainty in the 
transaction with the customers due to the necessary providers’ judgement in the production 
process29. Such uncertainty is due to service structural unpredictability, namely the customer’s 
structural inability to formulate a choice because he/she misses adequate information and 
consumption capabilities. Only an increased availability of information - made possible by open 
access to the production process – would increase consumption consciousness. In this regard, ICT 
technologies may play an important role in facilitating the customer’s involvement in the 
production process, allowing managing complexity through the transformation of well-defined 
and specific needs into standardized inputs of the production process. Customer’s unpredictability 
                                                      
28 From now on, anyway we talk about just service complexity and not product complexity. We justify such choice by 
recognizing that to the extent that the customer is involved in the production process, indeed the organization in that 
moment is providing a service. Moreover, when we talk about service complexity we refer to the specific case in 
which complexity is due to non-standardized knowledge transfers with customers. 
29 Capability introduced by Knight (1921) and reintroduced by Langlois and Cosgel (1993). 
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increases in so far as the satisfaction of the complex need requires that the professional judgment 
is exerted by more than one professional in the production process. In this case, the customer 
expresses a highly complex need, such as a long-term need. In fact, the customer’s decision 
capability further decreases to the extent that the service has to be redefined over time across 
different states of the world. Satisfying their needs over time becomes increasingly difficult for just 
one provider’s repertoire of routines, skills and mentality. 
 
In conclusion, while standardization always reflects an organization’s ability to standardize 
customers’ complex needs, personalization may be the necessary result of the needs’ inherent 
complexity (health care, long term care, education etc.). When the customer, because of need 
complexity, is not able to take a decision the only solution is to personalize the production 
process, that is to make the customer partaking in the process. This fact produces a radical form of 
uncertainty, input uncertainty, which, as it will be shown in the next section, is a source of dynamic 
transaction costs and, especially, of uncertain production costs for the organization.   
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1.2.2. Dynamic Transaction Costs (DTC) and Unexpected Production Costs (UPC) 
 
We have seen that when the customer’s needs are – inherently or artificially – complex, the 
production process is to be personalized, turning, hence, the customer’s structural uncertainty 
into structural uncertainty for the organization (input uncertainty). I contend now that input 
uncertainty is a source of production (in)efficiency that is directly influenced by organizational 
modularity. Within the Modularity Theory, modular organizations are responsible for 
organizational efficiency (minimization of TC, DTC and PC) and define the way production 
efficiency is reached (in the market, within hierarchy or in other organizational forms midway 
these two extremes)30. Here I contend that when input uncertainty is high, the organizational form 
is directly responsible also for production efficiency; dynamic transaction costs, in fact, show their 
‘productive side’ in the fashion of unexpected production costs. These are the costs of not having 
accumulated the capabilities required to personalize the production process with the customer.  
 
Dynamic transaction costs are the main mundane transaction costs that emerge unexpectedly in 
presence of input uncertainty. In this context, they can be considered as the costs of persuading, 
negotiating, coordinating with the final customer for satisfying his/her own complex need. The 
other mundane transaction costs (transportation and coordination costs) are expected because 
always resulting from an organization’s strategy to focus on specific market segments. In 
particular, transportation costs may emerge as the result of an organization’s strategy to provide a 
personalized transportation service. Coordination costs, as well, arise mainly as an organization’s 
personalization choice, since in many cases they could be cost-effectively solved by mechanization 
(ex. ATM machines). On the contrary, DTC may emerge unexpectedly and independently of the 
specific organization’s strategy, as in case of inherently complex needs.  
 
How do dynamic transaction costs show themselves in case of input uncertainty? In the 
Modularity Theory, uncertainty is about the economic change that - if not adequately addressed 
by the organization- prevents technological progress and organization survival. In that context, 
dynamic transaction costs arise as costs that the organization undergoes in acquiring production 
capabilities for not having adequate coordination capabilities. Conversely, input uncertainty arises 
                                                      
30 For instance, in presence of economic change, efficient is a non-modular organization that – while providing 
adequate incentives - efficiently overcomes dynamic transaction costs and, hence, guarantees organization’s survival 
over time (Langlois 2002; Langlois 2006). And consequently, the production process results organized within the non-
modular organization. 
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as a personalizing change of the current production processes (through the required customer’s 
involvement) that, if not adequately addressed by the existing coordination/production 
capabilities, determines productive inefficiency. In other words, analysing the effects and costs of 
input uncertainty means analysing the production process at any point in time, that is to ‘stop the 
time machine’ and look back at the accumulated capabilities31, which are direct responsible for 
the efficiency of the current production process32. In this context, DTC , before showing 
themselves over time, show their ‘productive side’ in the current production process, that is the 
production costs of not having accumulated so far the  capabilities required to coordinate with 
customers. We call such costs unexpected production costs. For instance, in health care and LTC 
service sectors, patients may decide to start legal actions not because of negligent injuries but  
because of emotional distress or psychological injuries. Differently from the usual and ‘foreseen’ 
production costs, the unexpected production costs arise in the fashion of mistakes, damages, 
misunderstandings, legal actions etc., and more broadly of ‘unpredictable’ resource losses related 
to the lack of coordination/production capabilities. Once the time machine has been restarted, 
DTC emerge again as the transaction costs of acquiring the production capabilities one needs over 
time (Langlois and Robertson 1995), and, this way, also as the costs of improving production 
efficiency (reduce UPC) over time.   
 
In general, in the Modularity Theory, production and transaction costs are strictly related because 
both the technological progress and transactions are a matter of organizational capabilities33 
(Loasby 1998; Langlois 2002): coordination capabilities among parties are required to sustain the 
common development of production capabilities. In case of input uncertainty, however, 
transactions are especially a matter of capability because production efficiency (the level of the 
UPC) directly depends on the way the provider coordinates with the customer, that is on the 
coordination/production capabilities accumulated so far. Such coordination capabilities in fact are 
necessary to personalize the production process for they allow creating a shared language system 
with the customers in the production of services. In fact, as Langlois and Cosgel (1996) argue, 
                                                      
31 As Loasby (1998) argues, capabilities “[…] are in large measure a by-product of past activities, but what matters at 
any point of time is the range of future activities which they make possible” Loasby (1998). 
32 In par.1.3. it will be shown that also motivation is responsible for the lack of capabilities and that the internal 
organization is responsible for the motivation as well. 
33 “[…] the line between production costs and transaction costs is far more blurry than one finds it to be in the 
literature of organization. One cannot take production costs as given and then explain organizational form or the 
boundaries of the firm on the basis of the costs of transacting (however one defines those) alone. For one thing, 
transacting is also an activity that requires skill, and the costs one incurs in transacting are thus a matter of ones’ 
capabilities” (Langlois and Cosgel 1996). 
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[…] agents do not automatically share “common knowledge” of the structure of 
production and consumption, of the menu of choices available. The economic 
problem of production becomes a coordination problem: discovering — or, 
rather, helping to create — an interpersonally shared structure of transaction. 
Just as conversation cannot take place without shared structures of meaning, 
transacting cannot take place in an institutional vacuum. In both cases, the 
problem of coordination is one of sharing structure. Meaning, indeed, is always a 
matter of structure. A signal — a piece of information — is meaningful only in 
terms of some structure that can interpret it. (Langlois and Cosgel, 1996) 
 
Coordination capabilities not only sustain the development of production capabilities over time, 
but are directly adopted in the production process involving customers and, hence, directly affect 
production efficiency at 𝑡0, 𝑡1 etc. Consistently, organizational efficiency should be evaluated not 
only on the basis of the coordination and productive capabilities developed for technological 
progress, but – when input uncertainty is high – also on the coordination/production capabilities 
developed to promote production efficiency: coordination capabilities in fact are themselves 
production capabilities when the customer is directly involved in the production process.  
 
The only experience, skills and intuitions are not sufficient for the provider to ‘judge’ what to 
produce in case of professional services; he needs to involve the customer’s idiosyncratic 
knowledge within the production process. The greater is the exchange of knowledge, the more the 
provider can know what the customer wants, in particular whether he/she needs a high or low 
personalized service. In this regard, I define a service as highly personalized when it involves a 
large use of customer’s idiosyncratic knowledge in the production process, and lowly personalized 
when it is produced without such knowledge. For instance, in case of health care services, 
customer’s knowledge obtained in the diagnostic phase allows the practitioner understanding 
whether the customer needs an ad hoc therapy or a more standardized one. In this context, the 
creation of a common structure of knowledge with the customer- thanks to 
coordination/production capabilities - is functional to the exertion of a conscious provider’s 
judgment, which in turn directly affects the UPC level. In line with Langlois and Savage (1997) – 
considering professionals’ knowledge transfers as a source of innovation, I maintain that overtime 
integration of additional practitioner’s knowledge (through meetings, conversation, conventions, 
scientific papers etc.) maybe functional also to productive efficiency, but only indirectly in terms of 
the personalization of the production process. 
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There are cases in which the conscious professional judgement has to be exerted by more than 
one professionals within the production process. In this case, we talk about highly complex needs. 
Long term needs are an example of this type of needs; as they change through different states of 
the world, the provider may be unable to preserve over time a common structure of knowledge 
with the customer. Common structure is necessary to evaluate which level of personalization is 
required and, hence, reduce UPC. By using the same example above, after the therapy, the patient 
may keep on suffering the same symptoms as before. In order to make the best use of the 
customer’s idiosyncratic knowledge in developing a new therapy, it may be required the 
integration of idiosyncratic knowledge of other professionals with similar or complementary 
specialties; a psychologist’s intervention may show that the symptoms are now due to a 
psychological problem. More broadly, the intervention of other providers’ knowledge in the 
production process allows to directly reduce UPC, thanks to different routines, mentality and 
specialization in the different states of the world.  
 
Consistently with the Modularity Theory, I maintain that the new production routines and the new 
ways the provider applies existing routines can represent innovation (Langlois and Savage, 1997) 
that may increase production efficiency, by promoting a progressive reduction of the repeated-
but-still-unexpected production costs across customers or with the same customer over time. In 
this sense, input uncertainty can be considered also as a specific source of innovation activity that 
emerges in the production process.  
 
To sum up, when input uncertainty is high, organizational efficiency cannot be evaluated without 
considering its effects on production efficiency. Coordination and production capabilities result 
two sides of the same coin; coordination capabilities directly affect production efficiency by 
enabling the creation of a common knowledge structure with the customer, which is required to 
reduce UPC in the production process. UPC are not DTC, but are strictly related to them; the 
former represents the way in which DTC show themselves at  𝑡1, 𝑡2 etc. in the production process. 
The levels of UPC and DTC are highly correlated; the former reflect the productive side of the 
latter so that a low level of DTC means a potential increase in production efficiency over time; in 
fact, when DTC are low it means that new personalization capabilities can be efficiently acquired 
and, hence, that the UPC level tends to decrease.  
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1.2.3. Organizational and production efficiency  
 
In case of input uncertainty, the relation between organizational and production efficiency results 
more intricate than in the general Modularity Theory. In this theory, the two types of efficiency 
just interact; productive efficiency is not influenced by the organization as it can be reached both 
in the market and through hierarchy; what matters is just minimizing the sum of DTC, TC and PC 
when DTC are high or low depending on the dynamic of the economic environment (Langlois 
2002, 2006). On the contrary, when input uncertainty is high, organizational and productive 
efficiency not only interact, but the former is directly responsible for the latter, through the 
presence or lack of productive/coordination capabilities. In this context, focusing on allocative 
efficiency as source of productive efficiency is misleading as it would not allow to adequately 
judge neither the quality of the production process nor the related role of the economic 
organization. To this regard, in an evolutionary framework, Langlois (1984) provides a functional 
definition of organizational efficiency which - differently from the comparative one adopted by the 
New Institutional Theory - calls into question allocative efficiency in order to evaluate the different 
organizations’ ability to sustain knowledge advancement. However, a consistent definition of 
production efficiency is required too that – instead of deriving from allocative efficiency – finds its 
roots in the organizational ability to generate knowledge. In this section, I show that in case of 
need complexity, as knowledge advancement may occur during the production process, firms 
hardly can minimize their costs. As UPC are high, organizational modularity affects production 
efficiency more than what allocative efficiency does. In particular, I argue that UPC level depends 
on the organizational culture which in turn is affected by the type of standards adopted in the 
production process and the internal allocation of decision rights. In fact, both organizational 
elements– by directly affecting workers’ activity - determine the ability of the organization to 
satisfy the customers’ complex needs. New indicators of production efficiency, hence, are 
required that allow identifying the role of these organizational elements on UPC and measuring 
UPC as a percentage of total costs over time.  
 
The evolutionary study within the Modularity Theory aims at recognizing – despite path 
dependency reasons – the function offered by different modular organizations over time; in this 
perspective Langlois (2002; 2006) reinterpretation of Chandler’s Visible Hand and the ensuing 
identification of a Vanishing Hand (Langlois 2003) is fundamental. The adoption of a different 
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efficiency standard to explain the emergence of firms in an evolutionary perspective is justified by 
the existence of structural knowledge imperfections (Langlois 1984), which cannot be taken into 
account by neoclassical allocative efficiency. According to Langlois (1984),  
 
“the incompleteness of structural knowledge makes it impossible to assess the market in 
efficiency terms. To suggest that the economic system is an evolving or learning process in 
which new knowledge is constantly being created is to suggest that there does not exist a 
fixed allocation problem against which efficiency may be judged. Efficiency, at least insofar 
as it implies a comparison with some postulated global allocation problem, is simply the 
wrong standard. The economy is not inefficient because of imperfect structural knowledge; 
it is simply a-efficient. The reality is not wrong because it doesn't fit the model; the model is 
inapplicable because it doesn't fit the reality. Now, one may wish to argue that, for basic 
price-and-allocation theory in some of its forms, the difficulties of incomplete structural 
knowledge may be safely ignored, allowing one to go on talking meaningfully about 
efficiency in the usual way. But one cannot argue this with respect to the theory of internal 
organization — at least if one accepts my assertion that changing structural knowledge is 
at the heart of that theory.” (Langlois 1984) 
 
 Therefore, efficiency is evaluated as an ex post reconstruction of the organization’s function, 
which in turn is identified on the basis of an axiomatically identified goal/means framework and is 
specified on the basis of the faced (dynamic versus static) environment (Langlois 1984). In this 
perspective, efficient is the organization that achieves a goal by minimizing the use of the means 
to reach that goal. And an organizational form (existing or not) is the most efficient among the 
existing organizational forms – if it is the ablest to economize on the means to reach the same goal 
(Langlois 1984). The issue, hence, is to identify among the existing (but also conceivable) 
organizational forms, the one that is most efficient in performing its function. As Langlois (1984) 
rightly observes, the importance of such type of efficiency is more limited than that elaborated 
within the NIE. In the comparative institutional framework of the NIE, explaining why an observed 
organizational form is the most efficient is equivalent to explaining why that organization is 
observed. Conversely, in an evolutionary framework explaining why an organization exists requires 
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also a path dependence investigation34. Hence, the most efficient organizational form is never the 
optimal organizational structure, but just the most conceivably efficient; as knowledge changes, 
other organizational forms may be invented that may better perform the function at hand. In this 
study, by omitting the path dependency reasons, I will focus on the functionalist explanation of 
organizational efficiency. Before analyzing production efficiency in case of complex needs and 
investigating to what extent organizations are functionally efficient, I will show under which 
conditions production efficiency cannot be considered as necessarily deriving from neoclassical 
allocative efficiency. 
  
We have seen above that knowledge imperfections, in case of complex needs, produce along with 
DTC, also UPC in the production process. In this case, I argue – in line with the Leibenstein’s 
concept of x-efficiency (Leibenstein 1966) - that allocative efficiency becomes relatively irrelevant 
for production efficiency. In fact, in the neoclassical theory, allocative efficiency produces a 
diligent management of given resources that determines the firms’ production efficiency. The 
assumption is that organizations have stable production functions through which they produce 
maximum output, given a certain amount of input. Therefore, competition leads the organizations 
to reallocate resources in order to minimize their costs. However, the assumption about given 
resources and static production function cannot be maintained when production cannot be 
completed without additional and emerging knowledge in the interaction between customer and 
producer (in case of complex needs) and among producers (in case of complex and long-term 
needs). For instance, in health care services, patients provide information necessary to provide the 
right treatments. In other words, in an ideal perfect market competition, organizations aiming at 
satisfying complex needs, would never minimize their production costs, nor they would receive 
sufficient information to reduce UPC through the price which anonymous customers may be 
willing to pay. At the equilibrium point, on the one hand, marginal costs cannot reflect the 
existence of UPC, as these costs are due to missing input (knowledge) and technology (namely of 
not having acquired knowledge and capabilities required for satisfying complex needs). On the 
other hand, the price does not provide adequate information about the customer’s needs; 
because of need complexity, the organizations have to involve the customer in the production 
process in order to obtain fundamental information and develop capabilities about how to satisfy 
                                                      
34 According to Langlois (1984), the existence of a specific organizational form is not only due to its a priori superiority 
but also to its history, so that different organizational forms may be both inadequate to efficiently face existing 
environments. In this research, we are interested just in the functionalist part of the complete explanation. 
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him/her. In fact, the economic system is not endowed with all the knowledge required to satisfy 
complex needs. The lack of such knowledge determines unexpected production costs, that is 
errors and waste of resources.  
 
This argument partially supports the Leibenstein’s intuition about the existence of x-inefficiency35 
which goes unnoticed in equilibrium models. Stigler, in his critique to x-inefficiency, accuses 
Leibenstein for not having provided a theory of waste because X-inefficiency – as described by 
Leibenstein - could be easily attributed to specific inputs. And to this regard, he makes an 
example; if two similar farmers obtain different amount of corn, and hence produce at two 
different production frontiers, the less productive farmer should attribute his worse outcome to 
some factors, which hence should be reallocated (Stigler 1976). However, I argue that another 
story is producing goods and services that aim to satisfy complex needs. Here firms need to 
integrate customers’ knowledge to be able to produce and, as different customers may be more 
or less able to express their needs, it may happen that the required knowledge is not available. For 
instance, in case of health needs, the patient may show symptoms that do not necessarily are to 
be attributed to the right illness. May be the illness is still to be discovered, or the patient may be 
unable or feel ashamed in providing additional elements that help a right diagnosis. In this case, 
UPC depend on the lack of the input (knowledge), not on its misallocation. Moreover, neoclassical 
theory has a great inconvenient, that of eliminating the problem of technological change due to 
knowledge advancement and, hence, the change in the production function itself. In case of 
complex needs production, such problem is fundamental as knowledge advancement obtained 
during the production process to some extent changes also the currently used technology through 
the development of new capabilities. During the production process with one specific client, the 
provider may progressively improve his/her ability to interact with all the customers in order to 
receive the right information. This means a progressive change of the technology of production, 
that is the production function. UPC are here the costs of not having acquired the capabilities 
required to satisfy the customer. The lack of correct knowledge to assess the patients’ illness may 
be also due to the inability of the provider to interact with the patient. Again, such costs cannot be 
                                                      
35 Leibenstein’s (1966) conceives x-inefficiency as the degree of inefficiency which arises in the market because 
contracts for labour are incomplete, not all factors of production are marketed, the production function is not 
completely specified, interdependence and uncertainty lead competing firms to tacitly cooperate (Leibenstein 1966). 
In particular, Leibenstein identifies as sources of inefficiency the psychological pressure the different economic agents 
face and the burden of the habits, inertia and routines. However, he was accused of not having provided a formal 
theory of waste or empirical proof of the existence of x-inefficiency (Stigler 1976). Here, the identification of input 
uncertainty in case of need complexity may lead to a first attempt of providing a theory of waste. 
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explained as resulting from a misallocation of resources, but as the lack of the optimal amount of 
knowledge about how to satisfy complex needs.  
 
Therefore, the theorization of UPC as expression of dynamic transaction costs in the production 
process, makes allocative efficiency a quite irrelevant standard for understanding the 
organizations’ production efficiency in case of complex needs. In fact, the assumption of cost 
minimization does not allow to recognize UPC as additional to PC that emerge as resource waste, 
errors, clients’ claims, and which in the end directly depend on the organizations’ capacity to 
create new knowledge, foster coordination and, hence, productivity. According to a functionalist 
perspective, efficient is the organization that minimizes the use of resources to reduce customer 
uncertainty related to the satisfaction of complex needs. Now, we investigate to what extent 
organizations are functionally efficient in presence of this type of uncertainty.  
 
In the previous paragraph, we have seen that the organization is directly responsible for 
production efficiency by sustaining knowledge advancement in the production processes at 𝑡1, 𝑡2 
etc. which involve both interactions customer-provider (in case of complex needs) and provider-
provider (in case of complex and long-term needs). When needs can be standardized, input 
uncertainty and UPC are negligible and, hence, production efficiency largely depends on scale, 
specialization and scope economies that minimize PC. In this case, production efficiency can be 
considered as mainly depending on allocative efficiency; the use of strict standards and monetary 
incentives by the organization, sustains a standardized organization of the production process, 
which is consistent with the use of the modular market as main coordination mechanism in the 
promotion of allocative efficiency. On the contrary, when needs are complex, input uncertainty is 
high and production efficiency largely depends on the organization’s ability to sustain efficient 
providers/workers’ activity (involving knowledge advancement) and, hence, manage UPC. In fact, 
despite the important role that ICT technologies may play in facilitating the customer’s 
involvement in the production process, satisfying complex needs implies the use of labor intensive 
technology on which depends the level of UPC. In the next sections, it will be shown that 
production efficiency (the level of UPC) depends on the organizational culture and in particular on 
the presence of democratic and open management. However, measuring the impact of 
organizational culture on productive efficiency is hard without objective measures. By referring to 
the Modularity Theory and behavioral theory, in the next sections, it will be shown that two, in 
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particular, are the organizational factors, related to organizational modularity, in charge of 
production inefficiency overtime; (1) the level of standards - constraining or enabling  providers’ 
knowledge advancement and the related production/coordination capabilities - and (2) the 
allocation of control rights, which may or may not incentivize the development of such 
capabilities. These organizational elements can be objectively measured by using working time 
(and related cost) as unit of measurement and, hence, by building different indicators of 
production efficiency that look both at the role of standards and workers’ effort. In particular, 
concerning the role of standards, the costs of standards can be measured as the cost of time spent 
to satisfy standards and subtracted to a personalized interaction with the customer. When 
standards are strict, we expect large UPC. Concerning the allocation of decision rights that affect 
the incentive structure, the costs can be measured as hours of absence from work because of 
sickness or injuries. In case of a hierarchical governance, workers - not feeling empowered - are 
expected to become ill or injure themselves to a large extent and, therefore, UPC are expected to 
be high. Both indicators help the organizations to evaluate their role on reducing UPC over time 
and in comparison with other organizations.  
 
At institutional level, the way standards are promoted is crucial to determine efficiency because – 
as we have seen - UPC and PC are driven by opposite levels of standardization. While UPC are 
reduced by existing coordination/production capabilities in the production process and, hence, 
require a few and general standards; the latter are reduced by hard standardization of the 
production process, which allows scale and specialization economies. Recognizing such opposition 
is extremely important to understand alternative possible paths of innovation in presence of 
intrinsically complex needs. The risk –in line with the prospect advanced by Industry 4.0 – is an 
indiscriminate application of standards at any organizational level to the purpose of reaching 
complete control of the production process and, thereby, reduce PC. In fact, when production 
process is aimed at satisfying intrinsically complex needs the perception of control is just illusory; 
the way input uncertainty reveals itself continuously changes and requires an answer that only 
human beings can efficiently give on the basis of their professional judgement and their flexibility. 
In this case, the cost of having invested in mechanization and automation is not repaid by savings 
due to increased control over the production process as UPC reasonably increase, even if maybe 
repaid by large reductions in labour costs and increased economies of scale, as it will be better 
shown in section 1.2.5.  
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In conclusion, the functionalist perspective of organizational efficiency not only helps to evaluate 
organizations in an evolutionary context, but also in a productive context. In fact, uncertainty and 
knowledge advancement may largely characterize production, making, hence, allocative efficiency 
a wrong standard for explaining productive efficiency. As UPC do not depend on resource 
misallocation, but on the lack of structural knowledge about how to satisfy customers’ complex 
needs, the role of the organization for production efficiency becomes fundamental. In case of low 
input uncertainty, production efficiency depends on the level of PC that is minimized thanks to 
allocative efficiency. Instead, in case of high input uncertainty, production efficiency is sustained 
through the participative governance of the organization and in particular through 1) allocation of 
decision rights that incentivizes intrinsic work motivation and 2) the adoption of loose standards 
(not only in the production process but also in the broader economic activity) that support over 
time the development of coordination/production capabilities. The use of indicators based on 
working time allows measuring UPC as a percentage of total costs in case of low and high input 
uncertainty (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 – Source of production efficiency in case of standardized and complex needs 
 
Source: Author’s contribution.  
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1.2.4. Organizational modularity in presence of input uncertainty 
 
In strategic management and industrial economics literatures the relation between product 
modularity and organizational modularity has been addressed by a number of studies (Sanchez 
and Mahoney 1996; Brusoni and Prencipe 2001; Sanchez 2000; Langlois 2002). While Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996) focuses on the conditions under the basis of which product modularity enables 
organizational modularity; within the Modularity Theory, Langlois (2002) highlights that the 
relation is not deterministic and, in particular, that environmental dynamicity (economic change) 
intervenes in defining the modularity level of the production process and, hence, of the 
organization36. I intervene in such debate by recognizing a fundamental complication in the 
relation between modular product/service and modular organization. I argue that such relation is 
mediated (and made complex) by the complexity and variety of the customers’ need, which – 
being factor to be integrated in the production of services, especially those to the person - make 
different organizational forms more or less functional to reach production efficiency over time. 
The issue is not whether and to what extent modular products design modular organizations and 
vice versa, but to what extent need complexity allows to efficiently modularize product/services 
and the organization. On the basis of the three types of need complexity identified above – 
artificially complex, inherently complex and highly inherently complex – I identify and ‘predict’ 
three different efficient levels of organization modularity.  
 
1.2.4.1. Artificially complex needs and organizational modularity 
 
According to Sanchez (1999), modular product architectures can be used to generate product 
variety and mass-customization, which in turn are able to target more finely grained customer 
preferences (Sanchez 1999). However, as sketched above, customers are uncertain (Langlois and 
Cosgel, 1996) and can acquire consumption capabilities only their needs can be standardized.  
Therefore, the possibility of generating mass customization products depends in the end on the 
type of need the organization is addressing. In this regard, I argue that when need complexity can 
                                                      
36 For instance, the case of the automobile industry (Langlois and Robertson 1989) shows that periods of rapid 
remodularization of the production process often gives rise to the (highly nonmodular) forms of organization. The 
production techniques adopted for Model T were a remodularization of the manufacture of automobile parts. During 
the experimentation of the production process, interfaces were necessarily in flux. Hence, such experimentation 
required authority that the ownership rights on most of the stage of production allowed avoiding the DTC of bringing 
outside players into the process. The result was a highly centralized internal organization in presence of radical 
change. When change slowed, production was re-decentralized (Langlois 2002). 
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be managed by the organization, the application of a modular architecture to the product enables 
organizational modularity in the way Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) suggests:  
We suggest that although organizations ostensibly design products, it can also 
be argued that products design organizations, because the coordination tasks 
implicit in specific product designs largely determine the feasible organization 
designs for developing and producing those products (Sanchez and Mahoney 
1996) 
It is an organization’s strategic choice that of maintaining need complexity and, hence, include the 
uncertain customer in the production process of the product/service. The organization decides to 
what extent involving the customers in the production process on the basis of a cost/benefit 
evaluation; the loss of profit opportunities - due to the loss of scale, specialization and scope 
economies - should be more than compensated by the savings for not having adopted standards 
and by profit opportunity for addressing a niche market. In fact, in so far as the production process 
is personalized, production efficiency increasingly depends on the reduction of UPC and the 
possibility to obtain such economies is limited. A ‘compromise’, in this regard, may be to 
modularize the product/service in order to involve the customer in just a few modules as in case 
of hobbyists37 (Langlois and Cosgel, 1996). In this way, the customer’s participation, for instance, 
to the design modules can be a source of different cost economies, by allowing a reduction of R&D 
costs, test market costs, promotion cost etc. Moreover, the modules, despite their internal 
complexity, are connected through standardized interfaces so that the non-standardized 
coordination with customer in a few production phases does not prevent the standardization of 
the overall production process. And in line with Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) a standardized 
production process enables the modular coordination of the production system.  
The impact of product modularity on modular production process and organization are well 
synthetized by Sanchez and Mahoney (2012);  
‘If a firm adopts a modular architecture development process in which it (i) first 
focuses on defining and then standardizing (i.e., freezing) the interfaces between 
the functional components in a modular architecture, and then (ii) constrains the 
development of all components to conform to the standardized interface 
specifications for the modular architecture, then the tasks of developing 
                                                      
37 ‘[…], hobbyists were terribly important in shaping the structure of the early microcomputer industry (Langlois 1992). 
These were largely final consumers — people who wanted their own computers for personal amusement. Not only did 
no consultancy services exist on the market, few of the necessary complementary capabilities existed on the market. So 
end-users integrated backward into the production of many components. And because these hobbyists did not possess 
the range of capabilities typical in large computer firms, each was forced to concentrate only on a small subset of 
complementary activities, which necessitated standardization and modularity in architecture to permit autonomous 
innovation.’ (Langlois and Cosgel 1996) 
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individual components become "loosely coupled" and can then be undertaken 
simultaneously by distributed development centers’(Sanchez and Mahoney 2012) 
Depending on the cost/benefit evaluation the organization decides which type of market to 
address (niche or mass market) and, accordingly, how to modularize the production process and 
the organization. When the choice is for a mass customized market, complexity of the need and, 
hence, of the product/service is reduced and the production process is efficiently organized in a 
modular way. The organizational form of the economic activity may result highly modular as well, 
but, in line with Modularity Theory, it is not necessarily modular; this aspect could depend on the 
level of DTC in presence of economic change. On the contrary, when the choice is for a niche 
market, complexity of the need is high and we will discuss below such a case with reference to 
inherently complex needs.  
 
1.2.4.2. Inherently complex needs and organizational modularity 
 
The role of need complexity in mediating the relation between product and organizational 
modularity is well identifiable in the case of inherently complex needs. More than products, in this 
case we deal with services, which can be reasonably assimilated to production processes. On the 
one hand, even in case of products, to the extent that the customer is involved in the production 
process, indeed the organization in that moment is providing a service. Moreover, inherently 
complex needs are especially satisfied by professional services (such as health care and legal 
services). Such overlapping between service and production process allows to focus our attention 
on the relation between production process modularity and organization modularity. In case of 
inherently complex needs, the production process cannot be completely modular because the 
customer does not have the consumption capabilities to satisfy his/her own vague need and the 
provider has to include the customer in the production process if the will is to produce a service 
that answers the customer’s needs. In this case, we have seen, production efficiency largely 
depends on the UPC level.  And if the production process/service is non-modular (since the 
customer is included in the production process), then the organization of the production system 
cannot be modular as well.  This is because not only productive efficiency (the level of UPC) 
depends on the way the provider coordinates with the customer, but also because the way the 
provider coordinates with the customer depends on the level of coordination/production 
capabilities accumulated so far by the provider. A modular production process would produce high 
UPC, and if supported by completely modular coordination with the customer would produce high 
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UPC also over time as the capabilities required are not developed. On the contrary, the creation of 
‘ambiguous’ boundaries with the customer, that involve some sharing of decision rights, would 
reduce UPC and more broadly UPC over time. The production process, however, should not be 
completely non-modular; even if the application of production routines is not standardized (it 
requires professional judgement), the applied routines are standardized (Langlois and Savage 
1997). By not imposing how the production process should be performed, such standards enable 
the development of coordination/production capabilities with the customer in the production 
process. Moreover, standards support not only loose coordination between the customer and the 
provider but also among providers themselves according to a process of pigeonholing38; on the 
one hand, the customer can identify the type of professional he/she needs, on the other hand, 
professionals can organize themselves in different specialties and subspecialties and, thus, know 
when they should interact with each other (Langlois and Savage, 1997). In line with Langlois and 
Savage (1997), I argue that in case of complex needs, the most efficient organizational form for 
professional services is a loosely coupled structure, the network, but the reason is also another and 
equally important. For Langlois and Savage (1997), the network is the most efficient because - 
while providing competition incentives like the market – it supports the advancement of 
knowledge like hierarchy (Langlois and Savage 1997). In presence of input uncertainty, however, 
another reason justifies the network structure as the most efficient modular organization: its 
support to production efficiency. Differently from the highly modular organization of the 
production process that can occur both in the market and in hierarchy, the network structure 
enables knowledge sharing with the customer in each production process at any point in time and 
more broadly the development of coordination/production capabilities required to create a 
common structure of knowledge with the consumer, which is functional to the reduction of UPC. 
Moreover, over time the network allows other providers to indirectly contribute to production 
efficiency thanks to the integration of idiosyncratic knowledge in other contexts (personal 
meetings, conventions, scientific papers etc.). 
  
                                                      
38 identified by Mintzberg(1979) and cited by Langlois and Savage (1997): ‘clients are sorted into categories according 
to which subset of standardized tools best fit their needs’. (Langlois and Savage 1997) 
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1.2.4.3. Highly complex needs and organizational modularity 
 
The efficient modularization level changes in case of highly complex needs (for instance long term 
needs satisfied by long-term care services and educational services). If the customer does not 
know today the characteristics of the needs to be satisfied, he/she even more does not know 
them when they change through different states of the world. In this case, the UPC level depends 
not only on the provider’s capabilities to involve customers but also on the coordination 
capabilities developed with other providers in order to directly integrate their idiosyncratic 
knowledge in the production process. In this case, standards should enable a highly non-modular 
production process. In fact, the provider has to exert professional judgment by taking into account 
the customer’s idiosyncratic knowledge and the knowledge emerged in the interaction with other 
similar and complementary professionals.  Consistently the organization of the economic activity 
should be highly non-modular. On the one hand, the organization should sustain ‘ambiguous’ 
boundaries provider-customer because, by sharing some decision rights on the production process 
with the customer, the provider can exert a professional judgment that reduce UPC. On the other 
hand, the organization of providers should be non-modular to support through qualitative 
coordination (Langlois 2002) the exchanges of varied knowledge, human routines, skills and 
mentalities required to satisfy the customer. Differently from the case of complex needs, here the 
non-modular organization of providers is directly functional to the increase of productive 
efficiency over time because any advancement of knowledge is directed to shape the professional 
judgement in each production process. 
However, since the production process is non-modular, the non-modular organization of the 
economic activity cannot be hierarchical. In fact, the centralization of information would limit 
internal knowledge transfers (Hayek, 1967). What instead is required is an internal structure based 
on rules that - even if not formally defined - always results from the interaction between the 
organization and the customer and in which knowledge transfers are more flexible and open than 
in the case knowledge has to pass through a center (Hayek, 1967). Accordingly, in such a structure, 
providers, differently from the network of professionals, share the ownership on 
production/coordination knowledge to perform their day to day operations with co-productive 
customers.  They become workers, whose autonomous professional judgment is exerted by taking 
advantage of the common capabilities produced in the interactions with the other workers during 
the production process. And on the basis of widely accepted rules, they coordinate their efforts to 
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create qualitative coordination with customers. In general terms, we can assume that 
organizations face similar proportions of clients with uncertain needs if they provide services 
aimed at satisfying the same typology of needs. However, organizations with a good reputation 
about the capability to provide personalized solutions, could attract clients with higher level of 
uncertainty as these attribute a higher value to such organizations’ capability. The same occurs 
concerning the objective complexity level of the need; organizations with a good reputation about 
the capability to obtain good results in case of complex needs, could attract this category of 
clients. 
 
To sum up, need complexity has been identified as a fundamental reason for explaining the 
relation between modular product/service and modular organization. Need complexity defines to 
what extent the production process can be modularized and, hence, which organization 
modularity level is efficient. In fact, when needs are complex, the organization – through its 
standards and coordination capabilities - directly affects the level of non-modularity in the 
production process, by allowing more or less participation of the customer to it. In this case, 
organizational efficiency directly determines productive efficiency influencing the level of UPC. 
Input uncertainty does not always emerge; need complexity can be sometimes the result of an 
organization’s strategic choice to address a niche market on the basis of a cost/benefit evaluation. 
However, when input uncertainty emerges because of inherent need complexity, standards have 
to enable coordination/production capabilities with the customer and the most efficient 
organization is a network organization that enables ‘ambiguous boundaries’ between provider and 
customers while supporting over time non-standardized coordination with other providers. In case 
of highly complex needs, standards – besides enabling coordination/production capabilities with 
the customer – have to support also the development of coordination capabilities among 
providers. In this case, the most efficient organization is a non-modular and decentralized 
structure in which also providers share some decision rights thanks to common ownership on the 




Table  1 – The effect of modularity of production on the modularity of the organization depending 
on the type of need. 
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1.2.5. The Non-Vanishing Hand 
 
As seen in section 1.1.1, Langlois (2006) explains the historical passage from vertical integration 
(described in the Visible Hand by Chandler) to vertical disintegration with the reduction of DTC 
over time, and synthetizes the concept with the expression Vanishing Hand (Langlois 2003). 
However, I argue that the growing importance of customer uncertainty for economic 
organizations partly complicates the analysis, as such type of uncertainty prevents the complete 
modularization of the economic system. 
 
The role of the customer has radically changed since the beginning of the 19th century. In the 
Western countries, the customer is no longer satisfied with standardized and anonymous mass 
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products and services. Moreover, for cultural reasons, the customer feels involved in the 
production process of services when needs satisfy human rights such as health care, long term 
care, education. As needs become increasingly complex, production efficiency reasons prevent the 
adoption of modular production processes and, hence, of modular organizations. At organizational 
level, customer uncertainty involves that organizational efficiency depends on production 
efficiency (UPC – due to lack of capabilities in the production process - are the ‘productive side’ of 
DTC). Instead, at managerial level, it means that no productive efficiency consideration can be 
achieved without an adequate analysis of the organizational structure. With high customer 
uncertainty, UPC and DTC are large and modular organizations are inefficient against them. Thus, 
customer uncertainty determines the degree of freedom of economic agents to modularize the 
production process and the organizations’ architecture toward the market structure. In other 
words, it slows down the vanishing hand process described by Langlois (2003), indeed supporting 
an opposite phenomenon which could be defined as Non-Vanishing Hand. In this scenario, 
elements of mechanization and automation that favor economies of scale and specialization, can 
be efficiently introduced but only if not directly used to manage input uncertainty. Otherwise, 
their presence would be not only ineffective, but even counterproductive as it could instigate 
unexpected and costly customers’ reactions. When needs are complex, UPC make it highly difficult 
to reach scale and specialization economies. In this case, the solution may be to enter in deep 
contact with the customer and understand whether there are parts of the production process that 
the customer can learn to do autonomously or that can be standardized without the risk of 
increasing UPC.  
 
However, input uncertainty can be also faced by adopting an alternative strategy, risk-pooling. 
Instead of facing directly customer’s uncertainty, this is transmitted to insurance companies that 
collect customers’ risks. In this way, the organization has the advantage to enlarge its dimensions 
and address a larger number of clients, with the possibility of introducing mechanization and 
automation in most of the production process and, hence, increasing economies of scale and 
specialization. Therefore, the responsibility about which path to follow to face input uncertainty, is 
on the institutional environment in which the economic organizations play. The crucial role of 
public institutions should be considered especially in case of customers’ needs promoting 
fundamental human rights, as by adopting the risk-pooling strategy, customers’ needs are not 
satisfied by the organization. What may happen is that while higher level institutions 
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(Constitutions) defend formally the existence of fundamental rights – lower level institutions 
(ordinary national and regional laws and regulations) define strict standards concerning how to 
perform the production process. In this way, in fact, the human right content of such needs is 
challenged as regulation may force organizations to introduce bureaucracy and standardization 
and exclude the customer from the production process. As UPC are likely to be high, the 
organizations implicitly adopt the risk-pooling strategy against input uncertainty. Today, high 
standardization of the organizational processes is wrongly justified by the need to increase control 
over production and is enhanced by the prospects of Industry 4.0. In the highly-standardized 
health care and long-term care sectors, hospitals and nursing homes make implicit use of risk-
pooling strategy by paying insurance premiums against the risk of patient claims. Indeed, all these 
organizations need to ensure themselves but only those not investing in production capabilities 
(reducing UPC), are likely to make larger use of risk-pooling. Such strategy, however, is costly as 
may lead customers to start litigations even in the absence of workers’ errors. It has been shown 
that in the US most malpractice claims indeed do not actually involve a negligent injury as two 
important studies implicitly show; the Harvard medical practice study (Brennan et al. 1991) and 
Utah/Colorado medical practice study (Studdert et al. 2000). Also, emotion distress and 
psychological injuries can cause claims (Stevenson and Studdert 2003) and, hence, increase the 
level of LTC insurance premiums. Therefore, by adopting a risk-pooling strategy, input uncertainty 
- along with producing UPC in the production process39– affects the organization’s reputation and 
contributes to determine the level of the insurance premiums paid. And, insofar as customers, for 
cultural reasons, will increasingly expect to receive high-quality personalized services, insurance 
premiums may become progressively non-affordable. 
 
In conclusion, from a functionalist perspective, we have no way of knowing ex ante which strategy 
– investing in capabilities or in risk-pooling – is the most efficient today for economic 
organizations. However, since such services may promote fundamental human rights, 
organizational efficiency cannot be the only source of economic concern. In fact, private UPC may 
become social costs; in so far as client’s demand is not satisfied, the consequence could be a 
reduced level of population health, with consequent high social costs. This argument should be 
taken into account by policy-makers that usually are called to subsidize such organizations for 
equality reasons.  
                                                      
39 including also the costs for customer claims in terms of time, administrative costs and attorneys’ expenditure. 
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1.3. Non-Modularity and Intrinsic Motivations 
 
1.3.1. DTC as Lack of Intrinsic Motivations 
 
 
The Modularity Theory holds that the main reason for the emergence of non-modular 
organizations is the overcoming of DTC, which – by hindering a smooth coordination among 
agents – prevent tacit knowledge transfers and, hence, knowledge advancement. Whether such 
costs reflect also the low individual effort in transferring tacit knowledge is overlooked by this 
evolutionary theory. Yet, since the effort employed in tacit knowledge transfers cannot be 
monitored nor measured, free riding could occur. In this paragraph, after having introduced the 
behavioral studies on the role of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tacit knowledge transfers 
(Frey, 1997; Osterloh, Frost and Frey 2002), I show that DTC may partly emerge as lack of intrinsic 
motivations to work, which support knowledge sharing. Then, by enlarging the evolutionary 
perspective to a behavioral one, I discuss to what extent non-modular organization may efficiently 
reduce DTC by sustaining intrinsic motivations rather than extrinsic ones. I maintain that while the 
sharing of alienation rights supports weak extrinsic motivations to knowledge transfers, the 
internal distribution of decision rights promotes cooperation in knowledge, insofar as it meets 
workers’ intrinsic motivations to work, in particular, the satisfaction of customers’ needs. Then, in 
par. 1.3.3., I argue that the network’s horizontal coordination and the bottom-up emergence of 
participative governance in firms are the most effective in reducing UPC respectively in case of 
complex and highly complex services.  
 
Over the last few decades, behavioral economics has recognized in intrinsic motivations –along 
with the extrinsic ones – a fundamental engine of economic activity and, more specifically, of 
knowledge advancement. Extrinsic motivations occur when individuals can satisfy their needs 
indirectly through monetary compensation. Conversely, intrinsic motivations are addressed when 
the individual finds immediate satisfaction in undertaking an activity, in relation to the activity’s 
flow, to a self-defined goal or to the obligations of personal and social norms for their own sake 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997). The first type of motivation supports competitive behaviors, the 
second one supports cooperation, trust, accountability (Tyler and Blader, 2000). As crowding 
effects characterize the relation between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations (Frey 1997), the 
organizations’ role is to carefully define the set of incentives so as to avoid that intrinsic 
motivations – when required - are crowded-out by extrinsic ones. In particular, intrinsic 
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motivations are required when agency problems cannot be solved by monitoring. Inter alia, this 
occurs when agents are required to provide effort that enhances tacit knowledge transfers. When 
the individual is the only producer of knowledge advancement, he/she can be compensated 
according to his/her contribution to final output and, hence, the organization can adequately 
adopt monetary incentives. Instead, in case of tacit knowledge transfers, the person cannot be 
compensated on the basis of his/her particular effort as a ‘social dilemma’ arises (Osterloh, Frost 
and Frey, 2002); in fact, the contribution of tacit knowledge to a team cannot be measured 
(problem of asymmetric information) and the danger is the undersupply of such resources40 by 
individuals who cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of the others’ efforts (problem of 
free riding). In this case, the organization’s role should be to manage extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations in order to avoid that extrinsic motivations dampen the individuals’ source of intrinsic 
motivations to work (Frey 1997) and, hence, that individuals free ride when their effort or output 
is not observable and measurable. More specifically, the organization’s role should be to reduce 
the use of monitoring, sanctions, and bonuses, as these practices may reduce self-determination 
and shift the locus of control from inside to outside the person (Osterloh, Frost and Frey, 2002). 
Conversely, the organization promotes intrinsic motivations by involving individuals to the 
definition of common goals; by fostering the emergence of self-organization and by sustaining 
personal relationships that raise the intensity of intrinsic motivations to cooperate and, more 
broadly, team spirit (Osterloh, Frost and Frey, 2002).  
 
Modularity Theory does not recognize the presence of a social dilemma in the high levels of DTC. 
Here opportunism – emerging because of structural uncertainty - is explicitly considered in the 
facets of hold-up risk and the risk of free riding in effort levels to produce knowledge 
advancement (Langlois 2002). No role it plays in determining low effort levels in the transfer of 
tacit knowledge and, hence, in the increase of DTC. However, in the light of the behavioral 
perspective above described, I argue that DTC partly reflect the existence of such social dilemma. 
Their emergence is due not only to the cognitive distance, among different agents, produced by 
decentralized markets, but also to the lack of trust and cooperation spirit necessary to sustain the 
individual effort toward the creation of a common ground for knowledge integration. So far, DTC 
                                                      
40 In this perspective, organizational tacit knowledge is called a ‘firm-specific pool resource’, namely a good (1) whose 
access is restricted to members of the firm in question, and (2) firm members have open access. As a consequence, 
firm members may free ride on such resources of the firm. While in case of Ostrom’s common pool resources, the risk 
is the overuse, in this case the risk is the undersupply. 
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have been considered high in the modular market because standards and decentralized ownership 
rights create ‘physical barriers’ to tacit knowledge transfers and, hence, increase the costs of 
persuading, negotiating and coordinating with other agents. However, such costs are reasonably 
high also because the modular market supports competition and mistrust, rather than trust and 
cooperation, and crowds out intrinsic motivations to work necessary to support tacit knowledge 
integration. For this reason, the level of DTC depends on the incentive structure provided by 
economic organizations. In this perspective, which is both evolutionary and behavioral, the 
behavioral social dilemma arises in an evolutionary economic environment in a so fundamental 
way that, in fact, the origins of innovation and economic change resides not just in the evolving 
interaction between modular and non-modular economic organization, but firstly in the way 
human beings shape their own environment in order to be incentivized by it to work. In particular, 
the non-modular organization emerges because it is thought out as a place adapt to support 
individuals’ intrinsic motivations to work whose satisfaction requires prolific knowledge transfers 
among agents.  
 
In conclusion, because of a social dilemma, intrinsic motivations to work- rather than extrinsic 
ones – are the most able to support efficient tacit knowledge transfers. DTC partly reflect the 
existence of such social dilemma and, hence, require organizations able to incentivize knowledge 
transfers. As the modular market produces extrinsically motivated coordination that crowds out 
the agents’ intrinsic motivations to work (Frey, 1997; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Osterloh, Frost and 
Frey 2002), the issue is to understand whether and to what extent non-modular organizations 




1.3.2. Non-modularity as support to the agents’ intrinsic motivations 
 
In the Modularity Theory, non-modular organizations – by repartitioning ownership rights in 
different hands – allow a ‘less explicit’ coordination than the modular market (Langlois 
2002;2006). The centralization of ownership rights in few hands facilitates the integration of 
knowledge and, hence, lower DTC by reducing the physical and cognitive distance among agents 
who are no longer independent owners in a decentralized context. But it is not clear to what 
extent the centralization of alienation rights also incentivizes the decrease of DTC. According to 
Langlois (2002), alienation rights are the only useful incentives provided by non-modular 
organizations; such rights not only protect against the hold-up risk, but also provide adequate 
incentives to the owner by making the value of the asset (to which the owner has a residual claim) 
measurable on the market (Langlois 2002). Even if the agent was tempted to free ride, the owners’ 
alienation right on the asset would incentivize the agent to contribute maximum effort anyway. 
Similarly, tacit knowledge transfers would be incentivized by the increased value of the asset on 
the market. In Langlois and Savage (1997), such point is made explicit; professionals are interested 
in sharing their tacit knowledge in the professional network because the increased knowledge 
would allow them to sell their services at a higher price. This argument is plain when the individual 
agent is the only responsible for the asset value or when individual effort is measurable and can 
be proportionally paid back. But it is unconvincing that the increased market value is sufficient to 
incentivize tacit knowledge transfers when neither individual effort nor output can be measured. 
In this case, sharing alienation rights on the final output provides weak incentives to cooperate to 
knowledge advancement. As Osterloh, Frost and Frey (2002) argue, in presence of a social 
dilemma “[…] firm members have to choose whether they follow a competitive course of action 
that furthers their own interests at the expense of others, or contribute to a cooperative solution 
that furthers joint interests (Osterloh, Frost and Frey 2002). In other words, in presence of a social 
dilemma, the profit interest backed by alienation rights is poor compared to other more 
contingent interests. The possibility to alienate the (portion of) assets is likely to be less 
incentivizing than the possibility to save energy at work in order to have fun at night. Individuals 
more likely decide on the basis of motivations that are related to their working activity and 
environment, including personal relationships, and that in fact may determine for the most part 
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the quality of their job and lives41. In this context, it is fundamental that the organization’s 
ownership rights support intrinsic motivations to work that favor tacit knowledge transfers. In the 
light of such argument, the ownership rights can be distinguished in two classes – modular and 
non-modular - depending on their different ability to incentivize knowledge transfers and, hence, 
DTC decrease. Alienation rights (even when shared) can be considered as modular because they 
hardly incentivize the contingent individuals’ will to transfer tacit knowledge to colleagues. 
Conversely, internally partitioned decision rights can be considered as non-modular ones insofar 
as such rights – by sustaining worker’s self-determination through his/her own contribution to 
knowledge advancement – favor DTC reduction. In this regard, workers’ empowerment may be 
constrained/enabled by standards, hetero-defined rules, procedures and owners’ and managers’ 
authority. While the hierarchical organization – based on highly constraining standards and strict 
internal procedures – represents an organizational solution that limits workers’ active 
participation to knowledge growth; a decentralized organization – by sustaining the development 
of trust and cooperation – recognizes workers as the de facto owners of the possibility to transfer 
knowledge and empower them to contribute to knowledge advancement during their daily several 
activities. For this reason, the non-modular organization able to promote organizational efficiency 
through DTC reduction always adopts cooperative mechanisms to support knowledge sharing. This 
issue will be better addressed in the next paragraph where I analyze such problem with reference 
to complex and highly complex needs, namely in case the incentives to knowledge sharing affect 
also the efficiency of the production process (UPC).  
 
In conclusion, enlarging the evolutionary perspective to a behavioral one allows better 
understanding of non-modular organizations and, in particular, of their internal partition of 
ownership rights. The modular market shows high DTC not only because of the cognitive distance 
due to knowledge decentralization, but also because of its incentive structure that favors mistrust 
and competition. Instead, within non-modular organizations, the possibility to support knowledge 
transfer and the related organizational efficiency is assigned to a horizontal partition of decision 
rights. While shared alienation rights hardly incentivize cooperation, an internally decentralized 
                                                      
41 The crucial nexus is the one between ownership rights, intrinsic motivations, non-self-seeking behavior (trust and 
reciprocity), co-operation and knowledge generation. One basic question in this respect is: “Why intrinsic motivation 
should be linked to non-self-seeking behavior and co-operation?” Maybe be obvious, but we need to explain very 
well.   
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distribution of decision rights favors workers’ empowerment by supporting his/her own 
participation to knowledge advancement and, thus, promotes the overcoming of DTC. 
 
 
1.3.3. UPC and internal repartition of decision rights 
 
The enlargement to a behavioral perspective is especially compelling to understand how to 
incentivize transfers of tacit knowledge when these are functional to the efficient production of 
complex and highly complex services. In fact, knowledge integration - by supporting the growth of 
coordination/production capabilities – influences not only the level of DTC but also of UPC, here 
considered as costs due to under provided effort and the related underdevelopment of 
capabilities in service personalization. Given the functional role of knowledge sharing to 
organization and productive efficiency, it is important to establish how the organization supports 
the incentives required to personalize services in case of complex and highly complex needs.  
 
1.3.3.1. Professional Network structure  
 
In professional network, individual effort is measurable thanks to the increased value of the 
service on the market, so that extrinsic motivations may be regarded as sufficient. However, a 
social dilemma arises when providers are called to share their knowledge and new practices within 
the network. In Langlois and Savage (1997), the network organization incentivizes professionals’ 
tacit knowledge transfers thanks to alienation rights, and in particular to the increased market 
value that the service obtains due to knowledge transfers. However, such argument does not take 
into account that individuals may restrain such transfer because not only their knowledge may be 
a source of competitive advantage for themselves and for competitors, but also because their 
intrinsic motivations lead them to provide minimum effort, since they are only weakly related to 
market value. Therefore, I argue that what favors tacit knowledge transfers in the network is not 
much its similarity with the market (namely, the attribution of alienation rights to the individual 
professionals) but mainly its non-modular character, that is its support to providers who are 
intrinsically motivated to satisfy the customers’ needs. The network structure in fact – by adopting 
a limited number of standards and by fostering professional values, reciprocal esteem and trust - 
produces a decentralized partition of decision making rights that supports individuals’ intrinsic 
motivations to contribute to knowledge advancement in order to improve customer satisfaction 
over time. The adoption of few standards is consistent with the network goal to facilitate 
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knowledge sharing. Too strict standards, instead, would prevent professionals to share their 
knowledge, because of the fear to be sanctioned for not having followed shared procedures 
(Savage and Robertson 1997; Langlois and Savage, 1997). In addition, seminars, conventions, 
magazines support knowledge transfers that allow providers to indirectly allow the 
personalization of future services and, hence, increase the overall customers’ satisfaction. This 
leads to the reduction of the 𝑈𝑃𝐶1 over time (mistakes, damages, waste of resources, legal claims 
etc.).  
 
In conclusion, the network structure supports tacit knowledge transfers among professionals 
thanks mainly to the low standards and decentralized repartition of decision rights, which support 
their intrinsic motivations to ‘indirectly’ satisfy customers through their contribution to knowledge 
progress.  
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1.3.3.2. The emergence of Participative Governance  
 
In case of highly complex needs, the personalization of the service is the result of a work-team 
and, thus, the social dilemma emerges during the daily production process. Workers, while 
providing services, need to rely on the contribution of knowledge, experience and sensitivity of 
the other workers in order to deal with the customer’s personalized needs. If they are intrinsically 
motivated to satisfy the customer, they know they have to cooperate with the other providers. 
However, the opportunities to free ride with impunity occur continuously because of 
unobservability and contract incompleteness. For the organization, this means, on the one hand, 
an insufficient development of cooperation capabilities among providers and a related high level 
of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 (waste of resources, many injury- and sick- leave hours, legal claims etc.) and, on the 
other hand, an inadequate growth of capabilities in the interaction with the customer that leads to 
high 𝑈𝑃𝐶1. In this context, fundamental organization’s goal is promoting the reduction of 𝑈𝑃𝐶, by 
knowing that when workers are satisfied for having satisfied the customer, 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 are reduced, 
along with the 𝑈𝑃𝐶1. Thus, central role of the organization is supporting cooperation, reciprocity 
and trust among providers and with the user, by investing in communication and observation of 
the customers’ needs. In particular, the organization should promote workers’ capabilities in 
customer’s satisfaction through increased self-organization and self-control. The asymmetric 
information problem causing the social dilemma during the production process requires us to 
focus on the governance level that directly manages working relationships42.  In fact, even in case 
of a cooperative organization that necessarily adopts participative praxis in strategic decision-
making, the organization of daily production process could be hierarchical, namely characterized 
by an internal organization of labor based on vertical relations and strict respect of the way and 
                                                      
42 In general terms, corporate governance allows to reduce coordination problems due to asymmetric information 
and diverging interests among different stakeholders, especially shareholders and managers. According to Alagoa 
(2015), “corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and 
controlled. It essentially involves balancing the interests of the many stakeholders in a company, which include its 
shareholders, staff (including management), customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community; and 
provide the framework for attaining the company’s objectives” (Alagoa , 2015). Compared to corporate governance, 
cooperative governance shows a specificity related to the type of ownership which is the potential misalignment 
between individual and cooperative objectives of members (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2014). Cooperative organization are 
controlled on an equal voting right basis by different typologies of patrons (e.g. producers, workers, consumers). In 
this context, the additional role of governance is to reduce coordination problems of members related to different 
interests at individual and collective level. Concerning worker cooperatives, the governance - thanks to democratic 
mechanisms - supports strategic decisions consistent with economic sustainability, employment stability and goals of 
mutual benefits (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2014). However, we have seen that because of a social dilemma, the problem of 
misalignment between individual and collective interests can occur also during the daily productive activity. Because 
of this, our focus is on the specific governance level of working relationships. 
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time of implementation of production rules and procedures (standards and internal routines) 
established by the organization. In this case, since decision rights are maintained in the hands of 
the management, workers are essentially executors of the rules and procedures, and their 
greatest source of motivation is necessarily the extrinsic motivation, which risks to crowd-out the 
intrinsic one. However, because of social dilemma, it is required a cooperative governance over 
the daily production process characterized by an internal organization of labor based on inclusion, 
participation and horizontal relations and in which standards are sufficiently loose and general 
(not detailed and bureaucratized, not administered in a rigid way etc…) to facilitate the bottom-up 
development of rules. Decision rights are shared among workers who are able to exert their own 
professional judgment and, thus, to nourish intrinsic motivations and sense of responsibility to 
support the organizations’ goals (widely overlapping and coherent with employees’ goals). 
In the light of the evolutionary MTF perspective, this type of governance translates into a 
progressive participative governance, which is characterized by the sharing of decision rights on 
the organization and management of productive tasks that allows increasing self-organization and 
self-control of quality standards.  In fact, supported by the creation of a common strategy based 
on cooperation, trust and reciprocal esteem among members, workers participate to the 
organization of the production process, and then exercise decision rights on the way and time of 
implementation of the production process. This is the way in which a multi-stakeholder 
governance emerges. The appropriate ways and times are progressively self-managed by the staff 
on the basis of self-defined rules that the group applies to itself and shares. In this way, the 
participative governance is effective in incentivizing knowledge transfers among workers and, 




In this chapter, the study of the Modularity Theory of the Firm has allowed to investigate how 
customer uncertainty in the production process affects organizational efficiency and imposes 
constraints to the organizational architecture. What emerges is that production efficiency depends 
on the organization’s system of ownership rights and, in particular, the linked level of standards 
and type of incentives. In general, few standards and a decentralized repartition of decision rights 
enable and incentivize knowledge transfers among providers and with the customer, support the 
development of capabilities in the production process and allow to reduce the unexpected 
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production costs. Such costs are the ‘productive side’ of the dynamic transaction costs and emerge 
because of the lack of capabilities in the personalization of the product/service. Such capabilities 
concern the interaction with the customer (the lack of which leads to 𝑈𝑃𝐶1), but can also concern 
the interaction among providers in case the personalization of the services involves knowledge 
sharing among providers (the lack of which leads to 𝑈𝑃𝐶2). In case of complex needs, the 
boundaries with customers are ambiguous as some sharing of decision rights is required in order 
to favor the exchange of the customer’s idiosyncratic knowledge. The most efficient organization 
among providers (according to a functionalist perspective) is a loosely coupled organization in 
which decentralized decision rights enable and sustain – mainly through intrinsic motivations - the 
general advancement of knowledge among professionals aimed at improve the personalization of 
services over time. In case of highly complex needs, requiring the knowledge contribution of more 
than one provider, the most efficient organization (according to a functionalist perspective) is 
highly non-modular and internally decentralized. Such characteristics allow the required flexibility 
in the management of knowledge and sustain providers’ intrinsic motivations to transfer 
knowledge in the production process.  
In the following chapter, I am going to analyze in depth the role of customer uncertainty for the 
efficiency of the production process and, hence, how such uncertainty creates constraints to an 




Chapter 2. Customization or Standardization? Service modularization as 
efficient ‘compromise’ 
Satisfying customers occurs at some costs. The organization’s goal is to keep such costs under 
control through an efficient design and management of the production system. In both 
manufacturing and service settings, production costs can be minimized thanks to the 
standardization of the production processes, but unclear are the constraints to an efficient design 
due to the involvement of the customer both as input resource and as co-producer (Bowen and 
Jones 1986; Larsson and Bowen 1989; Pitt and Foreman 1999). In particular, customization is 
usually seen as expression of ‘luxury economy’, the privilege of a non-price-sensitive élite (Sundbo, 
2002), rather than expression of an efficient strategy against unexpected production costs due to 
customer uncertainty in the production process. The lack of clarity on customer’s role in service 
design does not permit to fully recognize in modularization the efficient ‘compromise’ between 
customization and standardization. According to Sundbo (2002) among the opposite 
standardization and customization tendencies, modularization appears a valuable third way, able 
to guarantee cost effectiveness while promoting customization (Meyer and de Tore, 2001; 
Sundbo, 2002; Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008). But, as seen in the previous chapter, cost 
effectiveness does not depend only on the traditional production costs, but it is also a function of 
the UPC level or, in other words, of the level of capabilities developed for satisfying the customer.  
Modularization, thus, supports cost effectiveness mainly as decomposition principle that - by 
minimizing interdependence between modules and maximizing interdependence within - 
separates what can be standardized from what cannot be, especially idiosyncratic knowledge 
transfers (Balwin and Clark, 1997; Langlois 2002). In this way, it allowing on the one hand, the 
exploitation of scale economies and, on the other hand, the development of the capabilities 
required for an efficient management of the system. In the first chapter, we have adopted the 
modularity principle to identify the constraints that customer uncertainty imposes to an efficient 
organization’s architecture; in this chapter, we analyze the conditions imposed at the level of 
production process design and management.  
 Service management and marketing literature will help us in this investigation thanks to their 
focus on the role of customer as input and as co-producer in the production processes (Bowen and 
Jones 1986; Larsson and Bowen 1989; Pitt and Foreman 1999; Ojasalo 2003). Even if customers 
can be involved in the production process of goods, in services the simultaneity of production and 
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consumption necessarily involves at least the presence, if not the active involvement, of the 
customer at the moment of production. Such literature, hence, will provide us useful conceptual 
tools to gain insights into how the service system should be designed and managed in order to 
satisfy customers’ complex needs. The main issue is investigating what is the balance between 
customization and standardization and, in particular, what is the efficient modularization level in 
service design to satisfy unique customers’ needs. Nowadays, two are the identified service design 
solutions; 1) mass-customized services resulting from the mixing and matching of standardized 
solutions and 2) tailored services obtained by customizing all the phases of the services. The first is 
characterized by high modularity level, the second one by minimum level. The ‘compromise’ 
modularization strategy, instead, is still in need of more extensive research. This chapter, 
therefore, addresses the following research question: how does modular service design and 
management contribute to efficiently manage customer uncertainty due to complex needs? 
In the first section, I theoretically investigate how customer uncertainty due to complex needs 
affects productivity and, hence, imposes constraints to service design. After having shown that the 
customer introduces uncertainty in the production process as input resource and as co-producer 
(Bowen and Jones 1986; Larsson and Bowen 1989), in the light of the service productivity model 
(Ojasalo 1999; Gronroos and Ojasalo 2004; Gronroos and Ojasalo 2015) I argue that service 
productivity is a function of internal efficiency (manufacturing based efficiency) and external 
efficiency, here defined not as customer’s quality experience (Gronroos 2000) but as the service 
quality promoted by the organization and, in particular, by its coordination/production 
capabilities. While external efficiency is pursued over time by reducing UPC (due to the lack of 
organizational/production capabilities); internal efficiency is obtained by minimizing PC. 
Moreover, UPC level along with PC level, may be considered as a fundamental indicator of the 
quality of service design and management. A low level of both measures indicates a high-quality 
service design and vice versa. Drawing on this conceptual framework, in the second section, I 
orient my evaluation about the platform application of the modularity principle (Meyer et al. 
2007; Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008), which is generally adopted in service design. I argue that 
such approach produces two inefficient forms of service design in case of customer uncertainty 
due to complex needs. The first form - obtained by mixing and matching standardized modules 
(mass-customization) – is inefficient because it renounces to reduce UPC over time and hence to 
improve external efficiency; the second one – obtained by customizing all the input resources and 
service phases (customization) - renounces to minimize PC by not creating standardized back 
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office phases in which pursuing scale economies. In par.2.1.3., in line with Larsson and Bowen 
(1989) suggestion about the need of separating front-office activities from back-office ones in 
presence of CU, I propose, the blueprinting approach as alternative method, based on the 
blueprinting technique (Shostack 1982, 1984, 1987). This service design method, by separating 
between onstage environment and backstage one, clearly identifies the customer’s role in service 
design (Bitner et al. 2007) and, hence, may constitute a valuable instrument to manage customer 
uncertainty. More than the platform approach, such technique lends itself to produce an efficient 
service design modularization: while in front-office UPC may be reduced through service 
customization, in back-office PC can be minimized through service standardization and 
consequent economies of scale and specialization. In this way modularization appears a good 
compromise in the search of a service productivity, which depends on two different sources, 
internal and external efficiency. In conclusion to the first part, I analyze the role of management in 
promoting an efficient service modularization. Consistently with the blueprinting service design, 
management style should be diversified so as to sustain the customization of the service phases 
involving high input uncertain and the standardization of supporting processes and services 
involving irrelevant input uncertainty. In case of front office services, internal marketing (Berry, 
1980; Gronroos, 1981; Foreman and Money, 1995) is an efficient strategy as the employees, once 
made to feel responsible- are motivated to satisfy customers; conversely, in back office services, 
hierarchical manager style is still efficient. 
In the second part, I apply the above-developed conceptual framework to the study of long-term 
care (LTC) services. Through need analysis, LTC need emerges as a complex need (Bohmer 2005; 
Antonovsky 1996; Tan K.-K. et al., 2014) that intrinsically requires customer participation to the 
service process both as input and as co-producer, leading hence to high customer uncertainty. The 
platform approach (Meyer et al., 2007; de Blok et al. 2009, 2010a) identifies a health care path 
made by strictly sequential processes whose goal is not health promotion (outcome) but the fluent 
implementation of each service process (output), which mainly involves the avoidance of risky 
factors. Indeed, the platform approach solution – by limiting the customer role in service process - 
renounces to manage customer uncertainty with the consequent increase of UPC. Conversely, the 
blueprinting approach promotes both external and internal efficiency by enabling different 
modularity levels depending on need analysis. In fact, because customer uncertainty is intrinsically 
related to the need to be satisfied, the provider should design and manage the service in order to 
allow the patient to find meaningful their roles, able to improve the quality of their life and to 
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support significant social interactions. The separation between front-office and back-office 
activities supports providers’ effort toward patient’s health promotion, while allowing to maintain 
PC under control. In conclusion, some managerial implications are exposed in order to sustain the 
exploitation of both external and internal efficiency sources. 
 
2.1. Modularization of services 
 
2.1.1. Need Complexity, Customer uncertainty and Service Modularization 
There are several ways in which the modularity concept can be applied to service design, but what 
is the most efficient one in case of users’ complex needs? It is difficult to answer this question 
without firstly investigating how customer uncertainty affects the efficiency of the production 
processes and, hence, imposes constraints to service design. In the service management literature, 
the role of the customer in service productivity is recognized in the concept of external efficiency, 
usually related to the customer’s quality experience (Gronroos 2000; Gronroos and Ojasalo 2004). 
However, so defined, external efficiency only allows a posteriori evaluation and not an adequate 
control of productivity in service design. In order to address such issue, I draw on the studies on 
customer uncertainty in service processes (Bowen and Jones 1986; Larsson and Bowen 1989; 
Ojasalo 2003), the service productivity model (Ojasalo 1999; Gronroos and Ojasalo 2004; Gronroos 
and Ojasalo 2015), and the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter. After having 
defined external efficiency as the service quality mainly promoted by the development of 
production capabilities – I posit that the unexpected production costs may be considered as an 
objective and direct measure of external efficiency and that their level constitutes, along with 
production costs (PC), valuable indicator of the quality of service design internally defined by the 
organization.  
The service management literature shows that customer uncertainty, through the customer’s 
involvement in the production process, largely affects service productivity (Larsson and Bowen, 
1989; Ojasalo 2003). Generally speaking, the customer participates and introduces uncertainty in 
the service process both as input resource and as co-producer (Ojasalo 2003). Customer’s inputs 
may include information, effort, physical possession (Larsson and Bowen 1989; Gronroos and 
Ojasalo 2004). When the customer’s inputs are relatively unknown before the service is provided, 
the customer may introduce uncertainty in the production process and require the adaptation of 
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the service process. According to Larsson and Bowen (1989) input uncertainty is: "[..] the 
organization's incomplete information about what, where, when, and how customer input is going 
to be processed to produce desired outcomes." Input uncertainty, in particular, depends on two 
environmental variables, the level of demand diversity and of customer’s disposition to participate 
to the service process (Larsson and Bowen 1989). The diversity of demand refers to the 
uniqueness of the customer’s need to which the organization can respond by designing a more or 
less customized service. The customer disposition to participate refers to the customer's tendency 
to assume an active role in supplying labor or information inputs to the service production process 
(Larsson and Bowen 1989). In case of needs that can be standardized, input uncertainty is low (the 
customer’s inputs consist just in his/her own presence and standardized information) and, hence, 
the user’s co-producer role likely consists in following a strict script. On the contrary, in case of 
complex needs, input uncertainty is large. The need to be addressed not only is unique but also 
not clearly understood by the customer, who, hence, may be unable at the beginning to 
adequately express the knowledge required to be satisfied by the provider43. Thus, the customer 
adds uncertainty as input because he/she is unaware of his/her own input and, as co-producer, 
because he/she does not know any script to follow. In this case, only the reciprocal adaptation – 
through information exchange with the provider – can reduce this customer’s difficulty and, 
hence, the uncertainty in the production process. 
 
Because of customer’s involvement, service productivity has been considered as a function not 
only of traditional internal efficiency, but also of efficacy or external efficiency (Gronroos and 
Ojasalo 2004). The first corresponds to the traditional manufacturing-based concept of production 
efficiency and, hence, is regarded as depending only on the production technology adopted. The 
latter reflects the customer perceived service quality, which is based on the customer’s experience 
of two quality dimensions; the functional quality of the service process and the technical quality of 
the outcome (Gronroos 1983). For this reason, external efficiency depends on how the relation 
evolves with the company over time and, in particular, with front office employees (Gronroos and 
Ojasalo 2004). In particular, it depends on a mutual learning experience in which both parties – 
                                                      
43 Because of need uniqueness, the customer-provider interaction is complex and the interdependence type 
dominating the customer-provider interaction is neither sequential nor pooled, but reciprocal (the output of each 
becomes the input for the others), even if other minor different interdependence types may exist as well (Larsson and 
Bowen 1989). 
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customer and employees - learn how to interact with each other (Gronroos and Ojasalo 2004; 
Gronroos and Ojasalo 2015). As Gronroos and Ojasalo (2004) argues: 
"[…] service productivity quite frequently is dependent of how the relationship progresses. 
Relationships are learning experiences where both parties [...] get used to each other and learn 
how to interact with each other so that mistakes, service failures, quality problems, information 
problems and the like can be minimized. In other words, both the service provider and the 
customer gradually learn how to avoid mistakes and problems of various kinds that create 
unnecessary costs for both parties, and, in addition, have a negative impact on perceived service 
quality” (Gronroos and Ojasalo 2004). 
 Despite the valuable intuition about the existence of two distinct sources of service productivity, 
the focus on customer’s experience in defining external efficiency, does not allow to take into 
account the role of the organizational/production capabilities in ‘avoiding mistakes and problems’ 
during the production process. Indeed, the efficiency level according to which the customer’s and 
the provider’s inputs are managed in the production process, largely depends on the 
organizational/production capabilities so far developed by the provider. In particular, important 
are the capabilities able to incentivize the customer to disclose the idiosyncratic knowledge 
required to satisfy him. In general terms, one could argue that the customer is incentivized to 
express him/herself and to cooperate in service production because then he/she will receive a 
higher service quality (Ojasalo 2003). However, at a closer glance, the customer’s willingness 
depends on the providers’ capabilities to engage the customer in the production processes by 
creating a shared language system. If not adequately incentivized during the interaction, the 
customer’s inputs required are not provided and his/her co-producer role may finally result in a 
non-cooperative behavior. The direct consequence may be an unsatisfied customer. Thus, external 
efficiency should be defined not as customer’s quality experience but as the service quality 
promoted by the organization and, in particular, by its coordination/production capabilities. 
Against customer uncertainty, the provider’s capabilities should focus on the customization of the 
service processes in order to encourage the user’s cooperative behavior and the disclosure of the 
user’s inputs. Since the user does not know what he/she precisely needs, a 
customized/personalized interaction44 allows mutual adjustment as coordination mechanism with 
the provider (Thompson 1967), which in turn reduces customer uncertainty about how to provide 
the service outcome. Such capabilities are important not only in the interaction with the customer 
but also in the back-office phases among providers. Especially in cases of highly complex needs, 
                                                      
44 In this context, the concepts of personalization and customization are interchangeably used because they represent 
two sides of the same coin. While customization concerns the service content, personalization is about the way the 
service content is delivered (de Blok 2013). Here, the way providers interact with the customer indeed also changes 
the service content. 
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the effort made by providers in customization may depend also on the idiosyncratic knowledge 
emerged and transferred in the interactions among providers in charge of service customization. 
In this case, provider-provider interactions may be helpful for developing interaction strategies 
with the customer.  
In this line of reasoning, the unexpected production costs (UPC) elaborated in the previous 
chapter, should be considered as a measure of external efficiency. In particular, UPC1 - related to 
the productive relation between the customer and the providing organization - are the production 
costs due to the lack of providers’ capabilities in managing uncertainty due to the customer’s role 
as input and as co-producer. These may emerge in case of customer’s non-cooperative behavior 
during the process (through waste of time and other resources) or, once the service has been 
delivered, by requiring a new service, disseminating negative reputation and starting legal action 
against the organization. UPC2 – concerning the productive relation between the single provider 
(employee) and the organization - are the production costs due to the lack of providers’ 
capabilities to coordinate knowledge, efforts, skills and strategies which are necessary to 
personalize their individual interactions with the customer.  
Along with affecting the organization’s revenues, UPC should be considered as indicators, 
together with PC, of the efficiency level reached by the organization in service design and 
management. In fact, the level of organization’s capabilities required to manage customers’ 
quality perception and, hence, UPC, strictly depends on the way service design and management 
is ideated. For instance, the amount of time devoted by front office employees to perform 
bureaucratic tasks (UPC1)– being time subtracted to customization - is a direct measure of 
external efficiency and an indicator of the quality of service design and management. Providers’ 
mistakes and waste of resources due to lack of work motivation are an example of UPC2 that 
indirectly affect external efficiency. In fact, the lack of capabilities in customer-provider and 
provider-provider interactions can lead providers to lose work motivation that indirectly affect 
external efficiency. This is time subtracted both to 1) provider-provider interaction and, hence, to 
the development of new customization strategies and to 2) the interactions with the customer 
and, hence, to the identification of customized ways to satisfy him/her. In the light of the first 
chapter, I argue that UPC1 and UPC2 increase when the service design limits the development of 
capabilities, namely when 1) a large number of strict standards is used in service design and 2) the 
service is managed in a hierarchical way. However, these two conditions – ensuring service 
standardization - are necessary to control the PC level. Thus, an efficient service design and 
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management should promote at the same time both standardization and customization that 
respectively reduce PC and UPC in efficient ways. In other words, service design should be 
sufficiently modularized and sustained by management in order to take advantage of both 
productivity sources.  
 
In conclusion, in presence of customer uncertainty, service productivity depends on two sources 
of efficiency; manufacturing-based production technology (internal efficiency) and 
organizational/production capabilities (external efficiency). External efficiency has been defined as 
a measure of service quality assessed in terms of UPC, which largely reflects the producer 
perspective. In the light of this line of reasoning, we investigate in the next sections whether the 
modularity principle applied according to the platform approach is efficient in sustaining service 
productivity in the case of highly complex needs.  
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2.1.2. Modularity without Modularization: the ‘Platform’ approach 
In the service management literature, the modularity principle has been mainly applied to service 
design on the basis of the platform approach45, previously elaborated in product design (Meyer 
and de Tore, 1999; Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008). In continuity with product design in 
manufacturing settings, the service modularity principle has been developed in sectors such as 
logistics, banking, ICT, automotive, namely product-related services addressing clearly definable 
users’ needs (Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008; Lin et al.2010, Zhou et al. 2010; Bask et al. 2010; 
Bask et al. 2011). Despite the advantages in terms of flexibility, cost effectiveness and offering 
variety, I argue that the platform approach is inefficient to customize services addressing highly 
complex needs, such as personal services, as it does not allow to reduce UPC. On the basis of such 
method, customization can be obtained either by mixing and matching various standardized 
service modules (mass-customization) or by fine tuning any production phases (tailored service 
solutions). After having shown the service platform approach and the potential benefits identified 
in service design and management literature, I analyze the inefficiencies of the two customization 
strategies in case of need complexity.  
2.1.2.3. Service Platform 
According to Meyer and de Tore (1999), the service platform identifies the specific set of service 
functionalities – delivered in human or computer form – that are used across multiple services, or 
the procedural connections that bridge and link specific sets of service functionality (Meyer and 
De Tore, 1999). Ulkuniemi and Pekkarinen (2008) develop a conceptual model of modular services 
which is made by three different dimensions; service modules, modular processes and modular 
organizations. Service modules are the smallest service units, consisting of service elements and 
processes that can be offered to a customer separately or as a part of a greater service offering. 
Modular service offering, which is obtained by combining one or several service modules, 
represents the element visible to the customer, whereas the other two dimensions are the means 
thanks to which the modular service is created and are, thus, intra-organizational (Ulkuniemi and 
Pekkarinen, 2008). Modular processes are composed by service modules as well. However, here 
service module indicates not the smallest service unit constituting one service functionality for the 
                                                      
45 Anyway, modularity can be adopted for customization purposes not only on the basis of a platform, but also by 
changing dimensions of a service prototype that meets customer specification (Voss and Hsuan, 2009).  
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customer, but all the tasks necessary to obtain such functionality. While in the first case, the 
service module is made by the indivisible components expressing a service function, here the 
service module is constituted by all the indivisible steps to produce that service function. Such 
modules (tasks) – constituting the modular process - are designed independently but working as a 
whole to produce the service function. They are enabled by standardized interfaces, namely 
standardized way of working and documenting their sequential progress, that ensures the quality 
of modules (units) and improve their compatibility and flexibility. In turn, the modular production 
system is sustained by modular organization, that is loosely coupled networks (often obtained 
thanks to outsourcing) that operate a clear division of labor and allow organizational components 
to be flexibly recombined in a variety of configurations. The service provider selects the process 
and organizational modules in order to produce the requested service elements for the customer 
(Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi, 2008). 
Figure 4 - Modular service platform 
 
Source: Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi (2008) 
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Several are the identified benefits of the platform approach (Dorbecker and Bohmann, 2013). 
First, designing new services and redesigning existing ones is easier because each module of 
services, processes or organization can be improved or substituted in the platform separately from 
the other (Bask et al., 2010; 2011; Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi, 2008). Service modularity allows 
reducing service complexity so that the system is easier to be managed.  Moreover, by ensuring 
uniform service quality, modular processes enhance customer’s reliability and increase customer 
trust in the employees (Rahikka et al. 2011). Finally, flexibility due to modularity of services allows 
differentiating the solutions and, hence, to broaden the number of offerings, which can create 
value for the customer (Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi, 2008; Rahikka et al. 2011).    
According to the service platform model, two are the potential customization strategies; the 
principal is mass-customization, the second and secondary is the identification of a tailored 
solution without the use of service modules and standardized interfaces. With the mass-
customization strategy, modularity is an instrument to standardize services while meeting a 
heterogeneous demand. Customization is enabled by adding service modules to a standard 
package that meets the needs of the average customer in each segment. In fact, it is easier and 
more cost-effective to customize products to different market segments when some modules 
already exist. Intensive use of standard IT processes is made for managing customer segmentation 
and the customer interacts with the provider through a standardized interface. However, as the 
process modularity is not visible to the customer, he/she thinks to be treated uniquely. In this 
way, the main advantage of standardization, given by scale economies, is exploited.  
The mass-customization advantages cannot be fully exploited in case of highly complex needs as 
market segmentation hardly can be produced when the customer him/herself is not fully aware of 
his/her own need or is aware of his personalized need. Indeed, the organization’s inability to 
address need complexity through market segmentation reflects itself in the emergence of high 
UPC. Mass-customization strategy – while efficiently reducing PC thanks to intra-organizational 
standardized processes – is largely inefficient against UPC, with the consequence that external 
efficiency is not adequately pursued. In case of standardized interfaces, the role of the customer is 
limited and, thus, he/she is not able to express his/her own need. In this context service co-
creation means basically to follow a strict script. At the beginning, the client is called to give some 
basic and standardized information such as price, time, production volume and quality of the 
products. In fact, only standardized information can be entered in IT systems or allow to activate 
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different combinations of standardized solutions. During the service processes, additional 
customer’s information may lead to substitute some service modules (tasks) with others, but not 
to change the way the tasks are performed. Therefore, the risk of standardized human interfaces 
is that the customer is not incentivized to disclose the inputs required to produce a high-quality 
process and outcome, with the consequence that he/she may adopt non-cooperative behavior in 
the process or negatively react when the service is concluded. The client is not satisfied in his/her 
own need and this may lead to high UPC1. Moreover, the adoption of standardized customer 
interfaces enables the design of strictly sequential and standardized production processes in 
which also provider-provider interfaces are standardized. The consequence may be high UPC2 as 
such interfaces allow an efficient management of the information flow through the use of IT 
devices, rules and procedures (De Blok et al. 2014), but not the development of 
coordination/production capabilities required to sustain idiosyncratic knowledge exchange. 
Providers’ intrinsic motivation are, hence, frustrated with consequent increase of UPC2 and – 
through the decreased provider’s ability to interact with the customer - of UPC1.  
The second strategy consists in the identification of a highly-tailored solution by developing a 
specific service module into the platform for which the customer interface is non-standardized. 
This tailoring module represents the organization and processes needed to produce services with 
unique features having non-standardized interfaces. In this case, instead of formal rules, IT devices 
and procedures, what is adopted is professional judgement, capabilities and tacit knowledge. 
From a service productivity perspective, such solution efficiently faces UPC but - by customizing 
even back office phases - it renounces to minimize PC. In general, designing tailored organizational 
and process modules to produce services with unique features is considered excessively costly. For 
instance, a logistic organization that considers standardization a key strategic priority to produce 
mass customized services, may evaluate as inefficient developing tailored customer projects 
(Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi, 2008). For this reason, except in case of niche services, including 
luxury ones, the tailored strategy is regarded as a secondary option relative to mass 
customization. Especially in case of inherently complex needs, this is not a viable path as people 
are price sensitive but, nevertheless, want a customized service.  
In conclusion, the platform approach implicitly affirms that service efficiency can be obtained only 
by minimizing PC through scale and specialization economies in standardized, sequential and 
unvaried intra-organizational processes. UPC reduction is not considered as a fundamental source 
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of productivity when the customers’ needs are complex and not well defined. Consistently, two 
are the customization strategies identified; a mass-customized strategy and a highly tailored one. 
Neither of them is adequately efficient, while the first renounces to reduce UPC over time, the 
second one overlooks the efficiency sources that could come from standardizing phases not 
responsible for service customization. In the light of such line of reasoning, in the next paragraph, I 
elaborate an alternative application of the modularity principle, which is better able to exploit 
both sources of service productivity.  
 
 
2.1.3. Modularization as ‘Compromise’: the 'blueprinting’ approach 
 
In the previous sections I have shown that in presence of complex needs, internal and external 
efficiency depends respectively on the reduction of PC and UPC (par.2.1.1.) and that the platform 
approach to service design – by proposing either a mass-customized strategy or a niche highly-
tailored one - is not able to adequately exploit at the same time both productivity sources 
(par.2.1.2.). Here, my purpose is to identify an alternative modular strategy that - by designing the 
service package around the uncertain customer – is able to adequately reduce UPC along with PC, 
realizing an efficient ‘compromise’ strategy. As UPC reduction is pursued through customization 
while PC minimization is reached through standardization, I argue that a valuable strategy could 
be based on the blueprinting technique (Shostack, 1982, 1984, 1987), which separates between a 
front-office and back-office environment. This device, differently from the platform approach, 
allows to adequately managing customer uncertainty by accordingly adapting production 
processes in service design and management. Thus, after having shown the blueprinting 
technique, I propose the creation of a related approach to modularity that, centered on 
customer’s need analysis, allows a loosely coupled organization of back office and front office 
services.  
Blueprinting is a process control technique introduced by Shostack that allows to know how the 
service is structured in both analytical and holistic way (Shostack, 1982, 1984, 1987). By 
distinguishing between front office and back office actions, such technique allows to visibly 
identify the role of the customer in the service production and delivery system (Bitner et al. 2007). 
Chronologically the blueprinting is created firstly with the depiction of customer’s actions, around 
which “all other activities can be seen as supporting the value proposition offered to or co-created 
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with the customer” (Bitner et al. 2007). Then, the front-office employees’ actions are defined 
separated from the customer by the line of interaction. The line of visibility separates this part by 
the back-office employees’ actions, which are invisible to the customer. Finally, the support 
processes are defined, which are all the activities carried out by not contact employees that are 
needed to allow service delivery. Such technique, along with being centered on customer’s action, 
allows to evaluate, control and possibly modify the related level of service complexity and 
divergence (Shostack, 1987), aspects fundamental in defining the potential room for service 
personalization or mass-customization. Service’s complexity can be defined “by analyzing the 
number and intricacy of the steps required to perform it” (Shostack 1987). Divergence level is 
identified “by looking at the executional latitude or variability of those steps” (Shostack 1987). A 
highly divergent service involves a large amount of judgement, discretion and situational 
adaptation. A service of low divergence is highly standardized with the steps that are executed in a 
strict and unvarying manner and in which the employees are not allowed to modify the service in 
any way. The level of service complexity and divergence depends on the specificity level of the 
need to be fulfilled. In the health care sector, the service of a general medical practitioner is highly 
complex and highly divergent. An x-ray service is low complex and low divergent (Shostack 1987).  
The blueprinting technique lends itself to be adopted in the application of the modularity principle 
to service design, especially concerning the divergence aspect. By placing the customer’s need at 
the center of the model and by contemplating the related level of service divergence, this design 
strategy allows to modularize services on the basis of the customer’s need analysis, in a way that 
adequately reduce both UPC and PC. Indeed, it is the need and its more or less complex nature 
that - by transmitting uncertainty to the production process - imposes constraints to service 
design in terms of divergence level. Complex and personalized needs require highly divergent 
processes, made possible by a low modularity level, which enables judgement, discretion and 
situational adaptation in the interaction with the customer. Conversely, common and clearly 
specified need require low divergent processes, enhanced by a high modularity level that sustains 
standardization. Hence, need analysis is pursued to separate different need components and, 
accordingly, to develop a modularized service that clearly separate customized and standardized 
service functions. In particular, by taking into account the service divergence level (and, hence, the 
standardization/customization alternative), the blueprinting technique allows to identify three 
distinct types of customization, in which only the last one may be considered the result of 
modularization. The first model addresses specific and clearly defined customer’s needs and is 
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characterized by the highest modularity degree in order to minimize PC. All the service processes 
are made in back office. The customer – belonging to a clearly defined market segment - follows a 
strict script as co-producer and provides standardized information that is then processed in back 
office. The second model renounces again to need analysis and addresses the customer’s complex 
needs by developing a personalized solution. Modularity level is minimum as both front office and 
back office services are tailored on the specific customer’s needs. In this case, only UPC are 
reduced over time, but PC reduction is not pursued. While these two models correspond to the 
two types of customization identified by the platform approach, namely mass-customization and 
tailored customization, it is the third model - by realizing a compromise between the first two – 
that operates a real modularization of the service (see Table 2).  
In this case, the customer’s need is highly complex, but through the need analysis it is also possible 
recognizing common and clearly identified need components and the related efficiency sources. 
Consistently, a modular service package is designed which, differently from the platform 
approach, is obtained not by a modular but a modularized service process depending on the type 
of need addressed. The complex part of the need is addressed by personalized service modules 
(outcome), whose production steps – necessarily highly divergent – require customer involvement 
in order to manage input uncertainty and sustain UPC reduction. Conversely, common and clearly 
identified needs involve low customer uncertainty so that the provider has plenty of room for 
deciding between the design of front-office mass customized services – addressed by modular 
service processes - and back-office standardized processes. Other considerations may orient the 
provider in one of the two directions, related to the customer’s disposition or ability to participate 
to the service processes (Larsson and Bowen, 1989) and potential sources of economies. In this 
model, the blueprinting technique enables a type of modularization that takes into account the 
different efficiency sources when deciding among customization, mass-customization and 
standardization. The differentiation between front and back office services reflects respectively 
the differentiation in efficiency sources, UPC and PC (see Figure 5).  
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The line of visibility offers the provider a conceptual demarcation line to identify in front office 
activities the principal source of external efficiency and in back office ones the main source of 
internal efficiency. External efficiency is mainly reached thanks to personalized interface with 
customer and, to a lesser extent (when specific need components are clearly identified) thanks to 
mass customized services, which allow to promote also internal efficiency. The line of visibility, 
hence, becomes a potential instrument of modularization. In this model, front office services 
require customer’s idiosyncratic knowledge as input of the production processes and their 
presence as co-producer. The level of modularity needs to be minimized to adequately face high 
input uncertainty due to complex need components and, therefore, reduce UPC. In fact, the 
standards adopted in customer-provider interfaces require to be loosely defined to enable service 
customization through knowledge transfers and providers’ professional judgement. Similarly, 
provider-provider interactions should be characterized to a low degree by standardized interfaces 
and mainly by reciprocal interdependence that allow to sustain the exchange of knowledge, 
experience, strategies able to improve the individual provider’s interaction with the customer. 
Production processes are not strictly sequential but highly complex, divergent and centered on the 
processing of the customer’s input resources. Indeed, when the service function is addressing a 
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complex need, all its phases – even those invisible to the customer – have to be considered as 
done by ‘internal customers’, as all of them are oriented to manage customer’s inputs and are 
able to partly modify the service content. This is especially important for front office employees, 
who are engaged in provider-provider interactions and whose effort in developing new 
customization strategies cannot be measured. Attention for relational aspects in service design is 
here fundamental, because social interactions are able to modify both the process and the 
outcome of the service. In fact, both the customer-provider and provider-provider interfaces 
should be sufficiently loose to sustain the personalization of the interactions with the customers. 
For instance, the user during the interaction could discover to prefer a provider’s strategy for an 
activity and, hence, might require to some extent the modification of the rules (interfaces) on the 
basis of which producers are supposed to work together. The same could happen with provider-
provider interactions that might partly change the two interfaces. In the interactions, the provider 
could develop a new customization strategy that might influence the two interfaces. Moreover, 
even if employees46 have different professional specialties, the division of labor is intended to 
produce an integration of knowledge, skills and competences that enhances the overall 
satisfaction of the customer. Without good customer-provider and provider-provider interactions, 
the client may result unsatisfied and UPC may grow up.   
Conversely, back-office services are services that require neither the customer’s idiosyncratic 
knowledge as input nor the customer as co-producer, because they address a homogeneous need. 
Here the modularity level is maximized in order to minimize PC. Production processes are strictly 
sequential and providers perform functions by following stringent rules and procedures and by 
processing only standardized customer’s information. Here the division of labor is intended to take 
advantage of both the providers’ specialization - thanks to the repetitiveness of standardized 
operations – and, hence, of the economies of scale and specialization.  
 
  
                                                      
46 The terms ‘provider’ and ‘employee’ are used alternatively because on the basis of the conceptual framework 
developed in the previous chapter, the organization under analysis in case of highly complex needs is a firm. 
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Figure 5 - Blueprinting service design in case of complex needs 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
 
In conclusion, the blueprinting approach can be seen as an efficient instrument to modularize 
services as, differently from the platform approach, allows to efficiently manage customer 
uncertainty by identifying a loosely couple organization of service processes able to contextually 
promote external and internal efficiency. Once made the customer’s need analysis –blueprinting 
allows to separate highly complex and divergent services (front office) from standardized and 
sequential ones (back office). In back-office services, the level of modularity is maximized in order 
to minimize PC. In front-office services, it is minimized in order to allow human interactions to 
customize the service and, hence, reduce UPC. Given the fundamental role played by process 
divergence in case of services proving complex needs, the blueprinting approach should be 
preferred to the platform method as analytical tool for designing services especially in sectors like 
personal services or whenever the provider’s strategy is to provide a really personalized service 





2.1.4. Service modularization: the role of management 
 
Modularization in service design is a necessary but not sufficient condition for promoting both 
external and internal efficiency. Front office and back office services require very different 
management styles to promote external and internal efficiency (Shostack 1987; Pitt and Foreman, 
1999). In particular, in front-office activities, not only the customer but also the employee is 
source of input uncertainty. Worker’s effort in the interaction with the uncertain customer and 
other providers is not observable, nor is it measurable (asymmetric information problem) so that 
it would be better considering the employee as an internal customer (Berry 1980). In line with Pitt 
and Foreman (1999) on the relation between input uncertainty and management, I argue that 
internal marketing (Berry 1980) is a necessary strategy to manage the activity of front-office 
employees in order to promote external efficiency, while a hierarchical control over the 
employees and coordination with subcontractors sustain internal efficiency in back office phases.  
 
In the platform approach the main role of management is to identify market segments, to exert 
hierarchical control over the employees and coordinate with subcontractors (Pekkarinen and 
Ulkuniemi, 2008). In the blueprinting approach, instead, it is important that the manager is aware 
of the complexity level of the need to be satisfied and, once identified the source of input 
uncertainty, he/she is able to identify services to be personalized (front office services) and those 
to be standardized (back office services). Moreover, in order to efficiently manage the customer’s 
input uncertainty, the manager should be able to manage the employees’ input uncertainty. In the 
platform approach, as UPCs are not recognized as source of external efficiency, the employee is 
not viewed as an important source of uncertainty for the organization. But, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, the employee’s effort in tacit knowledge transfers is not observable nor 
measurable and, hence, may lead to free-riding behaviour (Frey, 1998; Osterloh, Frost and Frey, 
2002). This may occur not only in the interaction with the customer, but also in the interaction 
with the other providers, so that the level of capabilities required in the final interaction with the 
customer is not developed. Thus, the management of employees’ input uncertainty is functional 
to the management of customer uncertainty in the production process. In particular, the 
management plays a crucial role in sustaining the employees’ intrinsic motivations to knowledge 
exchange necessary to develop the capabilities required to reduce 𝑈𝑃𝐶1and  𝑈𝑃𝐶2. In this regard, 
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interesting insights may come from internal marketing – coined by Berry (1980) - according to 
which the firm should be considered as an internal market (Foreman and Money, 1995) in which 
the employee should be treated as an internal customer in order to encourage his/her own 
participation to service processes (Gronroos 1981). The employees are allowed assuming some 
form of responsibility and participating to the management of the organization, in order to 
support their intrinsic motivations to satisfy the customer and, to this purpose, to share 
knowledge with colleagues and customers. As Pitt and Foreman (1999) argue, in case of high 
employee's input uncertainty, internal marketing is necessary to motivate them toward the 
organization’s goal as 'it is a mechanism for assessing the attitudes, opinions, and feelings of 
employees, a tool for communicating with employees on aspects of strategy formulation and 
implementation, and a device for providing feedback to them on the progress reached by the firm 
and its members toward their mutual (congruent) goals' (Pitt and Foreman, 1999).  
 
On the contrary, in case of back office services, the employee is a negligible source of input 
uncertainty. Little is difficulty in monitoring and evaluating the quality and worth of the 
employees’ job, as the job is standard as well as the information transfers with the customer and 
colleagues. Back office employees can be easily substituted by IT technologies, robots or the 
market. In this case, as explained by the Modularity Theory of the Firm, other conditions affect the 
efficient type of organization required and the related type of management. In case of changing 
and innovative environment a hierarchical organization can be justified with a strict control by 
manager over the workers’ activity. Otherwise, the most efficient organization is the market in 
which incentives are given by the market price and the management role is to coordinate the work 
of suppliers.  
 
In conclusion, consistently with the blueprinting service design, management style should be 
diversified so as to sustain customization of service phases involving high input uncertainty 
(including the employees’ one ) and standardization of supporting processes and services involving 
irrelevant input uncertainty. In case of front office services, internal marketing is an efficient 
strategy as the employees, once made to feel responsible- are motivated to satisfy customers; 
conversely, in back office services, hierarchical manager style is still efficient. In other words, the 
separated front office and back office service phases require very different management skills that 
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indeed may require different staff, different performance measures and maybe organizational 
forms. Especially in large organizations it may be convenient to identify two different managers. 
 
2.2. Modularity and Long-Term Care (LTC) Services 
2.2.1. LTC complex needs as source of patient’s uncertainty 
The conceptual framework so far developed for highly complex needs is here applied to the study 
of long term care services. Once analyzed in this section the complexity of long term care needs 
and the related user uncertainty, in par. 2.2.2. I study service design and management according 
to the platform approach. After having shown that this method – generally applied to LTC services 
- is inefficient against UPC, I propose the blueprinting approach as a more efficient method to 
service design.  
The need for long term care is expressed by disabled and especially elderly individuals affected by 
chronic and worsening multiple co-morbidity47 problems. Differently from health care need –
concerning the medical measures required to fight specific diseases - LTC is about health and 
social dependency due to reduced mental and physical capacity, which does not allow to 
autonomously perform some basic activities such as bathing, dressing, getting in and out of bed or 
a chair, moving around and using the bathroom. These ones are often referred to as activities of 
daily living (ADL) (OECD, 2013). Such a dependency condition can be due to dementia (i.e. 
Alzheimer), other neuropsychiatric diseases, chronic diseases (heart diseases, stroke, cancer, 
chronic respiratory diseases and diabetes) and falls, whose risk increases with age.  
Usually the uncertainty considered in relation to health care and LTC needs, is the one related to 
biological variability (Bohmer 2005) or, in other words, to the customer’s body as input that 
necessarily is involved in case of health care and LTC services: similar pathological conditions can 
require different treatments as the patient may have different genetic predispositions and 
concomitant disorders. Moreover, because of comorbidity, uncertain may be the potential 
interaction among different therapies. Hence, providers do not know the customer’s need until 
                                                      
47Comorbidity is defined as “a concomitant but unrelated pathologic or disease process; usually used in epidemiology 




after care has begun and this type of uncertainty is reduced as the therapy progresses (Bohmer 
2005). However, biological variability is not the only type of uncertainty involved by the need of 
health expressed by LTC need. According to the WHO vision, “health is a state of optimal physical, 
mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity” (WHO, 2005). In 
other words, the need of health is complex and, sometimes, highly complex as it concerns 
different dimensions of the human being (medical, psychological and social). If two individuals 
have the same disability, they might perceive different health needs. Moreover, their conditions 
might deteriorate, producing, hence, new needs. Thus, a well-defined cause-effect relation 
between LTC services and health promotion cannot be identified. For this reason, the involvement 
of the customer in the service, not only as input but also as co-producer, can allow to obtain 
idiosyncratic knowledge that allows to better customizing the service and, hence, promoting 
customer’s health. To this regard, the salutogenic approach developed by Antonovsky (1996) and 
increasingly adopted in human sciences (Mittelmark et al. 2017) shows that motivating the active 
involvement of the customer may be itself a source of health. According to the salutogenic 
orientation, what explains health promotion is the presence of “generalized resistance resources” 
(GRRs), namely resources external or internal to persons that – by promoting the emergence of a 
‘sense of coherence’ construct in individuals facilitate successful coping with inherent stressors of 
human existence48. In this perspective, LTC services promote health not only by reducing risk 
factors (such as falls, infections ulcers) and through pharmacologic therapy, but also and especially 
through the provision of ‘salutary factors’ (GRRs), which - according to a recent review of 
salutogenic studies on elderly people - can be identified in terms of increased sense of security, 
increased sense of independence, participation, familiarity, significant relationships with others 
(Tan K.-K. et al., 2014). Attention to social relations – and, hence, to the customer as co-producer – 
is an important means of health promotion especially today when the increase of LTC demand is 
due not only to the ageing of the population but also to changes occurred in the household 
structure: increasing number of childless household, mobility of children and a growing 
participation of women - so far the main informal LTC providers – to the labor market. This social 
                                                      
48  As Antonovsky says, the weakness of the dominant paradigm is a pathogenic orientation that provides a 
dichotomous classification of persons into those who are ‘naturally’ healthy and those who have succumbed, 
temporarily, permanently or fatally to some disease. “If one is naturally healthy, then all one has to do to stay that 
way is reduce the risk factors as much as possible” (Antonovsky 1996). On the contrary, the salutogenic approach 
starts from the assumption that the human system is inherently flawed, and uses a continuum model, which sees each 
of us at a given point in time, somewhere along a healthy/dis-ease continuum. In this way, such approach is much 
more able to take into account the complexity of human being (Antonovsky 1996). 
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phenomenon shifted the responsibility for high quality social interactions onto the LTC providers, 
which, moreover, sustain the patient’s health promotion also by establishing good relations with 
relatives. In the light of such studies, I can argue that because of the complexity of the LTC need, 
customer uncertainty is high, not only because of biological variability related to the customer’s 
body, but also because health promotion requires as input the customer’s idiosyncratic 
knowledge, efforts and his/her active role as co-producer of mental and social wellbeing. In 
particular, customer uncertainty due to the patient’s role as co-producer may be high for several 
reasons. Firstly, as the LTC need is related to the user’s progressive loss of autonomy, not always it 
is peacefully accepted by the individual, who hence may assume a fractious behaviour. Moreover, 
accepting someone else’s help may mean giving strangers the access to intimate human life 
aspects (for instance in bathing, dressing services) so that these services, instead of being 
considered as helping, are experienced as humiliating, refused and able to reduce the patients’ 
self-esteem and health. Finally, the user’s inputs involved are the knowledge, mental and 
relational efforts and the physical presence of individuals often severed by neurological problems 
and that, hence, have difficulties in properly expressing themselves in language. Because of all 
these reasons, the patients’ cooperative role cannot be taken for granted. Despite each of LTC 
needs (bathing, dressing, moving around etc.) appears clearly defined and easy to be addressed by 
separate service functions, one cannot assume that the patient - as co-producer - is always willing 
to provide his/her own fundamental inputs (body, knowledge, attention, effort) in the processes.  
 
In conclusion, LTC needs intrinsically require that the customer participates actively to the service 
production process both as input and as co-producer, leading hence to high customer uncertainty. 
In the next sections, I analyze how customer uncertainty is managed in service design according to 
the platform approach. I show that, by limiting the customer role in the service process, the 






2.2.2. The platform approach to LTC service design  
 
The platform approach has been extended to the design of LTC services as a cost-effective strategy 
to address the large and heterogeneous demand of ageing and frail population (Vahatalo, 2012). 
By delivering LTC service packages in the shape of social and health care path – over which the 
patient smoothly flows – such approach develops mass-customized solutions, which integrate 
both social and health care aspects and ensure the continuity of patient care (Meyer et al., 2007; 
de Blok et al. 2009, 2010a). Despite the importance of a ‘patient-centered care’ is generally 
acknowledged (de Blok et al. 2009, 2013), I argue that such approach – by limiting the customer’s 
involvement in the service process to a mere choice option – renounces to adequately manage 
customer uncertainty and, hence, the related UPC.  
The platform approach allows designing mass-customized LTC service packages by establishing- 
thanks to standardized interfaces- service modules, modular processes and organizations. 
Examples of LTC service modules are personal care, health care, safety, rehabilitation, 
entertainment, transport services etc. These are groupings of one or several components that 
provide variants and substitutes to the same functionality. For instance, in personal care, variants 
are bathing, getting dressed, eating, toileting etc. Substitutes are different meals on the basis of 
customer’s diets. Standardized interfaces – sustained by a large use of IT - are protocols, rules, 
procedures, standard lines of communication that – by combining and connecting LTC 
components - allow to build and ensure the delivery of the overall service package (de Blok et al. 
2010). Service modules are performed on the basis of modular service processes that are the 
building blocks of a mass-customized social and health care path. Finally, service modules and 
modular processes are sustained by a modular organization characterized by network of different 
professionals (caregivers, animators, physiotherapists, nurses), who can be easily substituted 
without jeopardizing the network functionality. In this regard, service packages offered by 
independent subcontractors and managed by one provider allows an efficient coordination 
(Vahatalo 2012).   
In LTC service design the platform approach displays its usual advantages and limits. The 
organization looks for broader segments of clients that can be reached more efficiently with 
options that match their specific needs (de Blok et al. 2009). Choice option is regarded as an 
optimal solution to provide patient centered care as it is considered able to treat each client as 
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unique and adapt the service package over time depending on changes in the health condition of 
the patient (de Blok 2009). Second, the provision of modular packages – by pre-defining 
components in transparent ways - eases the interaction between client and provider (de Blok 
2010). Moreover, as the service package is usually originated from multiple providers, the 
application of modularity is likely to facilitate the coupled supply of care and service packages, 
facilitating the coordination of individual services, diminishing overlaps and preventing gaps in 
service provision (de Blok et al. 2009). Finally, the ability to standardize components should 
facilitate a cost-effective way of working, which answers the pressure for cost containment (de 
Blok et al. 2010a; de Blok et al. 2010b). These advantages can be reinterpreted in the light of 
service productivity. While the benefits in terms of internal efficiency are undeniable, external 
efficiency is only in part promoted. Mass customization may promote customer’s satisfaction in 
the initial service phases when the customer is approached for the first time. Moreover, the UPC 
can be reduced thanks to the choice options and variation in case of clearly definable customers’ 
needs (for instance need of helping in mobility, heightened toilet, meals etc.). However, these 
needs represent single instrumental aspects of the more important and complex patient’s health 
need. This, in particular, is source of UPC that cannot be reduced by mass customized services but 
requires personalized interactions with the customer. 
The platform approach plans out a very limited customer’s role both in terms of input and, 
especially, as co-producer. Interfaces are standardized and involve as customer input, the 
customer’s standardized information and his/her own physical presence, while as co-producer, the 
customer is just called to follow a well-defined script over the LTC pathway. In fact, at the moment 
of the access, information necessary to activate the service modules are specifically obtained 
through the selection of sub modules (washing, getting dressed etc.) and components (moment, 
time span, duration etc.)  from a menu of modules (care) (see Figure 6) (De Blok et al. 2010a). The 
regular interaction with the customer during the service is intended to obtain additional 
information to substitute - in case of changing conditions - some modules with different ones. In 
particular, the LTC path is cyclical and can be divided into three phases; a-priori specification, on-
the-job adaptation and on-going delivery of care packages (De Blok et  al., 2010). In the first 
phase, a generic assessment of the client’s needs takes place on the basis of which first general 
package is built. When care delivery starts, the on-the-job adaptation of the package occurs 
thanks to a more in-depth need assessment. Such phase is then followed by the on-going delivery 
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phase until some changes occur in the patients’ health conditions, which require again the on-the-
job adaptation phase and so on. 
Figure 6 - Platform structure of LTC service 
 
Source: de Blok et al. 2010a 
Moreover, the platform approach limits room for collaboration among caregivers. Even in the case 
the single caregiver was willing to hear the patient’s specific needs and desire of being more 
involved, the presence of standardized interfaces among providers, a strict schedule to follow and 
severe working procedures restrict the provider’s ability to exert his/her own professional 
judgement and positively answer the user. Deficiency in coordination has been recognized as 
causing problems in the transition of patients over the path (Meyer et al. 2007) and more broadly 
in the provision of demand based services, as the responsibility with coordination rests with the 
customer (de Blok et al. 2010a). The providers, in fact, - by engaging in offering a seamlessly 
combination of service in one care - are called more to solve logistic coordination problems, than 
to cooperate with other providers in order to sustain the customer’s health promotion. They have 
to integrate their care services, not to share information and strategies, that could allow to 
improve customization.  
 
By limiting the customer’s involvement in the service process and the collaboration opportunities 
among providers, the platform approach renounces to manage customer uncertainty coming from 
the complexity of health needs. In fact, the organization’s capabilities required to efficiently 
manage customer uncertainty are not developed. Consequently, both 𝑈𝑃𝐶1 and 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 are likely to 
be high. By limiting the role of the patient – the provider shows to be interested more in the 
service output – namely the smooth customer’s flow along the path - than in the service outcome, 
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which is the customer’s health promotion. The lack of time, attention and efforts in social 
interactions creates or worsens the communication barriers with the customer. In fact, the 
customer does not find the service meaningful, able to improve the quality of his/her own life and 
to support significant social interactions. Hence, 𝑈𝑃𝐶1  – concerning the transaction between the 
customer and the organization – may be high and largely affect the revenue. A high mortality rate, 
client’s falls, pressure ulcers, infections, low satisfaction of patients and relatives can largely affect 
the provider’s revenues through legal claims, bad reputation, waste of resources, especially of 
time in managing difficult relationships, etc. 𝑈𝑃𝐶2  – concerning the transaction between the 
provider and the company - may be high as well. Front-office providers’ intrinsic motivations are 
frustrated as they are not encouraged by the organization to interact with the patient and their 
family, to make efforts in the identification of new and more customized strategies or therapies. 
They do not receive training in order to improve their ability to satisfy the customer. Governance 
culture and rules are such that the providers’ time and effort are engaged to perform the tasks 
they are supposed to perform by contract. Given the existence of standardized interfaces among 
colleagues, they are not incentivized to exchange experience, suggestions, strategies that could 
allow to improve the customer’s experience of the overall service. Hence, sense of frustration, 
anxiety, pressure, tension can lead to front-office providers’ burn-out. 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 are, consequently, 
high due to the number of absences for illness and injuries.  
 
 In conclusion, what emerges is the creation of a health care path made by strictly sequential 
processes whose goal is not health promotion (outcome) but the fluent implementation of each 
service process (output), which mainly involves the avoidance of risky factors. Indeed, the 
platform approach solution – that creates broad segments in which client’s needs are reached 
through choice option – is considered as the only choice from a service productivity perspective 
(de Blok et al. 2009). However, the recognition of UPC as mainly deriving from health complex 
needs - leads us to adopt a different approach to service. In this perspective, in the next section I 
adopt the blueprinting approach in order to define an effective involvement of the customer and 





2.2.3. The Blueprinting Approach to Modularize LTC services  
 
We have seen in par.2.1.3. that the blueprinting approach allows to modularize service design in a 
way able to promote both external and internal efficiency. Thanks to need analysis, it promotes 
customization of service phases involving high customer uncertainty (front-office) and 
standardization of services addressing clearly defined needs and not worthy of being mass-
customized (back-office). In this section, the blueprinting approach is applied to LTC service 
design. While front office service phases are oriented to motivate the patient’s active participation 
in order to promote the satisfaction of his/her highly complex need and, hence, reduce UPC; back 
office services are intended to standardize support processes and this way to minimize PC.  
 
Differently from the platform approach that limits customer’s involvement to a choice option (de 
Block 2010a) and that, hence, can address only specific customer’s health needs, the blueprinting 
approach allows to motivate the user to actively participate as co-producer and, this way, satisfy 
his/her own health need, including also its social and psychological dimensions. As unknown is the 
way to promote the specific patient’s health, non-standardized customer-provider interfaces 
enable personalized interaction, which - through reciprocal adaptation – efficiently faces customer 
uncertainty related to his/her own health promotion. In particular, personalized interactions are 
required in personal care, nursing, physiotherapy and animation, all activities targeted to patients’ 
fundamental inputs, body and mind. For instance, thanks to customized interactions, the caregiver 
may find out that singing during client’s bathing, favors the patient’s cooperative interaction. The 
physiotherapist may try to motivate the recovering of the normal use of patient’s arm through pet 
therapy. In this context, interfaces among providers should be sufficiently loose to allow the client 
to be pleased in little aspects of daily life (sleeping a bit more, feeling useful in some activities, 
taking care of an animal, receiving special attentions by some providers). The identification of 
personalized therapies may occur thanks to the knowledge exchange among providers with similar 
or different professional competences. Continuing the above example, other professionals may 
identify useful strategies to obtain the patient’s cooperative behavior, for instance, through the 
use of symbolic language (music, art) or by helping to perform activities that are meaningful 
because related to his/her own life story (hobby, job, childhood). Hence, not only customer-
provider but also provider-provider interactions are oriented to personalize the service and, 
hence, to reduce UPC. 
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In support to personalized services, mass-customized processes may address in less intensive ways 
well specified needs that are shared among different clients. For this reason, physiotherapy and 
animation may be partly performed through mass-customized services.  
Figure 7 - Design of LTC services according to the blueprinting approach 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
As shown in Figure 7, the service process can be distinguished in two fundamental parts. The 
moment of access when a modular and quite general offering is proposed and the daily/weekly 
activities over which the offering is increasingly personalized. At the beginning, the customer is 
called to provide standardized information on the basis of which the LTC provider starts building a 
personalized service offering.  During the daily/weekly service, personal care and nursing are fully 
personalized. Their modularity level is minimum as professionals - by drawing their routines from 
a standard and widely shared toolkit - can exert their professional judgments (Langlois and Savage, 
1997). They are non-modular, except when need analysis allows identifying clearly defined need 
components. In this case, specific front-office services can be modularized: ex. in case of 
animation and physiotherapy (allowing this way to improve also internal efficiency). Physiotherapy 
and animation presents a greater modularity level in the sense that they are also in part mass-
customized. For instance, in residential care during physiotherapy, the customer receives a high 
quality individual time with the professional during which a personalized therapy may be 
identified able to motivate the patient to maintain or recover his/her own physical abilities. 
However, in support to this activity, the client also participates to physiotherapy activities along 
with other people belonging to the same segment. All these activities are supported by back office 
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services in which the level of modularity is high as standards strictly define sequential processes. 
Need analysis allows to identify services and supporting processes that involve just standardized 
customer’s knowledge as input and in which customer intervention may be efficiently avoided. 
Such activities usually consist in the registration system, meal preparation, drug preparation, user 
monitoring, cleaning environment, re-ordering objects, and transportation of goods. While 
innovation in front office activities is sustained by production capabilities and creativity in social 
interactions; in back office, standardization is likely to open the door to automation and the 
development of ICT robotic systems that allow to reduce labor costs and promote scale 
economies. 
Differently from the platform approach, characterized by a cyclical LTC path, here the care path is 
progressively oriented to pursue and maintain service personalization over time. Customized 
service phases offer professionals the occasion to evaluate whether the mass customized services 
phases have to be maintained or substituted over time. Therefore, while the need assessment 
performed during the access phase is general as in case of the platform approach (de Block 
2010a), all the front office daily/weekly activities are directed to (re)define a personalized therapy 
through to the extensive and intimate contact with the customer.  
 
In conclusion, the blueprinting approach promotes both external and internal efficiency by 
enabling different modularity levels depending on need analysis. In fact, because input uncertainty 
is intrinsically related to the need to be satisfied, the provider should design and manage the 
service in order to allow the patient to find meaningful their roles, to be able to improve the 
quality of their life and to support significant social interactions. The separation between front-
office and back-office activities supports providers’ effort toward patient’s health promotion, 





2.2.4. LTC service modularization: the managerial implications  
 
Generally, the blueprinting approach requires that the management is sufficiently aware of the 
different dimensions of need complexity that lead to input uncertainty. In case of LTC need, both 
customer’s and provider’s input uncertainty is high and, hence, the management should be 
sufficiently able to manage front office and back office services in order to customize phases that 
are source of health promotion for the customer and standardize the remaining ones. Moreover, 
in order to adequately manage the customer’s input, the management should be able to promote 
employees’ intrinsic motivations to take care of patients. To this regard, specialized health care 
literature highlights the importance of management in sustaining customer’s satisfaction through 
employees’ satisfaction (Tzeng et al. 2002, Ott and Dijsk, 2005; Elarabi and Johari, 2014). An 
important problem is reducing ‘rationing’ (Shubert et al., 2008), to be considered as detrimental of 
provider’s intrinsic motivations as it is the lack of sufficient time and resources the professionals 
perceive as needed by their patients (Shubert et al., 2008).  
 
The role of management on the organizational performance has been investigated mainly by the 
specialized literature on aging. According to such studies, mainly focused on nursing homes as 
complex adaptive systems (Anderson et al., 2003), the relationships among workers are non-linear 
and the service outcomes cannot be directly controlled by managers using traditional hierarchical 
approaches. One important problem, to be considered as detrimental to staff’s intrinsic 
motivation is rationing, which occurs when nurses lack sufficient time and resources to provide all 
the care they perceive is needed by their patients (Shubert et al., 2008). As shown by a recent 
literature review on rationing in nursing care (Papastavrou et al., 2014) factors influencing care 
rationing are to be found within the work environment, such as lack of time, lack of training, 
inadequate resources, unplanned increase in demand for patient care, communication barriers, 
habit, the role of teamwork (Papastavrou et al., 2014). By studying the relation between 
management practice and organizational performance, several studies show that specific 
managerial practices influence the capacity of nursing home staff to work together and, hence, at 
least partially reduce the causes of rationing. Management practices, such as building connections 
and developing existing strengths as resources for solving problems, are suggested to be more 
effective than traditional hierarchical approaches. In particular, they found out that management 
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by encouraging employees to incorporate diverse perspectives, will likely facilitate staff efforts to 
self-organize so as to meet the customer’s demand (Anderson et al. 2014; Dellfield 2008). 
 
In conclusion, the management plays a crucial role in identifying and promoting the different 
sources of productivity. Once identified the characteristics of input uncertainty related to LTC 
complex needs, managers should be able to reduce the rationing problem and sustain the front-
office employees’ intrinsic motivations to promote patients’ health. In this way, external efficiency 





2.3. Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, it has been analyzed how customer uncertainty produces constraints to an 
efficient design and management of service processes. When the customer introduces uncertainty 
as input and as co-producer in the production process, service productivity depends also on a 
mutual learning experience between customer and front-office providers. For this reason, a more 
precise definition of production efficiency takes into account the difference between internal 
efficiency (manufactured based) and external efficiency, here defined as the service quality 
promoted by the organizations’ production capabilities. UPC may be considered as a direct and 
objective measure of EE, and along with PC, indicate the overall efficiency of the service design. 
While IE is promoted by standardization, EE is obtained through customization. This fact implies 
that in order to promote both efficiency sources, service design should be sufficiently 
modularized. In this perspective, hence, platform approach to modularity – usually used in service 
design – is evaluated as inefficient. Its customization options (mass-customization and tailored 
customization) in fact do not allow to exploit both efficiency sources. As alternative, the 
blueprinting approach to service design is proposed. This approach allows for a real service 
modularization and permits to visibly identify the two sources of production efficiency. EE is the 
main source of efficiency in front-office services, where the customer is at the center with his/her 
own complex and less complex needs. IE is the principal source of efficiency in back office services, 
where customers’ input is standardized. While EE is promoted by non-modular customer-provider 
and (in back office) provider-provider interactions, IE is reached thanks to highly modular services 
(also in front office in case the organization’s employees, thanks to their capabilities, have 
evaluated the low complexity of their need and adopt mass customized service). According to this 
approach, two different management styles are required depending on the productivity source. 
On the one hand, the manager should sustain employees’ intrinsic motivations necessary to 
develop the capabilities required to reduce 𝑈𝑃𝐶1 and 𝑈𝑃𝐶2. On the other hand, as in case of 
standardized back office services, employee is a negligible source of input uncertainty, 
authoritarian style is efficient to support employees’ extrinsic motivations. 
Then, this framework has been applied to the study of LTC service design and management. Here, 
customer uncertainty is due not only to biological variability (Bohmer, 2005) but also to the user’s 
will (as co-producer) to provide his/her own fundamental inputs. While in the platform approach, 
the customer’s role is limited and, hence, UPC are not addressed, in the blueprinting approach, 
the customer is at the center of the service and both efficiency sources, EE and IE, are sustained. 
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Chapter 3. The identification of the Unexpected Production Costs in an 
empirical setting 
3.1. Research methods: Study design 
 
In this chapter, I conduct four exploratory studies – by using the theory building method 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) - to analyze the relationship between organizational and production efficiency 
(in particular, external efficiency49) identified in the first and second chapter in the light of the 
Modularity Theory of the Firm. An interpretative model is here developed to analyze five Italian 
LTC organizations as emblematic cases of different approaches to the management of UPC 
(considered as index of external efficiency). This study is important because the mechanism 
through which the organizational structure (by varying the level of standards and the repartition 
of decision rights) affects external efficiency over time is still an open question. In particular, there 
are two main hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that the organizations investing in high levels of 
standards and low levels of coordination capabilities, experience a progressively lower level of 
external efficiency (vicious cycle). Conversely, the companies highly investing in capabilities 
experience a progressively higher level of external efficiency (virtuous cycle). In order to build the 
model, the five LTC companies have been organized in four categories that are analyzed in four 
case studies. The categories were chosen by taking into account the level of investment in 
standards (high and low) and in coordination capabilities (high and low). The first case study 
adopts literal replication logic (namely similar results are predicted) and involves two 
organizations belonging to the same category (high investment in standards and low investment in 
capabilities) that allows findings to be replicated (Yin, 2003). This case study provides a first 
support to the hypothesized sketched model. Then, the other three case studies, involving 
organizations belonging to the remaining categories are shown. These allow to enhance the 
generalizability of the model by employing theoretical replication logic, according to which 
contrasting results are expected for anticipatable reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The 
evidence, analyzed on the basis of the hypothesized model, generate considerations that are 
consistent with and legitimate the theoretical hypotheses developed in the previous chapters.  
 
                                                      
49 defined as the service quality promoted by the organization’s capabilities to provide customized 
services. 
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Within the theoretical framework of the Modularity Theory of the Firm, it was argued that in 
presence of customer uncertainty, the most efficient organization – according to a functionalist 
perspective - is the one that minimizes its instruments to promote production efficiency. This is 
the sum of the production costs (measure of internal efficiency) and of the unexpected production 
cost (index of external efficiency) 50. While efficiency in production costs (PC) depends on 
allocative efficiency, the efficient management of the unexpected production costs (UPC) depends 
on the organizational structure. The organizations sustain external efficiency (low UPC), by 
defining the level of standards and influencing the development of organizational/production 
capabilities), which promote the progressive development of coordination capabilities. In 
particular, I argued that – participatory governance and the blueprinting approach to a 
personalized service design, combined with inclusive management, make a low use of strict 
standards and are able to sustain workers’ intrinsic motivations to cooperate with each other in 
order to satisfy the client and, hence, reduce UPC. Consistently, in this chapter, my purpose is to 
empirically investigate these three organizational levels as potential sources of production 
efficiency in case of LTC services. As shown in par.2.2.1, LTC is a highly complex need emerging 
when elderly people lose autonomy due to worsening multiple co-morbidity problems. My focus 
on the organization of caregivers’ work - basically consisting in patients’ personal care – can 
explicate very well the companies’ ability to face customer uncertainty. In fact, among LTC 
services, personal care is one of the most complex, as its provision requires caregivers’ attention 
to patient’s psychological and social aspects. In this empirical setting, my research question is 
declined as follows: 
 
RQ: How LTC organizations – through governance, service design and management - 
promote external efficiency (low 𝑈𝑃𝐶2) related to customer uncertainty in personal care 
service? 
 
In the light of the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, first, I hypothesize 
that governance is efficient if it is participatory as - by making a low use of strict standards and 
promoting a decentralized repartition of decision rights- caregivers are intrinsically motivated to 
                                                      
50 As defined in the first chapter, the unexpected production costs (UPC) are the productive side of dynamic 
transaction costs (Langlois and Robertson, 1995): unpredictable resource losses (mistakes, damages due to the lack of 
coordination/production capabilities required for the personalization of the production process. 𝑈𝑃𝐶1 emerge in the 
productive relation between the provider and the customer; 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 emerge in the productive relation among providers 
when other professionals’ non-standardized knowledge is required to personalize the production process. 
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develop coordination capabilities with customers and colleagues and to improve external 
efficiency. On the contrary, I expect low external efficiency in case of hierarchical governance, 
since workers are essentially executors of the rules and procedures, do not develop coordination 
capabilities and what matters is extrinsic motivation. Second, by adopting a blueprinting approach 
to service design, I theorize that a personalized type of personal assistance (which necessarily 
requires a low use of standards) adequately promotes external efficiency not only directly by 
allowing onstage caregivers’ personalized actions, but also indirectly thanks to supporting 
processes (investment in professionals’ training and in equipment, adoption of standards 
sufficiently loose to preserve personal interactions with patients and colleagues). Conversely, I 
expect that a mass-customized type of personal care is inefficient because its standardized 
interfaces with customers and colleagues prevent the development of coordination capabilities. 
Third, I hypothesize that external efficiency depends also on the management style; different are 
the combinations of governance and management that may be more or less conducive to external 
efficiency. Hierarchical governance may be alternatively characterized by authoritarian or tolerant 
management. While the manager with an authoritarian style refuses any debate with employees 
and relies on his/her own authority; the tolerant management involves employees at least in 
decisions that impact on their lives. Conversely, participative governance may show a more or less 
supportive management. In general, a supportive management that sustains team spirit is 
expected to promote external efficiency by sustaining providers’ intrinsic motivations to develop 
coordination capabilities among colleagues.  
 
Given the limited amount of information on such issues and the exploratory character of this study 
objective, I have adopted a qualitative case study design. According to Yin (2003), the case study is 
chosen as research method when, among other conditions, the contextual circumstances are 
highly pertinent to the phenomenon under study (Yin, 2003). In this research, the environmental 
settings due to the organizational structure are considered as central to explain the level of 
external efficiency. In addition, study embeddedness is here fundamental to analyze at the same 
time different organizational layers, their relation with the development of members’ capabilities 
and UPC as a measure of external efficiency. Nursing homes lend themselves to be a valuable 
research object because, despite most OECD public institutions have imposed strict quality 
standards, they provide elderly various service quality experiences, due to the different 
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capabilities developed over time. Attention on 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 as measure of external efficiency51  is 
justified by two factors. First, as LTC is a labor-intensive service, labor time represents a 
fundamental source of service quality. Despite a minimum number of assistance hours is 
established by law to guarantee service quality, such quality is threatened by the level of sick leave 
hours (𝑈𝑃𝐶2), as continuity of care is not guaranteed
52. Second, as LTC sector is subsidized by 
public institutions, LTC organizations’ revenues cannot be considered as a measure of 𝑈𝑃𝐶1 and, 
hence, of external efficiency53. Here, focus on caregivers’ work is justified by the fact that among 
workers, they represent the largest part and, hence, are those that mainly contribute to 𝑈𝑃𝐶2. 
Moreover, as seen above, such professionals provide the main and intimate type of daily 
assistance to the elderly, sustaining them during activities such as bathing, dressing, eating, 
walking etc. 54The organization may essentially motivate caregivers’ will to support the elderly. 
Thus, sick leave hours are here used as an objective measure (based on time) of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2, namely 
production costs determined by the organizational structure and, in particular, their internal 
allocation of decision rights, which is supposed to affect caregivers’ incentive structure. According 
to our discussed line of reasoning, hierarchical governance, standardized service design and 
authoritarian management – by favoring high level of workers’ sick leave hours - may produce high 
costs for substitution, low service quality and low satisfaction of patients and their families.  
 
In order to evaluate whether the model rightly interpret the way different organizational 
structures manage the level of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2, I have identified four related categories of investment in 
standards and coordination capabilities (see Figure 8). As shown in Chapter 1 and 2, in case of 
hierarchical governance, authoritarian management and standardized service design, we expect a 
high investment in standards and low attention to coordination capabilities. In fact, when 
standards are high, low room is available for coordination capabilities. The development of 
capabilities needs to be enabled by a low level of standards before being promoted by 
                                                      
51 As shown in the previous chapter, despite 𝑈𝑃𝐶2relate to the organization of labor, they are due to the lack of 
coordination capabilities necessary to customize the service and, hence, to manage customer uncertainty. 
52 Sick leave hours can be considered also as a measure of internal efficiency because they reveal costs for 
substitutions; high absence levels translate in the organization’s need to pay overtime hours or to temporarily employ 
a substitute. 
53 However, other minor indicators can be used, such as number and expenditure for clients’ legal claims, number of 
falls, infections ulcers etc. 
54 Despite a clear knowledge of service quality (and of external efficiency) requires the direct involvement of 
customers, given the theoretical focus of my study on the organizational and productive structure, I preferred to 
concentrate my empirical analysis only on the organization of front-office employees, namely caregivers, that allows 
to understand the internal mechanisms affecting productivity. 
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organizations’ incentives to providers’ intrinsic motivations. Conversely, an organization with 
participative governance, supportive management and customized service design is expected to 
have a low level of strict standards and high development of coordination capabilities. In case of 
the LTC sector, a minimum level of standards and procedures is imposed by the accreditation 
system. Hence, the categories have been identified on the basis of the different contribution by 
the accreditation procedures to the service quality in each organization.  The first category 
includes benchmark organizations, as these – by not considering the accreditation standards as 
able to guarantee service quality - promote service customization by sustaining the development 
of coordination capabilities with the users and among providers. The second category includes 
companies that do not consider the accreditation standards as sufficient to guarantee service 
quality, but sustain the development of coordination capabilities only with users. The third 
category involves organizations that evaluate as adequate the publicly imposed level of standards 
and, hence, do not much invest further in coordination capabilities. Finally, the organizations in 
the fourth category includes organizations having made a very high investment in standards and, 
thus, a low investment in coordination capabilities. These organizations do not consider sufficient 
the level of standards imposed by the accreditation system and promote a greater standardization 
of the production processes.  
 
 
Figure 8 – The four categories of analysis 
 
   Source: Author’s contribution 
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The three theoretical hypotheses about the concomitant role of governance, service design and 
management on external efficiency can be interpreted in the light of a cyclical vicious or virtuous 
model of interaction (see Figure 9). In particular, I argue that the organizations with a hierarchical 
governance, authoritarian management and standardized service design (namely belonging to the 
third and fourth categories) experience a vicious cycle that increasingly reduce external efficiency, 
while the organizations with participative governance, supportive management and customized 
service design (the other two categories) know a virtuous cycle that progressively increases 
external efficiency. 
 
Figure 9 – Vicious Cycle Interpretative Model 
 













Figure 10 – Virtuous Cycle Interpretative Model 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
 
In the first case, we expect to find providers with a low level of intrinsic motivations. Caregivers’ 
work – consisting in the execution of rules - can be monitored so that the organization provides 
incentives to extrinsic motivations, which are expected to crowd out intrinsic motivations. In turn, 
the low level of intrinsic motivations and the organization’s attention toward the fulfillment of 
standards lead to a limited development of coordination capabilities to customize the service. The 
lack of coordination capabilities translates in low empowerment and burn-out problem for 
providers who, thus, make a larger use of sick leave hours. A high level of absences translates into 
lower service quality as continuity of care is hindered and customers’ knowledge is not adequately 
used to customize their services. Because of it, the occasions for providers to coordinate among 
themselves in order to customize the service are reduced, along with the possibility to experience 
high satisfaction level in customization, which, in turn, hinder intrinsic motivations. As a 
consequence, the related development of coordination capabilities is again reduced and so on. 
The vicious cycle, according to a functionalist perspective, leads to a worsening in the 
management of customer uncertainty.  
Conversely, when governance is cooperative, management is supportive and service design is 
personalized, customer uncertainty is efficiently managed. In this case, we expect to find a high 
level of intrinsic motivations to work, as the organization recognizes its inability to monitor 
caregivers’ effort in the exchange of non-standardized knowledge. Coordination capabilities are 
supported; providers, as owners of tacit knowledge, feel empowered and experience low burn-out 
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problems thanks to their coordination capabilities. Thus, they tend to make a lower use of sick 
leave hours, which, in turn, means a higher service quality and a greater use of customer’s 
knowledge for customization purpose. Because of it, also the opportunity for providers to 
coordinate in order to customize the service increases along with their satisfaction level. Thus, the 
level of coordination capabilities increases and so on. The virtuous cycle improves over time the 
management of customer uncertainty.  
 
This interpretative model is evaluated by analyzing five LTC organizations within four case studies 
(see Figure 11). 
Figure 11 – Organization of the case study 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
 
After a brief introduction of the five organizations, I compare the different levels of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 of the 
organizations belonging to the four categories. Then, I analyse whether the different levels of 
𝑈𝑃𝐶2 can be explained by my interpretative model. First, I show that the differences among 
organizations are not large concerning the level of intrinsic motivations. In fact, the existence of a 
self-selection problem55 partly complicates the analysis: in the light of the hypothesized model, 
since the level of sick level hours is related with percentage of answers, but not with intrinsic 
                                                      
55 “Self-selection bias is the problem that very often results when survey respondents are allowed to decide entirely 
for themselves whether or not they want to participate in a survey. To the extent that respondents' propensity for 
participating in the study is correlated with the substantive topic the researchers are trying to study, there will be self-
selection bias in the resulting data. In most instances, self-selection will lead to biased data, as the respondents who 
choose to participate will not well represent the entire target population” (Lavrakas, 2008) 
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motivations, respondents are supposed to be the most motivated within each organization, 
including the most hierarchical. In other words, respondents’ motivation may be due also to the 
caregivers’ personal background not only to organizational incentives, so that another motivation 
index is required that reflects only the organizations’ incentives. This index is identified in the 
percentage of answer, as – despite its conciseness - concerns the overall population and is 
reasonably dependent on the incentives provided by the organizational structure. Then, I analyse 
this issue in the four case studies. The first case study analyzes two organizations belonging to the 
third category by adopting literal replication logic. According to Eisenhardt (1989), “in replication 
logic, cases which confirm emergent relationships enhance confidence in the validity of the 
relationships” (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this particular case, similar results provide information 
consistent with the presence of a vicious cycle. Then, the remaining three case studies have been 
built by comparing these organizations with each one of the organizations representing the other 
three categories in order to make the related types of cycle clearer. Finally, the regression analysis 
provides evidence that supports the hypothesis about the effect of the organizational structure on 
the caregivers’ satisfaction level. 
 
In order to investigate my research question, I use a mixed source of evidences; qualitative survey 
data, quantitative archival records and semi-structured interviews to managers.  Triangulation of 
qualitative and quantitative data is used to analyze theoretical hypothesis according to a 
qualitative approach (Yin, 2003). According to Eisenhardt (1989), “the triangulation made possible 
by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses” (Eisenhardt, 1989). The survey provides information about caregivers’ subjective 
evaluation of different organizational aspects related to governance, service design and 
management on the one hand, and their levels of motivation and satisfaction on the other hand. 
Archival records offer quantitative data about potential 𝑈𝑃𝐶2, namely the number of sick leave 
hours collected over five years and other general information about organizations. Interviews to 
managers provided information about the organization of labor, the type of investment in 
coordination capabilities and service design that allowed me to choose organizations and better 
interpret survey results.  
 
In conclusion, the four case studies provide evidence which is consistent with the existence 1) of 
vicious cycles in the organizations belonging to the third and fourth categories and 2) of a virtuous 
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cycle in the companies representing the first and second categories. In the fourth category, we 
expect that the vicious cycle is accelerated by the large attention to standards. In the first 
category, we expect an acceleration of the virtuous cycle given by the great attention to 
capabilities. This interpretative model, inductively developed, contributes to define the content of 
the relationship between organizational and production efficiency developed in the first chapter in 




The case study research was conducted in the center-north of Italy. In order to draw solid 
conclusions on this novel subject, purposive sampling was used to identify organizations 
representative of the four categories above defined. Five organizations were selected so that 
literal replication mechanism could be adopted within the first case study and theoretical 
replication could be used in the comparison with the other three companies. While the first two 
organizations should predict similar results, the comparison with the other three companies 
should predict contrasting results for anticipatable reasons (Yin, 2003). To preserve uniformity 
within our sample and promote meaningful comparison among organizations, the following 
inclusion criteria for the study were adopted. 
First, organizations have to offer their services to a client population mainly represented by frail 
elderly people. This means that all these organizations deal with similar issues concerning need 
assessment and satisfaction. Despite reputation effect may work and, thus, organizations may face 
different proportions of clients with uncertain needs organizations, one of the most used 
customers’ selection criteria of the residential care center is the closeness to their own family and 
social context. However, since most of customers receive a public support in the organizations 
under study and public entry criteria may differ among Regions, the organizations under study 
may face clients with different level of complexity in health conditions.  Second, all the 
organizations have to provide residential care services, namely they design and manage a service 
system that has to satisfy the same elderly needs. Third, the organizations have kept the same 
governance and management for at least over the last ten years. This is an important condition to 
evaluate whether governance, management and service design affect sick leave hours. Fourth, all 
the organizations are certified with the care related ISO900156, meaning that their products and 
                                                      
56 Stella Montis has obtained a comparable certification to ISO9001 that is based on provincial standards. 
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processes are registered and implemented in an established manner. This should facilitate 
comparison. Moreover, in most OECD countries, minimum quality level in service provision is 
guaranteed by public institutions which impose nursing homes the satisfaction of a number of 
formal quality standards as a requisite for service delivery and public reimbursement. In particular, 
over the last eight-six years, service design has been largely shaped by the system of license and 
certification identified by the Framework Law 328/2000. Licensing refers to the formal verification 
by a public body concerning the fact that a specific provider meets the standards to operate in the 
market, whereas certification refers to the possibility for that provider to operate as a node of the 
national health system. Licensing and certification, provided by the Regions and Provinces, are 
considered as the main tools through which the quality of the service is guaranteed in the formal 
care. As Casanova (2012) highlights, “in general, the certification reflects the necessity of 
evaluating the response to a need for care and its standardization, with the aim of overseeing and 
improving the quality of the response” (Casanova 2012). Regional variations are inevitable but 
their common source in the above-mentioned Framework Law and intensive bureaucratic and 
legislative activities over the past decade by regional governments actually resulted in relatively 
similar regulations. The most important indicators used across regions are structural requisites 
(characteristics of the rooms and identification of service modules) and functional conditions. The 
last ones impose not only a minimum number of professionals’ hours for user, but also the 
standardization of managers and professionals’ procedures that have to be traced in order to build 
service quality indicators. Even if identified at regional level, the national system of licensing and 
certification allowed to choose organizations belonging to different regions without the risk for 
comparability and with the advantage of increased variability. In order to identify the 
organizations representative of the four categories, the companies were selected on the basis of 
informal networking and a structured interview to managers about the level of standards adopted 
in the organization of labor, the degree of autonomy for each role and task, and the type of 
investment made as support to caregivers’ work (in equipment, training etc.). In the end, five 
organizations were identified; three cooperatives and two investor owned enterprises.  
The organizations in which literal replication logic is applied, Chiocciola and S. Lorenzo, are multi-
stakeholder social cooperatives of equal dimensions (60 bed spots), situated in the same town, 
Florence, and belonging to the same consortium of cooperatives, Consorzio Zenit. The consortium 
– dealing also with supporting cooperative’s administration – is a dynamic reality that carries out 
and finances research activity in order to improve service quality.   It promotes the homogeneity 
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of quality standards within its partners by requiring the fulfilment of licensing standards and by 
organizing professionals’ training. However, the organizations have also been developing 
independently of each other. Located in different areas of Florence, they have been managed for 
more than ten years by the same coordinators who have developed their own specific style in the 
interaction with the employees and clients. Thus, on the one hand, the presence of the 
Consortium promotes uniformity among organizations, on the other hand, their separate 
evolution allows for some variability. In these organizations, managers’ interviews show that 
caregivers have clearly defined tasks to daily perform and receive annual training activities 
required by accreditation. Given the central role of accreditation in the promotion of service 
quality, such organizations have not considered as necessary further investing in standards or 
sustaining providers’ capabilities. As such, they are considered as representative of the third 
category (low investment in standards, low investments in capabilities). 
 
Concerning the other three organizations, Arsia is a large IOE situated in Milan in which, according 
to management, caregivers have to strictly follow a protocol in which the time required by each 
task is contemplated. The organization, in fact, has invested in operation management strategy to 
reduce uncertainty of performance and, this way, reduce production costs. This organization is 
expression of the fourth category; very high investment in standards, low investments in 
capabilities. Villa Niccolini is a IOE with 82 bed spots, situated in Prato, in which caregivers have 
low degree of autonomy in the organization of labor but receive psychological support in the 
relationships with users and colleagues. This company has been included in the sample as 
representative of the second category (high investment in standards, high investments in 
capabilities). Finally, Stella Montis is a multi-stakeholder social cooperative with 60 bed spots, 
located in Fondo (TN), that promotes caregivers’ participation to governance by systematically 
investing in training activities to support relationships with colleagues and patients and by 
supporting the creation of thematic working groups to face organizational problems or promote 
new working strategies. For this reason, it is considered a good representative of the first 





3.3. Data Collection 
 
3.3.1. Surveys and interviews  
 
In order to evaluate the different types of governance, service design and management and their 
relation with UPC, I made face to face in-depth interviews to the managers and submitted the 
same survey to professionals of each organization (caregivers, physiotherapists, animators and 
nurses with the exception of cleaners), including also workers with a fixed term contract.  For the 
reader to have a more precise idea of the kind of questions asked and the structure of the survey, 
a template of the survey is available in Appendix 1. The survey in general asked subjective 
questions about their working activity. It contains 75 questions divided in five sections, namely 
‘Personal information’, ‘Motivating factors’, ‘Governance’, ‘Satisfaction’ and a fifth part 
‘Certification procedure’ reserved to those having worked at least six years in the organization. 
The survey is largely based on the one adopted by Stella Montis every two years for evaluating 
workers’ satisfaction. Because of the necessary modifications adopted for the purpose of our 
analysis, the survey was first tested in a nursing home not included in our sample, by asking a 
couple of caregivers to fill it out. Since changes were required, I tested it again with another 
couple of caregivers in another organization (again excluded from our sample). Finally, the survey 
was submitted by the manager of each organization on the basis of stringent procedures that I had 
exposed in person and then left written in a document (see Appendix 2). Following the 
procedures, the manager had to explain the caregivers the type of research and the importance of 
their contribution for improving working conditions. As the survey was anonymous, the managers 
had to provide each survey in one envelop and, once filled out, each caregiver had to seal the 
envelop and put it inside a box that, according to the procedures, had to be collocated in a 
common area. Because of five working shifts over the week, not all the caregivers could receive 
the survey on the same day. Thus, each organization was allowed 15 days to submit the survey, 
over which the survey was proposed to most of workers. Then I received the box back by 
managers. In general, data collection took place during a one-month period: from the 1st to the 
31th of March 2016. 251 surveys were submitted, 184 different answers were collected and 181 
were kept for the analysis. However, since focus centered on caregivers with a permanent 
contract, in order to preserve homogeneity between the sample and the population under 
analysis, I dropped all surveys that indicated a level of education higher than high school 
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(corresponding to all professionals with the exclusion of caregivers)57 and those that indicated a 
fixed term contract (or left unanswered the question). The other answers being incomplete or 
irrelevant for different motives. Therefore, the sample (122 respondents) represents 64.25% of 
the total population studied.  
 
 
3.3.2. Administrative data 
 
 
Administrative data have been collected to build a potential measure of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 and obtain a 
general description of the organizations (dimensions, ownership structure) and their population 
(number of women, strangers, fixed term contract). To build an index of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2 I used the annual 
sick leave hours58 for each caregiver with a permanent contract over the period 2011-2015 and 
the relative annual worked hours (with the exclusion of overtime). In the context of LTC 
organizational structure, caregivers’ hours of sick leave may represent important informative data 
as they reveal costs for substitution and service quality. In fact, on the one hand, high absence 
levels translate in the organization’s need to pay overtime hours or to temporarily employ a 
substitute; on the other hand, caregivers’ sporadic attendance prevents high service quality by 
preventing the continuity of care.  
 
In order to have a comparable measure of caregivers’ hours of sick leave within time series and 
across organizations, for any caregiver I have calculated the annual hours of sick leave (SL) over 
the expected working hours (EXP) during the period 2011-201559. Calculation over five years 
increases data stability and facilitates comparison across the organizations. EXP data correspond 
to the expected working hours by contract and it has been calculated by adding worked hours 
(excluding overtime hours) and sick leave hours60. For the purpose of this study, such data have 
                                                      
57 to be sure about it, I asked managers whether other professional had a degree and whether there were caregivers 
with a degree. In all cases, as expected, it was confirmed the absence of caregivers with a degree and the presence of 
only professionals with a degree. 
58 It is to be noted that the organizations cover the all sick leave costs for the first three days. From the 4th to the 20th 
day, the organization pays the 50% of the expected wage and from the 21st to 180th day pays the 33.34%, while the 
remaining part is paid by the Italian Social Insurance Institute, INPS. 
59 In order to use annual data over the mentioned period, first it was necessary to check that no change had been 
occurred in the population of permanent workers between January and March period. This information was given by 
managers. 
60 This calculation method has been preferred to the one that subtract hours of absence different from illness to the 
expected working time because the type and number of hours of absences that employee can do is established not by 
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been considered only for workers with a permanent contract. This is because in presence of a 
fixed term contract, the organization necessarily relies on workers’ extrinsic motivations to 
promote production efficiency thanks to the threat of not renewing the contract. Since we are 
interested in analyzing the amount of sick leave as a measure of UPC and, hence, of the 
organization’s ability to intrinsically motivate production efficiency, we have restricted our study 
to employees having a permanent contract. 
Outliers have been excluded from the calculation of UPC over the five years. The exclusion 
criterion was the presence of a large number of sick leave hours for a certified health reason 
(attested physical limitations or serious illness) or for important personal problems (single 
mothers, recognized family problems, etc..), namely situations not affected by the organizational 
characteristics. To this purpose for each organization, I have sorted the five-year-distribution in 
increasing ordered data and highlighted workers’ sick leave hours collocated above the ninetieth 
percentile. Then I have shown the file to managers of each organization and I asked them whether 
workers’ absence had been certified. Moreover, I asked them whether there were other 
individuals with a frail health status placed below the ninetieth percentile. Caregivers identified by 
managers were considered as outliers since their sick leave hours could not be influenced by the 
type of organization. Having the list of caregivers for each year, it was possible to calculate 
turnover from one year to next and, hence, the mean as indicator of the stability of the 
organization.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
the single contracts but by law and collective bargaining and, hence, it is scarcely proportionated to the number of 
worked hours expected by contract. 
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3.4. Data Results 
 
This section analyses data collected to evaluate whether the evidences support the hypothesis 
about the role of the organizational structure as engine of a cycle promoting or deterring external 
efficiency. First, I provide a general description of all the organizations, which allows to evaluate 
their main differences and similarities. After having shown that the organizations belonging to 
different categories display different levels of sick leave hours, I ask whether such differences can 
be explained in the light of the hypothesized model on the basis of the different organizational 
characteristics. The analysis starts with the purpose to establish whether a relationship exists 
between the level of sick leave hours and the motivational/satisfaction level. To this regard, the 
different percentage of answer to the survey reveals the presence of a self-selection problem, 
which partly complicates the analysis. The study of the sample characteristics suggest that 
caregivers’ motivation may depend also on personal factors, especially in the most hierarchical 
organizations. Thus, the percentage of answer is used as alternative index of intrinsic motivation 
because, despite its conciseness, concerns the overall population and largely reflects the 
organizational incentives. The four case studies are then presented, in which governance, 
management and service design are analyzed on the basis of caregivers’ answers to the survey and 
interviews to the managers. In order to visualize organizational differences and explore the 
connection with the level of UPC, the blueprinting of the service design is built for each institution. 
In this context, instead of starting with the user’s action (as usually happens), the chart is created 
on the basis of the caregivers’ evaluation of the organization. The case studies allow to identify 
different types and levels of cooperation capabilities developed in each organizational type; in 
Arsia, Chiocciola and S. Lorenzo (the last two categories), cooperation capabilities emerge only in 
spontaneous ways, but in Villa Niccolini and Stella Montis they are sustained by their 
organizational structures. In particular, while in Villa Niccolini (second category) capabilities 
concern approach in communication in order to reduce the burn-out problem, in Stella Montis 
(first category), capabilities concern also the strategies to be adopted in order to increase 
caregivers’ empowerment. Finally, the relationship between some fundamental organizational 
characteristics and satisfaction levels is studied thanks to regression analysis on the 122 
respondents. The resulting evidences suggest that some important organizational characteristics 
(type of governance and level of training) affect the level of satisfaction across the organizations 
representing the four categories.  
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3.4.1. General description of the organizations 
 
In this section, the description of the main organizational variables allows to identify the first 
differences and similarities among nursing homes across the different categories. As it will be 
documented, such data partly come from surveys, partly from the administrative office of each 
organization. This means that they refer to two partly different populations; the one of 
respondents and the one fully representative of caregivers. 
 
Table  3 - Main organizational characteristics of the sampled nursing homes in 2015 
 Bed spots AWU (ULA) ownership province 
Arsia 150 50.4 IOE MI 
Chiocciola 60 26.5 coop FI 
S. Lorenzo 60 27.7 coop FI 
Stella Montis 60 25.2 coop TN 
Villa Niccolini 82 34.6 IOE PO 
 
Source: administrative data 
 
As Table 3 shows, organizations display various ownership structures and organizational 
dimensions. As indices of the last element, I have adopted the number of bed spots and the 
average working unit(AWU)61. This measure corresponds to the number of workers employed in 
absence of part-time contracts. Three of them (Chiocciola, S. Lorenzo and Stella Montis) are social 
cooperatives that are organized in order to assist 60 users62. Differences in the number of AWU is 
reasonably due not much to the differences in the effectively occupied bed spots, but in the 
legislative requisites and how bed spots are positioned in the building63. If we look at Figure 12, 
we can see that the number of members largely changes across organizations. In particular, the 
different percentage of members in Stella Montis and in the two organizations belonging to the 
consortium, could suggest a greater use of cooperation mechanism in S. Lorenzo and Chiocciola. 
The restriction of membership is itself directed to guarantee that members are effectively 
involved in the governance, not only in a formal, but also in a substantial way. The other workers 
                                                      
61 This is calculated by dividing the total number of worked hours in a week by the number of expected full-time 
worked hours (38 hours per week). 
62 It may happen that the structure has vacant bed spots, however, it is in the interest of the organizations to find new 
users. In this circumstance, in Tuscany, professional hours required do not change and the organization has to cover 
the relative costs. 
63 While in S. Lorenzo bed spots are placed on three different floor, in Chiocciola they are placed on the same floor. 
Hence, in order to meet the requirement concerning the number of caregivers for bed spots, in case of S. Lorenzo 
meant to have more hours compared to minimum required.  
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may become members overtime, when they get better acquainted with the organization, or be 
simple employees, who are nonetheless an important stakeholder of the organization. Moreover, 
as stated in the first chapter, what firstly matters is the presence of cooperative governance at the 
level of working relationships during the productive activity (involving some sharing of decision 
rights in the production process) that generates a multi-stakeholder governance and to a lesser 
extent the presence of cooperation at corporate governance level (involving the sharing of 
strategic decisions and alienation rights). In line with this reasoning, our results show greater use 
of cooperation in Stella Montis than in Chiocciola and S.Lorenzo. Conversely, Arsia and Villa 
Niccolini are investor owned enterprises with very different dimensions both in terms of bed spots 
and AWU (see Table 3). Given the potential benefits deriving from economies of scale, the very 
large dimension of Arsia may partly explain its misleading tendency to minimize production costs 




Figure 12 - Percentage of members within cooperatives 
 
 
Source: survey (perc_answer: Chiocciola 79%, S. Lorenzo 67 %, Stella Montis 77%) 
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Additional and important information come from the analysis of gender, nationality and age of the 
working population. 
 
Table  4 - Number of Italians and Foreigners in the sampled organizations 




Italian 18 (28%) 16 (52%) 13 (38%) 29 (81%) 33 (77%) 
Foreigners 46 (72%) 15 (48%) 21 (62%) 7 (19%) 10 (23%) 
Source: administrative data 
 
 
Table  5 – Gender differences across organizations 




Female 44 (69%) 25 (81%) 26 (76%) 30 (94%) 39 (91%) 
Male 20 (31%) 6 (19%) 8 (24%) 2 (6%) 4 (9%) 
Source: administrative data 
 
As Table 4 and Table 5 show, while female percentage is very high in all the organizations from a 
minimum of 69% in Arsia to 94% in Stella Montis, different is the case for citizenship. Arsia in this 
case is the nursing home with the greatest number of foreigners (72%), followed by S. Lorenzo and 
Chiocciola (62% and 48%), while Stella Montis and Villa Niccolini are the ones with the lowest 
percentage (19% and 23%)64. This is an important information that could allow to explain along 
with the turnover level, the ability of the organizations to create a participative governance. 
According to Hansmann (1996), homogeneity of membership lowers transaction costs. 
Consistently, we can expect that the organizations with high percentage of foreigners (along with 
a high turnover) are more heterogeneous and, hence, find more difficulties in sustaining a good 
communication level than the organizations in which people speak the same language, have 
similar cultural benchmarks and work in the same organization for a long time. To this regard, 
however, data on turnover65 of permanent caregivers are quite low (see Table 6), suggesting that 
all the organizations had time to try to promote participative governance.  
 
                                                      
64 Different percentage of strangers can be explained by the different extent and type of migration flux in different 
territories, along with the length of time of the phenomenon and presence of intermediary services to obtain Italian 
certifications required by law. 
65 Having the list of caregivers for each year, it was possible to calculate turnover from one year to next and, hence, 
the mean as indicator of the stability of the organization. Turnover was calculated as follows 
∑ 𝑡𝑜𝑡.𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡+𝑡𝑜𝑡.  𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡.𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡
, 
where 𝑡𝑜𝑡. 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡. 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜𝑡. 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 
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Table  6 – 2011- 2015 Turnover of permanent workers across organizations in percentage 
Turnover (%) 2011(out) 2012 2013 2014 2015 (in) MEAN 
Arsia 7 14 8 17 6 10 
Chiocciola 9 3 0 17 0 4 
S. Lorenzo 9 6 10 10 7 7 
Stella Montis 0 4 7 7 0 4 
Villa Niccolini 2 19 13 15 10 14 
Source: administrative data 
 
Data on nationality are interesting too if considered along with the number of women (see Figure 
13). In fact, we could expect that foreign women – who usually care for children or dependent 
relatives - cannot rely on a social network in case of emergency, so that they may use sick leave 
hours to look after them66. This reason may provide a rival explanation with respect to my 
hypothesis, as the level of sick leave hours may depend on this personal condition, not only on the 
organizational characteristics. This variable should be especially considered in case of Arsia, the 
organization belonging to the fourth category, namely the one with a high investment in standards 
and low investment in coordination capabilities, as foreigner women represent more than half of 
the workers (56%). However, as shown in table 7, sick leave hours data of foreigner workers are 
on average lower than in case of Italians. This result could be explained by the fact that they may 
















                                                      
66 Concerning child’s illness, according to law (D. Lgs. 151/2001), up to 3 years old, the mother or father can be absent 
whenever it is required but without any retribution (they only continue to make contributions for eventual pension); 
after 3 years old to 8 years old, mother or father has only 5 days available; after 8 years old, specific days are not 
accorded. Parental leave is also recognized for serious family reasons for up to two years but it is unpaid (Law 
53/2000) 
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Table  7 - Average sick leave hours of foreigner/Italian workers over the period 2011-2015 
 
Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Villa Niccolini Stella Montis 
Italian Foreigner Italian Foreigner Italian Foreigner Italian Foreigner Italian Foreigner 
10.6 9.1 5 3.2 5.3 4.7 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.8 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
Other important data to be considered concern the average workers’ age (see Table 7). In 
Chiocciola and Villa Niccolini (with an average age greater than 47), the population is older than in 
Stella Montis, S. Lorenzo and Arsia, where the population is about 45 years old. This fact can 
influence the level of sick leave hours in the organizations, because with ageing, the working 
population is frailer. 
Table  8 - Average workers’ age at 03/2016 
 
age mean sd min max 
Arsia 44.63 8.27 28 56 
Chiocciola 47.32 9.42 30 69 
S. Lorenzo 45.11 8.9 30 64 
Stella Montis 45.33 9.8 27 63 
Villa Niccolini 47.2 10.9 22 62 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
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Finally, valuable information comes from the number of annual temporary and permanent 
contracts. In general terms, we can see in Table 10 that all the organizations rely on permanent 
contracts. With the exception of Arsia (where values are uneven), over the five years all the 
organizations have maintained similar percentage of permanent contract hours over the total. 
Temporary contracts are usually used for substitution reasons. The singularity of Arsia, according 
to management, has been due to the ownership will to reduce, for cost reduction reasons, the 
number of assistance hours (very high) closer to the minimum legal requisites. This requires 
management to reduce over time the number of fixed term contracts, which incredibly dropped 
from 60336 hours in 2011 to 15915 hours in 2015 (see Table 8). Conversely, the number of 
permanent contract hours has an irregular trend from 2011 to 2015 (see Table 10). Therefore, in 
all the organizations, data on permanent contract hours inform about an important opportunity 
for their governance, namely establishing and nurturing relationships with the personnel on the 
basis not of extrinsic but of intrinsic motivations. Moreover, combined with data on turnover and 
on working time, they show that personnel are highly stable and, hence, that the organizations, at 
least over this five-years-period, had the opportunity to promote the desired working rules and an 
organizational climate suitable for their objectives.  
 
Table  9 – Absolute and percentage number of annual fixed term contract hours  
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 MEAN 
ARSIA 60336 37064 11343 8270 15915 26586 
 0,46 0,35 0,13 0,1 0,17 0,24 
CHIOCCIOLA 9353 7993 7131 7834 6228 7707 
 0,16 0,14 0,14 0,15 0,13 0,14 
S. LORENZO 4888 3169 5509 8013 6595 5634 
 0,1 0,07 0,12 0,16 0,13 0,12 
STELLA MONTIS 9513 9345 8024 767 5128 6555 
 0,23 0,22 0,19 0,02 0,12 0,16 
VILLA NICCOLINI 3060,25 3852,75 3713 2998 6208,46 3966 
 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,1 0,06 
Source: administrative data 
 
Table  10- Total number of annual caregivers’ hours 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 MEAN 
ARSIA 129531 104657 87974 77834 91861 98371 
CHIOCCIOLA 59822 56066 51591 51711 48264 53491 
S. LORENZO 50897 47480 46986 49738 50513 49123 
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STELLA MONTIS 41038 42723 42776 39947 45989 42495 
VILLA NICCOLINI 63157,5 66488,76 65502,25 66257 63004,96 64882 
       
Source: administrative data 
 
Table  11– Absolute and percentage number of annual permanent contract hours 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015          MEAN 
ARSIA 69195 67593 76631 69564 75946 71786 
 
0,53 0,64 0,87 0,89 0,83 0,75 
CHIOCCIOLA 50470 48073 44460 43877 42037 45783 
 
0,84 0,86 0,86 0,85 0,87 0,86 
S. LORENZO 46010 44311 41477 41725 43918 43488 
 
0,9 0,93 0,88 0,84 0,87 0,88 
STELLA MONTIS 31525 33379 34753 39179 40861 35939 
 
0,77 0,78 0,81 0,98 0,88 0,84 
VILLA NICCOLINI 60097,25 62636,01 61789,25 63261 56796,5 60916 
 0,95 0,94 0,94 0,95 0,9 0,94 
 
Source: administrative data 
 
 
In conclusion, such data provide a general description of the main contractual dimensions of the 
organizations. What emerges is that the companies – despite their different ownership and 
dimensions – have promoted stable relationships with their personnel, justifying hence an 
investigation on the role of governance, management and service design in shaping caregivers’ 
behavior. Because of important differences in the number of foreigners, we can reasonably expect 
that in the more ‘international’ organizations, it has been more difficult to promote participative 
governance at least because of group heterogeneity. However, the low turnover and high 
percentage of permanent contracts suggests that this effect has been reduced or, at least, could 
have been reduced if wanted. Finally, the different percentage of foreign women has to be taken 
into account when evaluating the meaning of sick leave hours, because these could be due also to 
family problems.  
 
 
3.4.2. Sick leave hours across organizations 
 
Table 11 shows the evolution of sick leave hours across organizations over the period 2011-2015. 
As it can be seen, despite the number of absences varies across years, no increasing or decreasing 
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trend characterizes the period that, hence, is unlikely to be influenced by any exogenous 
phenomenon. As expected, the organizations expressing the four categories show differences in 
the level of absences for illness over the time span and, hence, also in the mean value. Arsia (first 
category) results as the nursing home with the highest amount of average sick leave hours (9.6%), 
as expected because of its organizational characteristics. Chiocciola and S. Lorenzo (second 
category) – despite their high number of members among caregivers – show a medium level of 
absences (respectively of 4.3% and 5.5%) and this could be explained by the low participatory 
organization of labor. Villa Niccolini (third category), despite its for-profit ownership structure, 
displays a level of absences much lower than the cooperatives Chiocciola and S. Lorenzo (2.7%). 
Finally, Stella Montis (fourth category) is the organization with the lowest level of sick leave hours.  
 
Table  12 – Time series 2011-2015 of sick leave hours/ expected worktime  
Illness hours/Exp. 
Worktime (%) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 MEAN 
Arsia (I) 9.8 10.2 8.9 9.5 9.4 9.6 
Chiocciola (II) 4.6 3.9 5.1 3.7 4.2 4.3 
S. Lorenzo (II) 6.1 4.8 4.4 4.5 5.4 5.1 
Villa Niccolini (III) 3.7 2.3 2.2 1.6 3.7 2.7 
Stella Montis (IV) 1.7 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.8 
Source: Author’s calc. based on administrative data 
The purpose of this research is to establish whether a relation can be identified between the 
different amount of absences and the organizational structures of the companies belonging to 
different categories. In particular, a relation that supports the hypothesis about the presence of a 
virtuous or vicious cycle. The different percentage of answer to the survey partly complicates the 
analysis of the cycles by creating a self-selection problem. After having analyzed the characteristics 
of the self-selected sample, the respondents’ answers on their motivational level will be analyzed 
along with the type of relationship with the level of sick leave hours.  
 
 
3.4.3. Self-selection problem and respondents’ identity 
 
In order to apply the interpretative model to the study of the five organizations, it is fundamental 
to take into account that the percentage of respondents across organizations largely varies and, 
hence, that a self-selection problem exists. The anonymous character of the survey does not allow 
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to clearly match each respondent with the corresponding level of sick leave hours. Before 
continuing our analysis, therefore, it is necessary to establish who exactly were respondents.  
 
Table 12 displays the percentage of answer to surveys across organizations. The highest value is in 
case of Villa Niccolini (83%), followed by Chiocciola and Stella Montis (79% and 77%) and by S. 
Lorenzo and Arsia (67% and 42%). Some hints on their identity are, nevertheless, obtainable. First, 
we have evaluated whether the sample was adequately representative of population. To this 
purpose, I have used as control variable ‘worktime’. As it can be seen in Table 13, population and 
sample means of worktime is similar, as well as the percentages of population and sample having 
worked at least 10 years. The sample of respondents can be considered as representative of the 
population, since no relevant distortion is detected. 
 







Arsia 52 22 0.42 
Chiocciola 29 23 0.79 
S. Lorenzo 30 20 0.67 
Stella Montis 31 24 0.77 
Villa Niccolini 40 33 0.83 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 





Tot. Organizations 8.4 8.0 
Source: Author’s calc. based on administrative and survey’s data 
 






Tot. Organizations 54 55 
Source: Author’s calc. based on administrative and survey’s data 
 
Given that the sample of respondents is representative of the population, then we calculated the 
correlation between the means of sick leave hours and of answer percentage. The resulting value 
is negative and extremely high (-0.9412) and statistically significant (0.000 p-value). Such 
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correlation suggests that respondents are those having made the lowest level of absences within 
each organization. Another confirmation in favor of this interpretation comes from the analysis of 
the distribution of 2011-2015 sick leave hours of the permanent workers having received the 
survey. Figure 14 shows that the number of respondents could be included among the number of 
workers having made an absence level below 5% (with the exception of C. for two elements that 
are just above the 0.5 line). Given the good representativeness of the sample, this fact reinforces 
the hypothesis that respondents are those having made the lowest level of absence within their 
organizations, that are assumed to have stronger intrinsic motivations.  
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3.4.4. Motivation and Satisfaction Levels across Organizations 
 
In the first chapter, intrinsic motivations have been regarded as a fundamental engine for the 
creation of new knowledge and the development of coordination capabilities.  Consistently, 
satisfaction related to personal and team results should be considered as a fundamental objective 
for the organization in order to increase and maintain over time high intrinsic motivations among 
workers. As it will be shown, most of respondents declare to be highly motivated about most of 
aspects in all the organizations. Such information, however, needs to be analyzed by taking into 
account the self-selection problem. In particular, the negative relation between the average 
motivational factors and sick leave hours suggests that respondents (workers with low absence 
levels) find motivational sources also in their personal background, especially in the most 
hierarchical organization, where we expect a negative influence by the institution. This 
interpretation is consistent with the hypothesized model. Because of the self-selection problem, 
the variable ‘percentage of answer to the survey’, can be considered as an index of the level of 
intrinsic motivation to work, which concerns the entire population and is reasonably affected by 
the organizational structures.  
The 34 questions on motivation and satisfaction can be collected in four different aspects: 
- Relationship with the users (intrinsic motivation); 
- Relationship with colleagues and manager (intrinsic motivation); 
- Learning and ability to contribute to organizational goals (intrinsic motivation); 
- Remuneration and conciliation work-private life (extrinsic motivation). 
The survey was structured so that a clear comparison could be drawn among motivating factors 
and the relative levels of satisfaction: issues identified as source of motivations are then asked to 
be evaluated in terms of satisfaction. In order to avoid confusion among the elements of 
motivation and satisfaction, the survey visibly separates questions on motivation and satisfaction, 
placing the first at the beginning of the survey and the second at the end. Besides, among the 
instructions for managers it was required to highlight the differences between motivating and 
satisfaction aspects, suggesting strategies of explanation.  
 
Relationship with the user 
In general, data show that caregivers attribute high value to the relationship with the user. On a 
scale between 1 (not important) and 7 (very important), mean value for motivation is usually 
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greater than 6 and also the level of satisfaction is high (greater than 5) (see Table 15). Coefficients 
of variation67 (CV) are low concerning answers on motivation but they are higher in the evaluation 
of satisfaction, suggesting that in each institution, greater divergence of views concerns their 
satisfaction level.  
 
Table  16 – Motivation and satisfaction level in the relationship with users 
Legend: 
Mot_1/Sat_1 - helping elderly to improve their quality of life 
Mot_3/Sat_3- Being able to influence the organization of your work so as to better meet the needs of the guests 
Mot_6/Sat_6- Having a good relationship with patients 
Mot_7/Sat_7- Participating to social and animation activities with patients 
Mot_16/Sat_18- Entering in synthon with users and his/her own needs 
 
  Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
Mot_1 mean 6.67 6.91 6.32 6.25 6.73 
CV 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.08 
Sat_1 mean 5.55 5.74 5.45 5.79 5.18 
CV 0.35 0.28 0.17 0.15 0.32 
Mot_3 mean 6.34 6.39 6.02 6.04 6.43 
CV 0.14 0.1 0.14 0.13 0.12 
Sat_3 mean 5.31 5.54 5.05 5.44 5.21 
CV 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.36 
Mot_6 mean 6.72 6.91 6.5 6.61 6.73 
CV 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.08 
Sat_6 mean 5.95 6.68 6.1 6.08 5.96 
CV 0.27 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.21 
Mot_7 mean 6.13 6.26 5.75 5.83 5.97 
CV 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.19 
Sat_7 mean 5.26 5.47 5.53 5.71 5.36 
CV 0.32 0.3 0.24 0.17 0.34 
Mot_16 mean 6.35 6.81 6.65 6.65 6.76 
CV 0.22 0.06 0.1 0.07 0.08 
Sat_18 mean 5.85 6.3 6.1 5.75 6 
CV 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.21 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
In general, we can see that the level of satisfaction is only a bit lower than the level of motivation 
concerning the all aspects and that the level of intrinsic motivation is very high across 
                                                      
67 Coefficient of variation is a standardized measure of dispersion defined as the ratio of the standard deviation 𝜎 to the 
absolute value of the mean |𝜇|. 
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organizations. If we build two indices of motivation and satisfaction -obtained as sum of the 
variables concerning the relationship with users, we obtain a high correlation coefficient (0.46). 
The lack of great differences can be at least partly explained by the different percentage of 
answers in the organizations, with the lowest level in Arsia (42%), hierarchical organization that 
represents the fourth category. Moreover, in the light of our model, the absence of any relation – 
at organizational level – between sick leave hours and satisfaction indices (see Figure 16) can be 
explained with the fact that caregivers have different motivational sources from the organization. 
Especially for motivational factors related to the relationship with users, this is reasonably 
expected. In fact, the level of motivation may largely depend on vocation and past experiences. 
Finally, to some extent, this result may be also due to the low analytical power of the survey 
instrument to deeply understand individuals’ motivations, instrument that however is 
fundamental when the population to investigate is large as in this case.  










Internal working relationships 
  
Experiencing positive relationships with the colleagues and the manager is considered as a highly 
important motivating factor, as the mean values in Table 16 show. 
 
Table  17 - Motivation and satisfaction level in the relationship with colleagues and management 
Legend: 
Mot_8/Sat_8 – Experiencing a supportive and collaborative climate with colleagues 
Mot_9/Sat_9 - Participating to activities for socializing with colleagues (dinners, tours, parties etc.) 
Mot_13/Sat_ 14- Trusting colleagues 
Mot_14/Sat_ 15- Trusting manager 
 
  Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
Mot_8 mean 6.13 6.45 6 6.46 6.45 
CV 0.16 0.15 0.2 0.11 0.1 
Sat_8 mean 4.33 5.17 4.84 5.08 5.03 
CV 0.39 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.27 
Mot_9 mean 4.53 5.18 4.6 5.26 5.06 
CV 0.48 0.29 0.33 0.23 0.34 
Sat_9 mean 3.44 3.91 4 4.83 4.27 
CV 0.58 0.49 0.39 0.31 0.43 
Mot_13 mean 5.24 6.5 5.75 6.26 6.24 
CV 0.1 0.1 0.26 0.17 0.22 
Sat_14 mean 4.14 4.39 4.7 5.04 4.54 
CV 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.22 0.4 
Mot_14 mean 5.81 6.67 6.1 6.56 6.54 
CV 0.29 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.1 
Sat_15 mean 4.29 5.65 5.5 5.75 5.18 
CV 0.51 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.40 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Concerning the relationships with the manager, caregivers were called to evaluate to what extent 
it is important having the possibility to trust the manager.  As Figure 16 shows, most of workers in 
all the organizations regard the possibility to trust manager as a central motivating factor to work; 
value 6 and 7 were chosen by 96% of caregivers in Stella Montis, 91% in Chiocciola and 88% in Villa 
Niccolini, while in S. Lorenzo and Arsia it was chosen by 75% and 71% of the sample. However, 
different is the value given to the linked satisfaction level. In Stella Montis, in Chiocciola and in 
Villa Niccolini around 60% of respondents chose level 6-7, in S. Lorenzo 50% of the sample and, 
finally, in Arsia – with a bimodal distribution on value 1 and 6 – only 43 % of caregivers chose that 
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value. The different levels can be interpreted on the one hand as a reflex of the effective role of 
the manager in their daily activities and on the other hand as a reflex of the quality of the 
relationship with this person, which, especially in hierarchical organizations, is central to preserve 
caregivers’ effective behavior. Concerning the relationships with colleagues, data on satisfaction 
quite differ with respect to the evaluation on management. Through a comparison of Figure 18 
and 19 concerning the levels of motivation and satisfaction, we can note that modes in satisfaction 
distributions are shifted from values 6 or 7 to level 5, with the exception of Arsia in which mode is 
still on 6 but values are very dispersed as coefficient of variation shows (0.51). These data confirm 
a general difficulty to establish good interpersonal connections with colleagues when they are 
called to collaborate and support each other. However, interesting is the distribution of answer to 
the issue “Participating to activities for socializing with colleagues” as source of motivation (see 
Figure 20). In Stella Montis, where the organization supports participative governance and 
cooperation among colleagues, most of respondents considers socialization activities with 
colleagues an important motivating factor. This data informs about the instrumental role of playful 
activities toward the creation of a cohesive team. 
 














Figure 19 - Distribution of ‘Trusting colleagues’ satisfaction level 
 
 
Figure 20 - Distribution of ‘activities with colleagues’ motivation level 
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Two motivating and satisfaction factors whose level not only necessarily depend on the 
organizational characteristics, but also essentially affects the organizations’ ability to promote 
coordination capabilities, are the following: 1) the existence of fair and equal relationships and 2) 
recognition and appreciation of personal efforts. As Table 17 shows, both variables are on average 
considered very important (most of the means are greater than 6). Being treated in equal and 
transparent manner is generally considered as fundamental motivating factor especially in 
Chiocciola and Villa Niccolini, where the 91% attributed to it a very high level. Instead, with 
respect to satisfaction, caregivers on average are quite disappointed and their opinion largely 
differs between each other, as large coefficient of variation (greater than 0.30 in almost all cases) 
shows up (Table 17). The only exception is Stella Montis where the satisfaction level is higher than 
in Chiocciola and Villa Niccolini and where the coefficient of variation remains quite low with 
values concentrated around the mean. As expected, the lowest value about the fairness of 
treatment has been given by caregivers in Arsia, while in Villa Niccolini and S. Lorenzo respondents 
admit that their personal effort is not adequately recognized. 
 
Table  18 – Quality of the relationships internally to the organization 
Legend: 
Mot_5/Sat_5 - recognition and appreciation of personal effort 
Mot_15/Sat_16 - fair and equitable treatment 
 
  Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
Mot_5 mean 6.2 6.52 6.2 6.52 6.6 
CV 0.27 0.32 0.16 0.08 0.10 
Sat_5 mean 4.61 4.47 4.15 5.21 4.06 
CV 0.38 0.48 0.44 0.18 0.50 
Mot_15 mean 5.9 6.68 6.47 6.58 6.66 
CV 0.3 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.09 
Sat_16 mean 4.55 4.91 5.4 5.29 4.61 
CV 0.42 0.34 0.23 0.19 0.45 








Figure 21 –Quality of internal relationships as motivating factor 
 
 




If we create two indices of motivation and satisfaction that include all the aspects analyzed so far 
concerning internal relationships, as expected, correlation matrix (Table 18) shows that there is a 
correlation between motivation and satisfaction level of 0.25 which is lower than in case of the 
relationships with users (0.46) This is an important information; it means that the organizations 
(largely representing the first two categories) are not able to sustain motivations related to the 
quality of the internal relationships for which the organizations are responsible.  
 
Table  19 – correlation matrix 
 motivation2 satisfaction2 
motivation2 1.0000  
   
satisfaction2 0.2533 1.0000 
 (0.0079)  
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
Despite a negative relation can be identified between sick leave hours and intrinsic motivation to 
work due to internal relationships (see Figure 23), because of the self-selection problem, an 
additional index of intrinsic motivation is required. To this regard, the variable ‘percentage of 
answer’ can be considered as a valuable alternative for two important reasons. First, even if it is a 
synthetic index (as a percentage is) it concerns not the sample but the entire population. Second, 
it is a measure of the caregivers’ motivation to actively participate to their organization’s life that 
reasonably depends on the organization’s ability to incentivize workers’ cooperative behavior. As 
you can see in Figure 24, there is a negative relation between ‘percentage of answer’ and ‘sick 
leave hours’, suggesting, in line with the hypothesized model, that sick leave hours depend on 








Figure 23 – Relationship between motivation and sick leave hours 
 
 




Along with variables on motivation and satisfaction, fundamental it is the respondents’ evaluation 
of the organizational climate, which can be considered as an index of the quality of the 
relationships internal to the organizations and, hence, of the coordination capabilities so far 
developed within the organization. In fact, while motivation is highly subjective and may be the 
result of personal experiences, the latter takes necessarily into account the relationships existing 
within the working environment also for potentially highly demotivated colleagues, who may be, 
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because of the self-selection problem, did not answer. The fact that the climate variable is not 
significantly correlated with motivational factor is an element in support of this interpretation. As 
Figure 25 shows, differences among companies are clearly visible, with Stella Montis having been 
attributed the highest values for all the aspects and Arsia the lowest values. 
 
Figure 25 – Evaluation of organizational climate in each organization 
 
 
If we build an index of the organizational climate made of the main variables68, we see that a 
negative relation exists between the mean value of sick leave hours and the average value of 
organizational climate (see Figure 26). The dimensions of the balls, related to standard deviation, 
show that in Stella Montis (small dimension) is where respondents’ evaluation is more 






                                                      
68 The index is given by the sum of four variables corresponding to questions 9.1, 9.2, 9.4 and 9.7 













Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo
Stella Montis Villa Niccolini
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Figure 26 – Relation between organizational climate and sick leave hours 
 
 
Learning and ability to contribute to organizational goals 
The development of coordination capabilities could not be possible without workers’ interest in 
learning new things (Mot_10), in possession of the knowledge required to carry out their job 
(Mot_11) and keen on contributing to reach the organization’s goals (Mot_12). In this regard, 
Table 19 shows that, on average, caregivers attributed high values to all the three aspects (values 




Table  20 – Learning and ability to contribute to organizational goals 
Legend: 
Mot_10/ Sat_11– Growing professionally and learning new things 
Mot_11/ Sat_12– Having information necessary to do your job 
Mot_12/ Sat_13– contributing to reach the organization's goals 
 
I issue   Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
Mot_10 mean 6.14 6.64 6.3 6.08 6.57 
CV 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Sat_11 mean 4.53 5.04 5.63 5.66 5.48 
CV 0.45 0.29 0.17 0.16 0.3 
II issue  Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
Mot_11 mean 6.33 6.68 6.25 6.26 6.73 
CV 0.19 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.07 
Sat_12 mean 5.04 4.91 5.26 5.38 5.42 
CV 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.32 
III issue  Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
Mot_12 mean 6.24 6.54 5.95 6.25 6.60 
CV 0.09 0.09 0.2 0.08 0.09 
Sat_13 mean 4.8 5.43 5.3 5.55 5.54 
CV 0.39 5.6 0.19 0.22 0.3 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Correlation matrix (see Table 20) shows that some correlation exists between motivation and 
satisfactory levels (0.30), suggesting, hence, that the organizations are quite careful about these 
issues. 
 
Table  21 – correlation matrix 
 Motivation3 satisfaction3 
Motivation3 1.0000  
   
satisfaction3 0.3025 1.0000 
 (0.0011)  
 
 
Remuneration and conciliation of work with private life  
 
The role of extrinsic motivations to work is analyzed in order to understand in which consideration 
they are taken by caregivers in comparison with the intrinsic motivations. For a type of work in 
which the quality of relationships reflects the quality of the service, the role of intrinsic 
 143 
motivations is important. Table 21 shows that, among extrinsic motivations, the possibility to 
conciliate work and private life is on average more evaluated than the wage. As in the first chapter 
was posited, too much attention on extrinsic motivations could crowd out the intrinsic motivations 
necessary to develop coordination capabilities (Frey, 1997). The combined analysis of Tables 15 
and 21 shows that the mean values on remuneration are a bit lower compared to intrinsic 
motivations to work with a higher dispersion of data around the mean. To this regard, it is 
interesting to compare the distribution on mot_4 (remuneration and contractual conditions) in 
Figure 27 and mot_16 (entering in tune harmony with users and his/her own needs) in Figure 28 
as example of intrinsic motivation. While in case of mot_16 data are concentrated on the highest 
values (6-7), mot_2 displays lower evaluations. These figures show that in all the organizations 
respondents work especially on the basis of intrinsic motivations. Nevertheless, as Frey 1997 
argues, remuneration remains an important motivating factor able to promote coordination 
capabilities to the extent that it is not the prevalent source of gratification. To this regard, data 
show that on average caregivers are not satisfied. In Arsia 47% has chosen a value below or equal 
to 4, in Chiocciola 57%, in S. Lorenzo 45%, in Stella Montis 54% and in Villa Niccolini 64%.  
 
Table  22 – Remuneration and conciliation work – family life 
Mot_2/Sat_2 - Being able to reconcile work and family life 
Mot_4/Sat_4 - Remuneration and contractual conditions 
 
  Arsia Chiocciola S. Lorenzo Stella Montis Villa Niccolini 
        Mot_2 mean 5.05 6.04 6 6.5 6.06 
CV 0.43 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.24 
         Sat_2 mean 4.8 5.83 5.05 5.63 5.27 
CV 0.37 0.31 0.3 0.19 0.27 
        Mot_4 mean 5.81 5.77 6 5.74 6.19 
CV 0.3 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.17 
        Sat_4 
 
 
mean 4.77 4.04 4.2 4.34 3.52 
CV 0.33 0.4 0.34 0.3 0.56 






















Figure 29 – Satisfaction related to contractual conditions and remuneration 
 
 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that initial evidence supports the hypothesis concerning a potential 
important role of intrinsic motivations, more than extrinsic ones, and their impact on the level of 
sick leave hours. Despite the level of intrinsic motivations is high across the organizations as 
explained on the basis of the self-selection problem, alternative measures have been identified – 
percentage of answers and the organizational climate - which allow to hypothesize an important 




3.4.5. First case study: the organization of mass-customized services 
 
In this section, I analyze how governance, service design and management are perceived by 
caregivers in the cooperatives Chiocciola (C.) and S. Lorenzo (S.L.). Because of their similar 
characteristics in terms of dimension, working population and membership in the same 
consortium, I analyze them in the light of the literal replication logic, by expecting similar results at 
governance, management and service design level. Preliminary interviews with the management 
allow to understand how labor is organized within both companies and, therefore, to better 
interpret caregivers’ answers to the survey. According to the management, once a month the 
organization of work shift is defined. However, the monthly chart is not much reliable as many 
changes can occur because of requests of permission and other modifications required by 
caregivers (for instance temporary limitation to do night shifts or to perform some tasks, like 
manual handling of users). Hence, a weekly chart is then defined, which again may partly change 
for the above-mentioned reasons. For each shift, tasks are strictly defined as well as the expected 
execution time, so that caregivers should clearly know their function. Despite some training 
courses are sporadically organized on how to improve service quality in the relationship with 
users, no other specific support is provided to caregivers during their daily activity. 
 
3.4.5.1. Hierarchical Governance  
 
In the first chapter, governance – by intervening on the organization of labor - has been 
recognized as a fundamental source of production efficiency when product/service is to be 
personalized because of need complexity. In particular, two governance types have been 
compared, the hierarchical and participative ones. The former sustains workers’ extrinsic 
motivations by defining strict and meticulous rules and procedures (standards and internal 
routines) about the way and time of implementation of production routines. The latter nurtures 
also intrinsic motivations by sustaining self-organization and self-control of performance quality 
and execution times.  
 
In order to identify the type of governance characterizing our first case study, specific questions 
have been posed that, analyzed together, allow to evaluate whether governance is hierarchical or 
participative. Again, on a 1-7 scale, caregivers were asked to evaluate whether they agreed or not 
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with the following statements (1= completely disagree; 7= completely agree), as Table 22 shows. 
To these questions, caregivers of both organizations have answered similarly. 
 
Table  23– Evaluation of governance in C. and S. L. 
Legend: 
Gov_5: Since a hierarchical structure among different roles exists, limit yourself to follow standardized procedures.  
Gov_9: There are clear contact persons 
Gov_10: The role of Union is important to guarantee fair and equal relationships 
Gov_11: Workers, directly participating, reach better results than Union 
  Gov_5 Gov_9 Gov_10 Gov_11 
 Obs. 22 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 5.31 6.32 4.40 4.32 
CV 0.36 0.18 0,5 0.51 
 Obs. 17 18 17 16 
S. Lorenzo Mean 4.65 5.83 3.59 3.81 
CV 0.42 0.28 0.60 0.52 
 Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
On average, the existence of hierarchy is perceived: in C. mean value was 5.31 and in S.L. 4.65 (see 
table 9). As Table 23 shows, in C. 54.54% of respondents agrees with this sentence (chose level 6-
7), while in S. L., only 40%. Differences between the two organization exists but they are not 














Table  24– Evaluation of governance (gov_5) in C. and S. L. 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
The issues gov_10 and gov_11 together allow to understand if workers need Unions to obtain fair 
and equal relationships in the organization of work or, alternatively, they do not need Unions 
because they have entered into a constructive dialogue with colleagues and the manager (in other 
words, they directly participate to the discussion about the creation of a fair and positive working 
relationships). In this way, I obtain workers’ subjective evaluation about the type of governance. 
For instance, if they need Unions about issues like fair work schedule (heaviness of shifts, 
organization of replacements for holidays, disease, injuries etc) and a fair assignment of tasks 
(preparation of meals, cleaning, handling, toileting of patients etc.) it means they do not have any 
type of control on the way and time of implementation of the production process, so the 
governance is hierarchical. Conversely, if they do not need Unions and affirm to obtain better 
results with their own direct participation, it means that they have a type of control over the 
production process that is the result of their direct effort to create a fair environment.   
In Table 22, values of gov_10 and gov_11 show that hierarchy is not perceived as stringent; the 
low mean values obtained for questions on Union (3.95 in Chiocciola and 3.55 in S. Lorenzo) and 
workers’ direct participation (4.59 in C. and 3.68 in S. L.) suggest, on the one hand, the lack of a 
strong internal opposition to directors, on the other hand the low caregivers’ involvement in the 
solution of organizational problems. Moreover, as Figure 30 and 31 show, data are highly 
dispersed (especially concerning issues on Unions, in which CV is 0.56 in Chiocciola and 0.60 in S. 
  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
Gov_5 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
1 2 9.09 9.09 2 11.76 11.76  
2 1 4.55 13.64 1 5.88 17.65  
3 0 0 13.64 1 5.88 23.53  
4 2 9.09 22.73 3 17.65 41.18  
5 5 22.73 45.45 2 11.76 52.94  
6 4 18.18 63.64 6 35.29 88.24  
7 8 36.36 100.00 2 11.76 100.00  
Tot. 22 100.00  17 100.00   
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Lorenzo), meaning that a common vision about the role of Unions and direct participation does 
not exist.  
 
Figure 30  –  The role of Union in C. and S. L. 
 
 




In the light of Figure 32, we can see that a real difference between caregivers in C. and S. L. 
emerges about the clarity of their own roles (gov_2); of colleagues’ roles (gov_6) and about the 
presence of clear contact persons (gov_9). 95% test on the mean of gov_2 shows that the 
organizations’ means are statistically different with a p-value 0.0324. In C., roles and tasks are in 
general more defined than in S. L. where greater confusion may lead caregivers to experience a 
greater sense of frustration and to not identify the sources of organizational problems. This 
difference among the organizations will be confirmed in the part reserved to accreditation, where 
the problem of clarity of tasks emerges one more time.  
 
Table  25 - Evaluation of clarity of roles in C. and S. L. 
Legend: 
Gov_2 - You know your own role and tasks 
Gov_6 - You know your colleagues' tasks 
Gov_9 - There are clear contact persons 
 
  Gov_2 Gov_6 Gov_9 
 Obs 22 21 22 
Chiocciola Mean 6.77 6.29 6.31 
CV 0.08 0.21 0.18 
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 Obs 19 18 18 
S. Lorenzo Mean 6.16 6.11 5.83 
CV 0.16 0.17 0.28 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Figure 32- Clarity of roles and tasks in C. and S. L. 
 
An integrated analysis of the answers to the questions on the ability to cooperate with colleagues 
(gov_1, gov_3, gov_4) provides important information on the level of coordination capabilities so 
far developed by workers.  
 
Table  26 - Evaluation of coordination capabilities developed in C. and S. L. 
Legend: 
Gov_1: You work in group and you are able to cooperate with colleagues 
Gov_3: You would better work in another team 
Gov_4: You would have problems in changing your team 
  Gov_1 Gov_3 Gov_4 
 Obs 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 6.32 4.1 4.41 
CV 0.15 0.54 0.53 
 Obs 19 18 18 
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S. Lorenzo Mean 6 3.06 3.8 
CV 0.16 0.6 0.51 
 Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
As Table 26 displays, in both organizations caregivers attribute themselves good capabilities to 
cooperate with colleagues (gov_1). With a low CV and negative skewness (in C. Skew= -1.17, in S.L. 
Skew= -0.76), most of answers are concentrated on values 6 and 7. 
 
Table  27– Evaluation of capability to work in group in C. and S. L. 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
However, as Table 25 shows, their evaluation of personal coordination capabilities is not 
supported by the answers to questions gov_3 and gov_4, which are about the quality of 
relationships within the workteam; mean values are evidently low. It is to be noted that team 
work could have been interpreted both as the group of caregivers in the organization but also as 
the overall group of workers, including physiotherapists, nurses, animators, and managers. 
Independently of the dimension of the team, Figure 33 clearly reveals that caregivers have not a 
common opinion in this regard. In Table 25 the coefficients of variation of gov_3 and gov_4 show 
that data are highly dispersed around the mean (for both questions CV is greater than 0.5 in C. and 
in S. L.). This means that workers have not a common opinion and, especially, that their opinion 
does not reflect any organization’s strategy to improve capability to work together. 
 
 
  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
Gov_1 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
3 0 0 0 0 0 0  
4 1 4.55 4.55 2 10.53 10.53  
5 3 13.64 18.18 2 10.53 21.05  
6 5 22.73 40.91 9 47.37 68.42  
7 13 59.09 100.00 7 31.58 100.00  
Tot. 22 100.00  19 100.00   
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Figure 33– Evaluation of coordination capabilities in C. and S. L. 
 
 
In general, as the different mean values in Table 25 suggest, workers would have more problems 
to change their workteam rather than to maintain it. This result may be explained with the fact 
that – despite the lack of ad hoc organization’s investments, good friendships have been 
developed on the basis of personal affinities. Low mean of gov_4 (4.41 in C. and 3.94 in S. L. that 
are not statistically different from each other) and high CV (respectively 0.53 and 0.51), in fact, do 
not suggest the development of a common sense of belonging.  Because of this reason, the good 
answer to gov_1 about their capabilities to cooperate is to be explained by the fact that workers 
have answered on the basis of their personal capabilities to stay with colleagues and to change 
work-team and not thanks to any organization’s support.  
 
By taking into account the above results on the type of governance and the level of coordination 
capabilities so far developed with colleagues, we should analyze answers on the sources of 
coordination problems with colleagues (see Table 27). The mean question was “In your opinion, 
why tensions and coordination problems emerge among colleagues?”. In this case, it was asked to 
tick only one box relative to a level to score between 0 (I do not agree) and 3 (I completely agree). 
For most of them, problems emerge in particular times of the day (coord_1). As Table 28 displays, 
in C. 52% and 29% agree and completely agree with this sentence, while in S.L. respectively the 
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33% and 28% of caregivers agree. This result suggests that in absence of shared rules and 
adequate coordination capabilities, individuals are more vulnerable to disputes when they are 
tired. However, an important source of coordination problems with colleagues is due also to 
difficult situations with users and with colleagues, hinting that caregivers have difficulties in 
providing a personalized service especially when patients show serious behavioral problems (for 
instance when affected by Alzheimer disease). Concerning the relationship with colleagues, in 
Chiocciola almost 60% have chosen level 2 and 3, while in S. Lorenzo 50%. F-test on the mean of 
coord_3 and coord_4 show that these are not statistically different, meaning that workers 
similarly perceive the gravity of these sources of coordination problems.  
 
Table  28  – Evaluation of the sources of coordination problems with colleagues in C. and S. L 
LEGEND 
Coord_1: They emerge at certain times of the day  
Coord_2: Lack of a clear leadership 
Coord_3: Particularly difficult situations with some users 
Coord_4: Bad interpersonal relationships with some colleagues 
  Coord_1 Coord_2 Coord_3 Coord_4 
 Obs. 21 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 2.0 1.27 1.64 1.55 
CV 0.4 0.92 0.66 0.68 
 Obs. 18 18 19 19 
S. Lorenzo Mean 1.78 0.5 1.79 1.42 
CV 0.56 1.24 0.63 0.75 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  29– coordination problems in C. and S. L. 
Coord_1  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 1 4.76 4.76 2 11.11 11.11 
1 3 14.29 19.05 5 27.78 38.89 
2 11 52.38 71.43 6 33.33 72.22 
3 6 28.57 100.00 5 27.78 100.00 
Tot. 21 100.00  18 100.00  
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
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3.4.5.2. Management: the lack of a leadership 
 
Within a hierarchical organization, management could make the difference depending on the type 
of relationship established with workers. In the previous chapter, coordinators have been 
recognized as playing a crucial role in sustaining caregivers’ intrinsic motivation to work. For this 
reason, in a survey section, caregivers were asked to answer this question “How is your 
relationship with the manager?” and to tick a box on a 0-3 scale, where 0 = I do not agree, 1 = I do 
not much agree, 2 = I agree, 3= I completely agree. As mean values in Table 29 show, in C. and S.L. 
management style combines authoritarian and supportive elements. If we adopt man_5 as index 
of manager’s supportiveness, on average caregivers chose a value of 2.48 in C. and 2.58 in S.L., 
showing that workers completely agree with the fact that the management gives weight to their 
personal problems (in C. 65% and in S. L. 63% chose level 3). Man_3, instead, can be considered as 
a measure of management’ authoritarian character. In Table 29, as the mean of man_3 is higher 
than 1.5 (in C. is 1.96 and in S.L. is 1.76), the relationship is to be considered as quite hierarchical. 
Moreover, most of respondents – 70% in C. and 53% in S. L. - maintain that in case of 
disagreement, the manager closes the debate relying on her own authority by choosing level 2 and 
3(see Table 30). Team spirit (see Table 31) seems a little higher in C. than in S. L. (𝜇=1.91 in C. 
versus 𝜇=1.67 in S.L.), but the result mainly shows that an important part of respondents does not 
feel sufficiently incentivized: only 39% in C. and 22% in S. L. completely agree with it (see Table 
31). Minor differences, however, exist. Even if means are not statistically different, as Figure 34 
shows, in S. L., the coordinator seems a bit more interested in treating workers fairly and equally 
(75% chose level 2 and 3 to man_1 in S.L., 61% in C.). To sum up, these data suggest that managers 
are empathic and able to create high quality personal relationships with single workers, but they 
are not sufficiently able to obtain workers’ support in their decisions. They need to rely on their 




Table  30 – Evaluation of management in C. and S. L. 
Legend: 
Man_1 - Manager treats workers fairly and equally  
Man_2 - Manager is able to incentivize team spirit 
Man_3 - When at odds with you, the manager closes debate relying on his/her own authority 
Man_4 - Manager involves you in decisions that impact on your life 
Man_5 - Manager lends weight to your personal problems and supports you in difficult times 
 
 Man_1 Man_2 Man_3 Man_4 Man_5 
 Obs 23 23 23 23 23 
Chiocciola Mean 1.78 1.91 1.96 1.96 2.48 
CV 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.47 0.36 
 Skew -0.34 -0.62 -0.61 -0.26 -1.9 
 Kurt 1.77 2.03 2.14 1.91 5.61 
 Obs 20 18 17 17 19 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.2 1.67 1.65 1.82 2.58 
CV 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 
 Skew -0.96 0.22 -0.1 0.13 -1.07 
 Kurt 2.56 2.02 1.71 2.49 3.13 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
Table  31– Authoritarian character of management in C. and S. L. 
man_3  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 3 13.04 13.04 3 17.65 17.65 
1 4 17.39 30.43 5 29.41 47.06 
2 7 30.43 60.87 4 23.53 70.59 
3 9 39.13 100.00 5 29.41 100.00 
Tot. 23 100.00  17 100.00  
 








Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  32 – Evaluation of leadership in C. and S. L. 
man_2  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 4 17.39 17.39 1 5.56 5.56 
1 3 13.04 30.43 8 44.44 50.00 
2 7 30.43 60.87 5 27.78 77.78 
3 9 39.13 100.00 4 22.22 100.00 
Tot. 23 100.00  18 100.00  
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
3.4.5.3. Mass-Customized Service Design  
 
In this section, I analyze the supporting processes to the service design and I employ and apply the 
knowledge so far collected on governance, capabilities and management to elaborate the model 
of service blueprint implicitly adopted in C. and S. L.. To understand which supporting processes 
characterize service design, I basically refer to data about professionals’ training and accreditation, 
which inform about the workers’ perception respectively on 1) the quantity and quality of training 
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received to improve their coordination capabilities and 2) the way public quality standards support 
service quality. Then, I employ information so far collected about governance and management to 
identify the work team profile in both organizations, which is necessary to build service blueprint. 
What emerges is a not cohesive group in which coordination capabilities are not sufficiently able 
to sustain high quality personalized interfaces with users.  
 
Survey question on training was “How do you consider training received by your organization?” to 
be answered by choosing among four options, where 0 = I disagree with, 1 = I do not quite agree, 
2 = I agree with, 3 = I very much agree with. First, it was asked whether they received an adequate 
training and orientation to start working in the organization (i.e. presentation of the organization 
of labor and schedules, charts to fill out, presentation to colleagues and users, visit of the building 
etc.) (form_1); whether they received training required by law and necessary to the profession 
(which are HACCP system69, occupational safety, the CPR emergency procedure70 and manual 
handling) (form_2); whether so far they have received additional training to improve their own 
competence in the relationship with hosts and their families (form_4) and with colleagues 
(form_3). In line with information provided by managers, data clearly exhibit that workers have 
received initial orientation and, especially, training required by law: as Table 32 shows, in C. such 
items received a mean value respectively of 2.18 and 2.52; in S.L. mean value was 2.2. and 2.6, 
with low coefficient of variation in all the four answers. Conversely, respondents agree but not 
fully agree with the fact of having received training in support to their relationships with users 
(form_4) and colleagues (form_3): mean values are visibly lower than in case of form_1 and 
form_2. These data should be interpreted in the light of the interview with the managers. Both 
organizations have organized classes to face issues like the humanization of care, conflict 
management, relations with patients affected by Alzheimer disease. However, as Table 33 shows, 
only 39% in C. and 20% in S. L. completely agree with the fact of having received training to 
support their relationship with users, while for relationships with colleagues only 41% in C. and 
25% in S. L. is fully unanimous (see Table 34). This means that a problem exists in training courses 
maybe due to the contents – not sufficiently focused on the resolution of their real problems – or 
due to their sporadic character. Caregivers feel that they could be more trained and receive more 
support, especially in their relationships with colleagues. As expected, t-test shows that means of 
                                                      
69 HACCP is the acronym of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point, which is a systematic preventive approach to 
food safety. 
70 CPR is the acronym of Cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 
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form_3 and form_4 are not statistically different and, hence, that the consortium provided similar 
levels of training. 
Table  33 – Evaluation of training in C. and S. L. 
Form_1: You have initially received an adequate training and orientation 
Form_2: You have received training required by law 
Form_3: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with colleagues 
Form_4: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with hosts and their 
families 
 
  Form_1 Form_2 Form_3 Form_4 
  22 23 22 23 
Chiocciola Mean 2.18 2.52 1.86 1.91 
CV 0.31 0.13 0.63 0.52 
  20 20 20 20 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 
CV 0.4 0.23 0.48 0.24 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  34 – Evaluation of training in C. and S. L. (form_4) 
Form_4  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
0 3 17.39 17.39 3 15.00 15.00  
1 4 13.04 30.43 2 10.00 25.00  
2 7 30.43 60.87 11 55.00 80.00  
3 9 39.13 100.00 4 20.00 100.00  
Tot. 23 100.00  20 100.00   
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  35 – Evaluation of training in C. and S. L. (form_3) 
Form_3  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 4 18.18 18.18 1 5.00 5.00 
1 4 18.18 36.36 7 35.00 40.00 
2 5 22.73 59.09 7 35.00 75.00 
3 9 40.91 100.00 5 25.00 100.00 
Tot. 22 100.00  20 100.00  
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Along with training, accreditation is to be considered as an important supporting process that over 
the last 6 years has largely influenced service design by formalizing a number of procedures to be 
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followed during service delivery in order to guarantee minimum service quality. The accreditation 
system is expected to influence caregivers’ work both directly and indirectly. First, caregivers are 
required 1) to document all their tasks by filling out several tables every day (see Table 35) and 2) 
to fill out documents required when participating to the building of the Personalized Intervention 
Plan71 together with other professionals (this occurs every time a new patient enters and then 
every six months). These tasks subtract time to high quality relationships with the users and shift 
caregivers’ attention toward the fulfilment of formal requisites rather than to the satisfaction of 
users. Second, most of bureaucratic burden falls on the manager’s shoulders (as he/she is the final 
responsible for the satisfaction of public requirements) and on the other professionals’, who in 
turn are less prompt to sustain coordination among workers. In this way, this system may produce 
a general impoverishment of personal relationships leading to the standardization of interfaces 
with users and, consequently, with colleagues. 
 
Table  36 - Number and types of records daily filled out by caregivers in C. and S.L. 
• Record of hydration (when it occurs); 
• Record of shaves; 
• Record of baths; 
• Record of defecation (when occurs); 
• Placement and mobilization (every three hours); 
• Records about cleaning of equipment; 
• Record on change of linen; 
• Kitchen daily journal; 
• Record for monitoring fridge temperature (twice a day); 
• Record for sanitization of taps (once a week); 
• Record about kitchen cleaning (twice a day); 
• Check of fire blankets. 
Green records are filled out for each patient 
Source: Interview to manager 
 
                                                      
71 English translation of the Italian ‘Piano Assistenziale Individualizzato’ (PAI), which is a project sheet in which 
information about medical and social diagnosis are collected and updated along with a set of health and social-health 
care services. For each PIP, usually only one caregiver is involved. 
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The survey section on accreditation was reserved to caregivers having spent at least six years in 
their organizations (see Table 36). First, it was asked whether they knew the accreditation system. 
In Chiocciola, 83% of the respondents (19 individuals) have spent at least six years in the 
organization and among them only 68% (13) affirmed to know the procedures; In S. Lorenzo 80% 
(16 individuals) has been working for this period and among them, just 69% (11) knew the 
procedure. This means that a consistent share of the population did not know the procedures 
even if they have been working for a long time in the organization.  
 
Table  37 – Number of caregivers knowing accreditation 
 Chiocciola S. Lorenzo 
Tot. of respondents 23 20 
Having worked ≥ 6 years 19 (83%) 16 (80%) 
Having worked ≥ 6 years and 
knowing the procedure 
13 (68%) 11 (69%) 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Leading question was “How has your working activity changed with the introduction of the 
accreditation system?” It was asked to tick only one box between 1 (I do not agree) and 7 (I 
completely agree). In general, what emerges is the lack of a common vision about the benefit and 
problems due to the accreditation system. As the coefficients of variation display in Table 37, data 
are quite dispersed concerning the quality of relationships within team work. More than half of 
respondent agree with the fact that cooperation capabilities with colleagues are greater than in 
the past (accr_1) with 54% and 55% of respondents choosing a value higher than 4. However, 
Figure 35 shows the presence of a bimodal distribution in both organizations that in case of S.L. 
can be interpreted as a measure of the lack of a common opinion on this issue, while in C. seems 
to reflect quite opposite visions. Such difference can be partly explained by the fact that in C. tasks 
and role are more defined than in S.L. (see answers to gov_2 discussed above), so that caregivers 












Table  38 – Evaluation of accreditation system 
Legend: 
Accr_1: Team work is better than in the past and cooperation capabilities with colleagues are greater. 
Accr_2: You know better your role and your tasks. 
Accr_3: Compared to the past, your autonomy of decision is greater. 
Accr_4: Compared to the past, your autonomy of decision is lower. 
Accr_8: Compared to the past, Union's role is more important to create just and equal relationships. 
Accr_9: Compared to the past, workers, participating directly, reach greater results than Union. 
Accr_10: Compared to the past, the Union's role has not changed. 
 
 Accr_1 Accr_2 Accr_3 Accr_4 Accr_8 Accr_9 Accr_10 
 Obs 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Chiocciola Mean 4.15 5.08 4.46 3.54 3 4.31 5.31 
CV 0.63 0.45 0.57 0.68 0.83 0.86 0.36 
 Obs 11 11 11 11 10 10 11 
S. Lorenzo Mean 4.82 5.6 4.36 3.54 3.2 3.6 4.5 
CV 0.32 0.20 0.37 0.53 0.51 0.46 0.49 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 




Similarly, Table 37 shows various opinions concerning how their autonomy of decision has 
changed over time. On average, workers agree more with the sentence “your autonomy of 
decision has increased” (accr_3) rather than with the sentence “your autonomy of decision has 
decreased” (accr_4): in C. the mean value is 4.46 of accr_3 vs 3.54 of accr_4; in S. L. it is 4.36 vs 
3.54. As Figure 36 confirms, accreditation, by formalizing procedures, has clarified roles and tasks. 
This means that caregivers may have perceived an increased autonomy in their working activity so 
that the boundaries of their power of action are now well known. Because of the increased 
formalization of caregivers’ tasks, we could expect also an increased ability of Union to fight its 
battles by better identifying the potential sources of working problems. However, Table 38 shows 
that 62% in C. and 60% in S.L. agree with the fact that the Union’s role is not more important now 
than in the past, while they do not agree with the fact that workers are now more able to reach 
positive results than Union: only 38% in C. and 10% in S.L. chose values 6-7. Anyway, differences 
between C. and S.L. about workers’ and Union’ role (gov_10 and gov_11) and about knowledge of 
their own tasks (gov_2 and gov_6) are here confirmed. On average in C. people believe that 
workers’ active participation is more useful than Union; while 54% chose level 1 concerning the 
increased Union’s role, 54% chose level from 4 to 7 concerning the improved workers’ role. This in 
part can be explained by the fact that, workers – knowing better than in S.L. their own role – are 
more able to formulate specific issues that, in presence of a tolerant management, can be solved. 
On the contrary, in S.L., where roles and tasks are still less clear (despite the positive role of the 
accreditation to this regard), workers are not able to directly promote their own interests. Such 
condition, however, does not lead to rely on Union, on which workers have very different 
opinions. This fact may be due to the presence of a tolerant management able to avoid the 
creation of an opposition with workers. Finally, the low importance of the Union in both cases may 
be explained by the fact that LTC services in both organizations have been created and always 
been managed by the same cooperative. This fact may have contributed to the creation of sense 
of belonging and reduced the need of opposition with the cooperative direction.  
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Figure 36 – Evaluation of accreditation on the roles and tasks in C. and S.L. 
 
 
Table  39 - Evaluation of accreditation on the Union’s role 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Concerning the relation with patients and their families, opinions are positive (see Table 39). As 
Table 39 shows, 61% of caregivers in C. and 55% in S.L. maintain that the quality of their 
relationship with the users and their families increased (accr_5) and the patient is considered 
more at the center of the service than in the past (see Figure 37). This evaluation may be 
  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
Accr_8 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
1 7 53.85 53.85 2 20.00 20.00  
2 0 0 53.85 1 10.00 30.00  
3 1 7.69 61.54 3 30.00 60.00  
4 1 7.69 69.23 2 20.00 80.00  
5 1 7.69 76.92 1 10.00 90.00  
6 1 7.69 84.62 1 10.00 100.00  
7 2 15.38 100.00 0 0 100.00  
Tot. 13 100.00  10 100.00   
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explained by the fact that the formalization of procedures allows to better taking into account the 
patients’ basic needs, which are highly kept under control (frequency of hydration, handling, 
evacuation). However, in the two organizations, the effect of the accreditation is different on the 
time spent by caregivers in personal relationships with users. As Table 41 displays, in S.L. a greater 
number of respondents than in C. thinks that time for personal relationship has decreased (73% in 
S.L. versus 46% in C. chose level 5 to 7). This may be explained by the fact that in C. the 
introduction of the accreditation system has increased the number of procedures to follow but 
has not dramatically changed caregivers’ way of working. Instead, in S.L., the introduction of the 
accreditation system has been oriented to the complete formalization of jobs and, hence, largely 
changed workers’ way of working (not only of caregivers but also of the other professionals, 
included managers). In this institution, collective attention is still on the right fulfillment of the 
procedures, which is perceived as subtracting much time to personal relationship with users, at 
least more than the manual compilation of forms. 
 
Table  40  – Evaluation of accreditation on the relationship with users 
Legend:  
Accr_5: Compared to the past, you relate better with the host and his/her own family. 
Accr_6: Compared to the past, the user is more at the center of service. 
Accr_7: Compared to the past, time for personal relationships with the guest has been reduced because of the 
increased number of procedures to follow. 
 Accr_5 Accr_6 Accr_7 
 Obs 13 13 13 
Chiocciola Mean 5 4.61 4.38 
CV 0.49 0.52 0.47 
 Obs 11 11 11 
S. Lorenzo Mean 5.27 5.72 5.27 
CV 0.29 0.22 0.34 









Table  41 – Evaluation of accreditation on the relationship with users 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 





  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
Accr_5 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
1 2 15.38 15.38 0 0 0  
2 1 7.69 23.08 0 0 0  
3 0 0 23.08 2 18.18 18.18  
4 1 7.69 30.77 2 18.18 36.36  
5 1 7.69 38.46 1 9.09 45.45  
6 4 30.77 69.23 3 27.27 72.73  
7 4 30.77 100.00 3 27.27 100.00  
Tot. 13 100.00  11 100.00   
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Table  42 – Evaluation of accreditation on time for personal relationship with users 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
The positive role of procedures is confirmed by answers to the issue gov_7 that involves all 
respondents (not only those with 6 years of length of service) ‘compiling forms subtracts valuable 
time that you would rather spend in solving problems concerning the relationship with users and in 
managing other operations’ (see Table 42). In both organizations, 50% of population has chosen a 
level equal or below 4, even if another important share considers this activity as detrimental (see 
Table 43). This means that spending time in compiling forms is considered as an integral part of 
work, which is well accepted by most of them.  
In other words, in these organizations, despite the role of accreditation, the formalization of 
requirements has improved –by clarifying tasks – caregivers’ ability to satisfy patients’ needs so 
that time for personal relationships is efficiently used. However, in the perspective of promoting 
service personalization, this means that caregivers’ attention is focused more on the satisfaction 
of basic users’ needs rather than on their full wellbeing. For this reason, most of the services they 






  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
Accr_7 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
1 2 15.38 15.38 1 9.09 7.69  
2 0 0 15.38 0 0 7.69  
3 2 15.38 30.77 0 0 7.69  
4 3 23.08 53.85 2 18.18 27.27  
5 2 15.38 69.23 2 18.18 45.45  
6 1 7.69 76.92 3 27.27 72.73  
7 3 23.08 100.00 3 27.27 100.00  
Tot. 13 100.00  11 100.00   
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Table  43 - Evaluation of time subtracted to relationships by bureaucratic tasks 
 Gov_7 
 Obs 22 
Chiocciola Mean 4.14 
CV 0.63 
 Obs 18 
S. Lorenzo Mean 3.72 
CV 0.56 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  44 – Evaluation of time subtracted to relationships by bureaucratic tasks (gov_7) in C. and 
S.L. 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
The chart below (Figure 38) shows the model of the service blueprinting implicitly adopted in C. 
and S.L., which represent the third category (low level of standards and low level of capabilities). 
Despite front-office caregivers receive some personalized support from management and to a 
lesser extent from colleagues, this support depends also on the quality of relationships established 
with them, which not always is positive. Moreover, their help is not on the content of tasks to 
perform, which is standardized, but only on the approach to follow in order to incentivize users to 
receive the standardized care. For this reason, even if experiences of personalized care could 
  Chiocciola   S. Lorenzo   
Gov_7 Freq. Percent. Cum. Freq. Percent. Cum.  
1 7 31.82 31.82 5 27.78 27.78  
2 1 4.55 36.36 1 5.56 33.33  
3 2 9.09 45.45 2 11.11 44.44  
4 1 4.55 50.00 1 5.56 50.00  
5 1 4.55 54.55 5 27.78 77.78  
6 3 13.64 68.18 3 16.67 94.44  
7 7 31.82 100.00 1 5.56 100.00  
Tot. 22 100.00  18 100.00   
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emerge (especially in case of difficult patients to whom more attention is required), the overall 
service is expected to be mass-customized. In this case, the patient receives a personalized 
package of standardized services on the basis of common and clearly identified needs. In order to 
identify whether a relation exists between this type of service and the level of sick leave hours 
experienced in these organizations, a comparison is required with the organizations belonging to 
the other categories. 
Figure 38 – Service blueprint in C. and S.L. 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
 
3.4.5.4. Second case study: the organization of highly personalized service  
  
The comparison with the organization, Stella Montis, representing the first category (high 
coordination capabilities and low standard level) should allow to identify a benchmark in the light 
of the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter. Given the complexity of LTC 
need, the most efficient organization is the one that, thanks to its internal structure, is the most 
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able to face customer uncertainty. The organization included in the fourth categories reflects the 
characteristics required to be efficient and, as such, can be considered as a benchmark.  
 
As section on general characteristics highlights, Stella Montis is a cooperative organization similar 
to Chiocciola and S. Lorenzo in terms of dimensions, mean age of population, gender and level of 
education, while it differs because of the low number of foreigners and members among 
employees. The highly cooperative experience of Stella Montis suggests that membership status is 
not an essential condition in the promotion of cooperative experience, at least at the level of labor 
organization. The creation of a participative governance could have been facilitated by the 
reduced number of problems (in terms of lack of language and cultural barriers) that an 
organization with a low number of strangers, experiences. However, independently of the number 
of barriers that an organization may face, what matters is a constant persistence toward the 
creation of reciprocal and trustworthy relationships. The preliminary interview with the 
management of Stella Montis allowed to understand the number of efforts and difficulties that a 
path toward effective cooperation may involve. Work shifts are monthly defined by the 
management and partly may be changed on the basis of workers’ requests. Caregivers participate 
to the organization of labor in different ways. First, tasks are not strictly defined: there are three 
work shifts during which team-mates self-organize concerning which tasks to perform. Caregivers 
have increasingly learned how to behave and which tasks to choose in order to improve 
cooperation with colleagues and, therefore, satisfy at their best personal needs of patients. For 
instance, if one has prepared breakfasts twice in a row, then he/she knows that should propose 
him/herself for helping patients with getting up (which is a tougher task than preparing breakfast). 
If a caregiver prefers to work without team-mates and a patient prefers individual relationship, 
caregiver and patient may find a common ground. According to the manager, cooperation among 
caregivers is nurtured mainly thanks to the organization of specific training courses and the 
bottom-up creation of thematic team works. These, in particular, emerge in case of specific 
problems to address (i.e. with some user or colleagues) or to suggest new animation activities or 
training courses and are managed by coordinators. Some teams break up when the problem is 
solved, other may keep on working for many months. On the basis of the interview, we can detect 
that caregivers are highly empowered especially for three reasons. First, they are not merely 
executors of tasks, but they can decide which task to perform and their timing. Second, if they 
recognize the existence of a problem, they can suggest the creation of a workteam to solve it. 
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Finally, they are not required to provide a manual support during animation activities, because, if 
they want, they can organize and carry out new animation activities and tours on their own. 
Answers to survey questions provide caregivers’ subjective evaluation of the internal organization 
of labor, which is consistent with the depiction of given by the manager. Such data allow to 
advance some explanation about the low level of sick leave hours experienced by this company. 
 
3.4.5.4.1. Participative governance and high coordination capabilities 
 
Caregivers in Stella Montis (S.M.) do not consider their organization hierarchical (see Table 44). 
Respondents (77% of population) affirm that they do not limit themselves to follow standardized 
procedures (gov_5). Looking at Figure 39, if we compare distribution of answers in S.M. with the 
one of C. and S.L. concerning the organization’s hierarchical character, we can see that distribution 
of data is not concentrated on the right side of the distribution: mode is on level 5, while in S.L. is 
on 6 and in C. is on 7. F-Test on the means of gov_5 shows that means of C. and S.L., which are not 
statistically different from each other, are instead statistically different from that of S.M with a p-
value 0.0135. Besides as Table 44 displays, Union is not considered as much helpful to guarantee 
fair and equal relationships (gov_10) and, in any case, it is regarded as it was less important than 
their direct participation (gov_11). 
Table  45  – Evaluation of governance 
Legend 
Gov_5: Since a hierarchical structure among different roles exists, limit yourself to follow standardized procedures.  
Gov_10: The role of Union is important to guarantee fair and equal relationships 
Gov_11: Workers, directly participating, reach better results than Union 
  Gov_5 Gov_10 Gov_11 
 Obs. 24 24 24 
Stella Montis Mean 3.63 3.42 4.92 
 CV 0.52 0.64 0.39 
 Obs. 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 5.31 4.40 4.32 
CV 0.36 0,5 0.51 
 Obs. 17 17 16 
S. Lorenzo Mean 4.65 3.59 3.81 
CV 0.42 0.60 0.52 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
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Figure 40 and Figure 41 clearly show that in S.M. – differently from C. and S.L. - workers trust 
much more on their own active participation (gov_11) than the Union’s action (gov_10): while 
most of data in gov_11 are concentrated on the highest value (with mode on 7), in gov_10 
answers focused on the first values (with mode on 1). Therefore, in S.M. what emerges – in line 
with manager’s interview – is a highly participative governance. 
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Figure 40 – Evaluation of the role of Union in S.M.  
 
 
Figure 41 – Evaluation of workers’ participation in S.M. (gov_11) 
 
 
Answers to questions gov_3 and gov_4 display the level and type of coordination capabilities so 
far developed by caregivers (see Table 45). As it can be seen in Figure 42, while in case of gov_3 
answers are quite dispersed (CV=0.62) and 54% does not think that would better work in another 
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team, distribution of gov_4 in Figure 43 shows tendency toward the highest values as negative 
skewness (-0.62) and high kurtosis (2.74) shows. This may mean that caregivers have difficulties in 
changing work team and would not work better in another one because they have developed 
cooperation capabilities to work that can be used only with their specific team mates and in that 
specific context. They know how to relate with their colleagues especially because of the rules and 
habits that they have developed and accepted to share together and in which each specific person 
makes the difference.  
Table  46 – Evaluation of coordination capabilities 
Legend: 
Gov_3: You would better work in another workteam 
Gov_4: You would have problems in changing your workteam 
  Gov_3 Gov_4 
 Obs. 24 23 
Stella Montis Mean 3.38 4.7 
 CV 0.62 0.37 
 Obs. 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 4.1 4.41 
CV 0.54 0.53 
 Obs. 18 18 
S. Lorenzo Mean 3.06 3.8 
CV 0.6 0.51 














3.4.5.4.2. Supportive Management 
 
Management in Stella Montis received a different evaluation compared to those in C. and S.L. 
especially concerning one important aspect, the one related to authority (man_3). As Table 46 
shows, most of caregivers (79%) do not consider their coordinator as authoritarian. They do not 
agree with the sentence “When at odds with you, manager closes debate relying on his/her own 
authority” and F-test on the mean shows that the mean of S.M. is statistically different at 99% 
level (p<0.01) from those of C. and S.L. (which, as seen above, are not statistically different). This 
means that the manager prefers to obtain consensus on his own decisions rather than imposing its 
view on how things should work.  
 
Table  47 – Evaluation of management 
Legend: 
Man_1 - Manager treats workers fairly and equally 
Man_2 - Manager is able to incentivize team spirit 
Man_3 - When at odds with you, manager closes debate relying on his/her own authority 
Man_4 - Manager involves you in decisions that impact on your life 
Man_5 - Manager lends weight to your personal problems and supports you in difficult times 
 
 Man_1 Man_2 Man_3 Man_4 Man_5 
 Obs. 24 24 24 24 24 
Stella Montis Mean 1.71 1.79 0.83 1.88 2.17 
 CV 0.56 0.43 1.25 0.55 0.4 
 Obs 23 23 23 23 23 
Chiocciola Mean 1.78 1.91 1.96 1.96 2.48 
CV 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.47 0.36 
 Obs 20 18 17 17 19 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.19 1.73 1.76 1.72 2.55 
CV 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 











Table  48 – Evaluation of management 
  Man_3   Man_2  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
 0 12 50.00 50.00 1 4.17 4.17 
1 7 29.17 79.17 7 29.17 33.33 
2 2 8.33 87.50 2 50.00 83.33 
3 3 12.50 100.00 3 16.67 100.00 
Tot. 24 100.00  24 100.00  
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Moreover, as Figure 44 shows, most workers believe that the manager is quite able to incentivize 
team spirit, as 50% have chosen level 2 while 17% level 3.   
 




Finally, manager in S.M. does not seem to lend high value to personal problems as much as in C. 
and in S.L.. As Figure 45 shows, while in C. and S.L., mode is on level 3, in S.M. mode is on level 2. 
This fact may be due to the manager’s interest to create a cohesive work team so that not always 
he is able to satisfy workers’ personal problems. In conclusion, manager in S.M. appears highly 








3.4.5.4.3. Highly Personalized Service Design 
 
Evaluation of training in S.M. is very high not only concerning the one received at the beginning 
(form_1) and required by law (form_2), but also about the acquisition of competences for relating 
with colleagues (form_3) and users (form_4), as the average means show in Table 48. These data 
confirm information given by the manager about the importance of training activities to improve 
coordination capabilities with users and colleagues.  
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Table  49 – Evaluation of training 
Legend: 
Form_1: You have initially received an adequate training and orientation 
Form_2: You have received training required by law 
Form_3: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with colleagues 
Form_4: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with hosts and their 
families 
 
  Form_1 Form_2 Form_3 Form_4 
 Obs. 24 24 23 24 
Stella Montis Mean 2.42 2.5 2.61 2.46 
 CV 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.26 
 Obs. 22 23 22 23 
Chiocciola Mean 2.18 2.52 1.86 1.91 
CV 0.31 0.13 0.63 0.52 
 Obs. 20 20 20 20 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 
CV 0.4 0.23 0.48 0.24 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Comparison with distribution of C. and S.L. in figure 46 highlights particular attention for 
relationships among colleagues, that, hence, are considered as instrumental to the production of 
highly personalized services. Unlike C. and S.L., in S.M. all values are concentrated on the levels 2 
and 3, highlighting that no one among respondents, states to have received an insufficient 
training, while mode on level 3 informs that most (61%) states to have received much education 
on this issue (see Table 49). F-tests on the mean confirms this deep difference: in case of form_3, 
means are statistically different with P-value = 0.0004 and in case of form_4 with p-value 0.0167. 
In other words, these values are highly informative about the existence of an organization’s 
strategy on training as recognized source of external efficiency. In this perspective, the 
coordination capabilities developed could be defined as ‘relational capabilities’ which are able to 











Table  50  – Evaluation of training 
  Form_3   Form_4  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 2 8.33 8.33 
2 9 39.13 39.13 9 37.50 45.83 
3 14 60.87 100.00 13 54.17 100.00 
Tot. 23 100.00  24 100.00  
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
Concerning accreditation, we can see in Table 50 that the percentage of respondents is very high; 
(96%) have worked more than 6 years and 78% knows the procedures.  
Table  51  – Number of respondents knowing accreditation procedure 
Tot. of respondents 24 
Having worked ≥ 6 years 23 (96%) 
Having worked ≥ 6 years and 
knowing the procedure 
18 (78%) 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
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What emerges, unlike the other organizations, is the existence of a common opinion on the 
procedure’s ability to improve service quality, which is quite negative. According to Table 51 in 
S.M. respondents on average have attributed a low value to the sentences related to the quality of 
the relationships with users and families and lower than in C. and in S.L.. Sentence “you better 
relate with patients and their families” (accr_5) has received an average value 3.5 and it is 
statistically different (p-value=0.0272) and lower than the mean values in C. and S.L. (5 in C. and 
5.27 in S.L.), which are not statistically different between each other (see above).  Similarly, the 
user is not considered more at the center of the service than in the past (accr_6) and again, mean 
(3.44) is statistically different (p-value=0.0026) from the ones of C. and S.L. (in C. 4.61 and in S.L. 
5.72).  Finally, as Table 52 shows, 50% of respondents considers that time for personal 
relationships has decreased. These values suggest that caregivers agree on the fact that the 
publicly imposed request for a detailed documentation of tasks shifts workers’ attention to the 
promotion of a formal quality of service rather than to its effectiveness. 
Table  52 – Evaluation of accreditation on the relationship with users 
Legend: 
Accr_5 – You better relate with patients and their families 
Accr_6 – User is more at the center of the service than in the past 
Accr_7 – Time for personal relationships with users has decreased 
 
 Accr_5 Accr_6 Accr_7 
 Obs. 18 18 18 
Stella Montis Mean 3.5 3.44 4.78 
 CV 0.57 0.59 0.47 
 Obs. 13 13 13 
Chiocciola Mean 5 4.61 4.38 
CV 0.49 0.52 0.47 
 Obs. 11 11 11 
S. Lorenzo Mean 5.27 5.72 5.27 
CV 0.29 0.22 0.34 








Table  53 – Evaluation of accreditation on the time for personal relationship with users 
Accr_7  Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 3 16.67 16.67 
2 0 0 16.67 
3 3 16.67 33.33 
4 1 5.56 38.89 
5 2 11.11 50.00 
6 3 16.67 66.67 
7 6 33.33 100.00 
Tot. 18 100.00  
 
 
The graph below (Figure 48) sums up the characteristics of the service design adopted by Stella 
Montis by using again the service blueprint technique. On the basis of information collected in the 
above analysis, care service is highly centered on customer. Caregivers can establish a personal 
interaction with patients in order to identify their complex needs and are highly supported by 
their colleagues and the management both in the identification of the right strategy and the 
approach to adopt. Refusal of care can be reduced thanks to the collaboration of colleagues more 
in harmony with patients or thanks to the experimentation of new animation activities that indeed 
work as supportive strategies to the one required by the protocols. This chart, resulting from the 
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above analysis, is consistent with the presence of a very low level of the 𝑈𝑃𝐶2. The organization’s 
attention to the creation of cooperation capabilities allows to maintain high intrinsic motivation to 
work.  
 
Figure 48 - Service blueprinting in S.M. 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
Caregivers know that their presence is not easily substituted by someone else that does not know 
users and his/her own colleagues. Therefore, he/she expected to sick to a lesser extent than in 
other organizations. In turn, the low level of sick leave hours, by allowing the continuity of care, is 
consistent with the strengthening of coordination capabilities. Unlike the case of C. and S.L., in 
S.M. the organization is able to promote a virtuous cycle toward a progressive improvement of the 
quality of care. 
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3.4.5.5. Third case study: the organization of highly mass-customized service 
 
Arsia, representative of the fourth category (high level of standards, low level of capabilities) is a 
large IOE providing LTC services for 150 users. Owners of Arsia are also owner of another nursing 
home, geographically close and of similar dimensions, Paravia. Given the potentiality of scale 
economies, this fact partly explains the adoption of operation management principles in the 
design and management of LTC services. Moreover, standards are here considered as strategic to 
clearly define each specific sequence of care path and, therefore, reduce uncertainty of caregivers’ 
performances (for instance, omissions in care, patients’ falls, caregivers’ injuries etc.). 
Standardization of tasks, in fact, is reached thanks to the analysis of tasks according to a top-down 
method. Task is decomposed in sub-components that are more knowable and easier to be 
managed. OM principles have also been adopted in order to introduce innovative systems in the 
near future to support each phase of care path and, this way, reduce caregivers’ workload and 
improve service quality. According to management, the organization of work-shift is made once a 
year and can be changed by employees only in presence of two conditions; request of permission 
can be done until three days before and only if the worker finds someone else in substitution. 
Given these characters, we expect to find a highly standardized organization of service that leaves 
low room for the emergence of coordination capabilities, suggesting this reason as leading 
explanation of the high level of UPC experienced by the company. 
 
3.4.5.5.1. Hierarchical Governance 
 
The hierarchical character of the governance is confirmed by caregivers’ evaluation in survey. 
Despite in Figure 49, it seems more marked than in case of C. and S.L., organizations’ means are 
not statistically different from each other. However, it is important to take into account the 
different percentage of answer to the survey: in A. the sample represents only 42% against 79% in 
C. and 67% in S.L., correspondingly, respondents’ answers could not adequately represent the 
evaluation of the population. Additional information about the hierarchical character can be 
obtained by the analysis of the distributions about the role of Union (gov_10) and of direct 
participation of caregivers(gov_11). Figure 50 and Figure 51 show that – in comparison with 
distributions of C. and S.L - answers are polarized. This may be due to the fact that in A. both 
democratic instruments are used more often than in C. and in S.L., testifying the presence of some 
conflict with the directors, and, hence, the existence of a more hierarchical structure. 
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Table  54 – Evaluation of governance 
Legend: 
Gov_5: Since a hierarchical structure among different roles exists, limit yourself to follow standardized procedures.  
Gov_10: The role of Union is important to guarantee fair and equal relationships 
Gov_11: Workers, directly participating, reach better results than Union 
 
  Gov_5 Gov_10 Gov_11 
 Obs. 21 21 22 
Arsia Mean 5.57 3.9 4.04 
 CV 0.25 0.64 0.58 
 Obs. 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 5.31 4.40 4.32 
CV 0.36 0,5 0.51 
 Obs. 17 17 16 
S. Lorenzo Mean 4.65 3.59 3.81 
CV 0.42 0.60 0.52 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 
Figure 49 – Evaluation of governance in A. (gov_5) 
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Figure 50 – Evaluation of governance in A. (gov_10) 
 
 
Figure 51 – Evaluation of governance in A. (gov_11) 
 
 
Having due regard to the low percentage of answers, more information can be gathered about the 
cooperative capabilities developed so far by the organization (see Figure 52 and Figure 53). 30% of 
respondents believe that they would work better in another team work (gov_3) and 35% would 
 187 
not have problem in changing it (gov_4). There is a low number of respondents (20%) that does 
not think to improve his/her own working capabilities by changing team (having chosen level 1-2 
to issue gov_3) and 35% that would have problems in changing it (having chosen level 1-2 to issue 
gov_4). Noteworthy is the distribution of gov_4 (Figure 53), which shows opposite positions within 
the team, suggesting that caregivers nurture very different feelings concerning their workteam; 
while someone has settled in (those having selected values 5,6,7), someone else does not feel 
comfortable in the team (especially those having chosen level 1). In this condition, as it is unclear 
the role of governance in promoting coordination capabilities, what appears most interesting is 
that the organization, indeed, has played a marginal role and, hence, coordination capabilities 
developed so far are low. data on coordination problems can be read in favor of this 
interpretation.  
Table  55 – Evaluation of governance 
Legend: 
Gov_3: You would better work in another workteam 
Gov_4: You would have problems in changing your workteam 
  Gov_3 Gov_4 
 Obs. 20 20 
Arsia Mean 4.35 4 
 CV 0.44 0.59 
 Obs. 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 4.1 4.41 
CV 0.54 0.53 
 Obs. 18 18 
S. Lorenzo Mean 3.06 3.8 
CV 0.6 0.51 




Figure 52 – Evaluation of governance in A. (gov_3) 
 
 




Caregivers clearly admit that most of coordination problems with colleagues are due to 
particularly difficult situations with some users (coord_3) and bad interpersonal relationships with 
some colleagues (coord_4). As Table 55 below shows, means of coord_3 and coord_4 are very 
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high (respectively 2.06 and 2) with CV quite low (0.37 and 0.29) compared to the other two 
identified sources of coordination problems (coord_1) and (coord_2). The analysis of distributions 
(see Figure 54 and Figure 55) provides additional information on coord_3 and coord_4 thanks to 
the comparison with the case of C. and S.L. Unlike respondents in those organizations, caregivers’ 
evaluations are concentrated on level 2 hinting that these sources of coordination problems 
(relationships with users and colleagues) are so serious in A. that caregivers commonly recognize 
them. F-test on the mean of coord_4 (concerning bad relationships with colleagues) shows that in 
case of A. the means is statistically different from C. and S.L. (which are not statistically different 
from each other) with a p-value 0.0665. This information indirectly reveals that low coordination 
capabilities have been developed.   
 
Table  56 – Evaluation of sources of coordination problems with colleagues 
LEGEND 
Coord_1: They emerge at certain times of the day  
Coord_2: Lack of a clear leadership 
Coord_3: Particularly difficult situations with some users 
Coord_4: Bad interpersonal relationships with some colleagues 
 
  Coord_1 Coord_2 Coord_3 Coord_4 
 Obs 18 17 16 18 
Arsia Mean 1.83 1.18 2.06 2 
 CV 0.5 0.75 0.37 0.29 
 Obs 21 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 2.0 1.3 1.64 1.55 
CV 0.4 0.92 0.66 0.68 
 Obs 18 18 19 19 
S. Lorenzo Mean 1.78 0.5 1.79 1.4 
CV 0.56 1.24 0.63 0.75 
 












Figure 54 – Evaluation of coordination problems (coord_3) 
 
 







3.4.5.5.2. Authoritarian Management 
 
On average, as Table 56 shows, managers receive lower evaluation than in case of C. and S. L., 
showing the existence of problems in management-workers relationships under different 
perspectives. Half of population feels to be treated fairly, while the other half affirms to be treated 
unfairly (see Table 57). Mean is statistically different and lower than in C. and S.L. with a p-value 
equal to 0.0375. Interesting is that – by looking at distribution of (man_2) in Figure 56 –no one has 
chosen maximum level about the ability of management to incentivize team spirit, but most have 
chosen level 2, showing hence that this element is only partially recognized. According to table 57, 
a number of respondents (56%) agree with the fact that the manager relies on his own authority in 
case of discussions (man_3) and mean value (1.45) is not statistically different from the one of C. 
(1.96) and S.L. (1.76). Finally, 47% of workers do not feel involved in decisions that impact on their 
lives against 35% in C. and 29% in S.L. (man_4); and 53% do not think that the coordinator lends 
weight to their personal problems against 9% in C. and 5% in S.L (man_5). In conclusion, according 
to respondents, the manager in Arsia is authoritarian and in many cases perceived as unfair and 
not able to involve adequately workers. 
Table  57 – Evaluation of management 
Legend: 
Man_1 - Manager treats workers fairly and equally 
Man_2 - Manager is able to incentivize team spirit 
Man_3 - When at odds with you, manager closes debate relying on his/her own authority 
Man_4 - Manager involves you in decisions that impact on your life 
Man_5 - Manager lends weight to your personal problems and supports you in difficult times 
 
 Man_1 Man_2 Man_3 Man_4 Man_5 
 Obs. 20 19 18 19 19 
Arsia Mean 1.35 1.16 1.45 1.53 1.32 
 CV 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.97 0.75 
 Obs 23 23 23 23 23 
Chiocciola Mean 1.78 1.91 1.96 1.96 2.48 
CV 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.47 0.36 
 Obs 20 18 17 17 19 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.19 1.73 1.76 1.72 2.55 
CV 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 
 




Table  58 – Evaluation of management 
  Man_1   Man_2   Man_3  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 5 25.00 25.00 5 26.32 26.32 5 27.78 27.78 
1 5 25.00 50.00 6 31.58 57.89 3 16.67 44.44 
2 8 40.00 90.00 8 42.11 100.00 7 38.89 83.33 
3 2 10.00 100.00 0 0 100.00 3 16.67 100.00 
Tot. 20 100.00  19 100.00  18 100.00  
 
 
  Man_4   Man_5  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 3 15.79 15.79 5 26.32 26.32 
1 6 31.58 47.37 5 26.32 52.63 
2 7 36.84 84.21 7 36.84 89.47 
3 3 15.79 100.00 2 10.53 100.00 
Tot. 19 100.00  19 100.00  
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 






3.4.5.5.3. Mass-customized Service Design 
 
Concerning training, on average, caregivers state to have received a sufficient, but not satisfying 
level of education. Even in case of form_1 and form_2, concerning orientation and training 
required by law, 21% (4 individuals) does not much agree with the fact of having received it, while 
one person affirms not to have received it at all. Indeed, mean of form_2 is statistically different 
(lower) from mean of C. and S.L with a p-value 0.0476. In Figure 57, 58, 59, 60 distributions show 
that modes are always on level 2 (including form_1 which, however, displays a bimodal 
distribution).  
 
Table  59 – Evaluation of training 
Legend: 
Form_1: You have initially received an adequate training and orientation 
Form_2: You have received training required by law 
Form_3: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with colleagues 
Form_4: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with hosts and their 
families 
 
  Form_1 Form_2 Form_3 Form_4 
 Obs. 19 19 18 19 
Arsia Mean 2 2 1.89 2 
 CV 0.5 0.44 0.57 0.56 
 Obs. 22 23 22 23 
Chiocciola Mean 2.18 2.52 1.86 1.91 
CV 0.31 0.13 0.63 0.52 
 Obs. 20 20 20 20 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 
CV 0.4 0.23 0.48 0.24 























Figure 60 – Evaluation of training (form_4) 
 
 
Concerning accreditation, as Table 59 shows, 82% of respondents have worked more than 6 years 
and among them 67% declares to know the procedure. Similarly, to C. and S.L., they have not 
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developed a negative evaluation of the accreditation procedure, considering the implementation 
of the formal requirement a structural and unchangeable part of their working activity. As Figure 
61 reveals, most of respondents think that –thanks to accreditation – they relate better with users 
and their families (accr_5). This may be due to the fact that the accreditation has clarified 
caregivers’ knowledge about their own tasks and function in the provision of LTC services, as in 
case of C. (see Figure 62). However, more than in the other organizations, they recognize that time 
for personal relationships has decreased (see Figure 63). Mean of accr_7 in A. is statistically 
different from the one of C. and S.L. within a 90% confidence level. This fact may be due to the 
organization’s greater attention for the fulfillment of procedures due to the implementation of 
operation management principles. 
Table  60 – Number of respondents knowing accreditation procedures 
Tot. of respondents 22 
Having worked ≥ 6 years 18 (82%) 
Having worked ≥ 6 years and 
knowing the procedure 
12 (67%) 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  61 – Evaluation of accreditation 
Legend: 
Accr_5 – You better relate with patients and their families 
Accr_6 – User is more at the center of the service than in the past 
Accr_7 – Time for personal relationships with users has decreased 
 
 Accr_5 Accr_6 Accr_7 
 Obs. 12 12 12 
Arsia Mean 5.58 5.25 5.92 
 CV 0.31 0.42 0.17 
 Obs. 13 13 13 
Chiocciola Mean 5 4.61 4.38 
CV 0.49 0.52 0.47 
 Obs. 11 11 11 
S. Lorenzo Mean 5.27 5.72 5.27 
CV 0.29 0.22 0.34 




Figure 61 –  Evaluation of accreditation (accr_5) 
 
 













As the graph below shows (Figure 64), the type of service provided in A. is highly sequential and 
mass-customized. Because of the pervasive role of the procedures and strict timing to follow, the 
development of coordination capabilities is hindered. Caregivers are oriented to execute tasks 
required by protocols and expect only a material and standardized support by colleagues and 
management. If the approach in the provision of care is not standardized depends on the personal 
capabilities of caregivers, supported by introductory training courses received from the 
organization. For this reason, unlike C. and S.L., patients can hardly be considered as co-producer. 
Not only the interface with the user is highly standardized, but the adoption of the operation 
management standards makes it difficult for caregivers to obtain support in the management of 
problematic relationships with users. In these cases, caregivers’ role is to inform, as required by 
protocols, the manager and to document any refusal of care by users in ad hoc records. This chart, 
resulting from the above analysis, is consistent with the presence of a very high level of UPC within 
a vicious cycle that progressively reduces the possibility to develop the capabilities required. The 
lack of attention by the organization for the creation of cooperation capabilities does not allow to 
defend the innate intrinsic motivations to work, but, instead, leads to their reduction. Caregivers 
 199 
feel to be easily substituted by someone else as his/her own particular knowledge of users is not 
useful for improving service quality. Moreover, sick leave can be more easily accepted and 
increased, since it does not hinder the production process. Therefore, he/she gets sick to a greater 
extent than in the other organizations. 
 
Figure 64 – Service blueprinting in Arsia 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
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3.4.5.6. Fourth case study: the organization of low personalized service 
 
Villa Niccolini - a IOE providing LTC services for 82 users - has been chosen as representative of the 
second category (namely having high level of standards and high level of coordination 
capabilities). The organization presents a high level of standards, because – along with having 
implemented the accreditation system - it adopts job rotation as organization of labor. Every day 
caregivers receive a different color corresponding to specific tasks to perform over their work-
shift. In this way, on the one hand, caregivers – by continuously changing their function – are 
highly substitutable and their function is highly standardized; on the other hand, their work is 
more dynamic. According to the manager, caregivers learn to cooperate with everyone by 
changing always their team-mates. Moreover, the re-organization of labor is easier in case of 
unexpected events. Along with this characteristic of the organization of labor, the presence of a 
psychologist facilitates the development of coordination capabilities. Two morning a week the 
professional receives workers for providing a therapeutic support against the burn-out risk. When 
required by specific problematic situations, she organizes thematic training courses. The 
specificities of this organization suggest that the level of coordination capabilities among workers 
is improved by the organization, which is consistent with the low level of sick leave hours 
experienced. 
 
3.4.5.6.1. Low Hierarchical Governance  
 
In Villa Niccolini (V.N.), the governance – intended as the organization of labor – is considered by 
caregivers as less hierarchical than in the cooperatives C. and S.L, despite its investor owned 
nature. As Table 62 shows, only 33% of respondents (here representing 82,5% of total population) 
affirms that their function is limited to the fulfillment of standardized procedures (gov_5) against 
55% in C. and 47% in S.L.. Indeed, the mean of gov_5 in V.N. is statistically different and lower 
than in C. and S.L. within a 90% confidence level. The perception of a low hierarchical character 
may be explained with the fact that caregivers know very well how to coordinate with their own 
colleagues, so that the intervention of the manager is not usually required. In fact, to the question 
gov_6 “You know your colleagues’ tasks”, 64% of respondents chose level 7 versus 52% in C. and 






Table  62 – Evaluation of governance 
Legend:  
Gov_5: Since a hierarchical structure among different roles exists, limit yourself to follow standardized procedures.  
Gov_10: The role of Union is important to guarantee fair and equal relationships 
Gov_11: Workers, directly participating, reach better results than Union 
 
  Gov_5 Gov_10 Gov_11 
 Obs. 33 32 32 
Villa Niccolini Mean 3.91 4.56 4.5 
 CV 0.61 0.50 0.48 
 Obs. 22 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 5.31 4.40 4.32 
CV 0.36 0,5 0.51 
 Obs. 17 17 16 
S. Lorenzo Mean 4.65 3.59 3.81 
CV 0.42 0.60 0.52 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  63  – Evaluation of governance 
  Gov_5   Gov_10   Gov_11  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 10 30.30 30.30 6 18.75 18.75 5 15.62 15.62 
2 3 9.09 39.39 2 6.25 25.00 3 9.09 25.00 
3 1 3.03 42.42 2 6.25 31.25 2 6.25 31.25 
4 2 6.06 48.48 4 12.50 43.75 4 12.50 43.75 
5 6 18.18 66.67 3 9.38 53.12 5 15.62 59.38 
6 5 15.15 81.82 6 18.75 71.88 5 15.62 75.00 
7 6 18.18 100.00 9 28.12 100.00 8 25.00 100.00 
Tot. 33 100.00  32 100.00  32 100.00  
 

















Looking at Table 62, in V.N., 47% considers Union’s activity as highly important (gov_10) – not 
much differently from C. (45% of the sample) - but their perspective on the value of this 
instrument does not exclude the possibility (especially for the 41% of respondents choosing level 
6-7) to rely on the direct participation of workers to face organizational problems (gov_11). 
Differently from C. and S.L. where a common vision is not identifiable, here caregivers quite agree 
















Figure 67  –  Evaluation of governance (gov_11) 
 
 
Distribution of gov_4 (Figure 68) shows important information about the type of coordination 
capabilities so far developed in V.N.. Most of respondents (62,5%) clearly affirms that they would 
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not have problems to change work-team.  These data can be explained by the fact that the 
working plan is organized in a rotating way. Every day caregivers change not only tasks but also 
their own team-mates, so that over time they have developed adequate capabilities to coordinate 
with their colleagues, also thanks to the psychological support of a professional. This type of 
coordination capabilities does not require a deep knowledge of colleagues’ ability, knowledge and 
mood, because – as they affirm - they would not have problems in changing team-mates. In this 
sense, such capabilities are very different from those developed in C., S.L. and A. on the one hand 
and in S.M. on the other hand. In C., S.L. and in A. coordination capabilities have emerged not 
thanks to an organization’s investment, but spontaneously mainly in case of friendships and 
thanks to a stock of caregivers’ personal knowledge about how to relate with others. Conversely in 
case of S.M. and V.N. coordination capabilities seem to emerge thanks to the sharing of 
coordination rules. In particular, in the case of V.N. – where caregivers’ tasks are strictly defined – 
coordination rules are basically language strategies (for instance by adopting the words and tone 
of voice for a question rather than for a command). These are fundamental against the risk of 
burn-out and, indirectly, they support good personal relationships with users.  Instead, in case of 
S.M. shared rules concern not only the way of interaction (the approach) but also the content of 
tasks (workers have to decide which tasks to perform in coordination with colleagues). Indeed, 
capabilities on the approach are instrumental to the full participation of workers to the 
governance and, through that, to a full personalization of services (for instance, the adoption of a 
despotic approach by one may prevent the active participation of the others). In this case, 
colleagues need to know each other to coordinate in the best possible way. To sum up, we could 
affirm that in V.N., coordination capabilities have a reduced content compared to those in S.M. as 











Table  64 – Evaluation of governance 
Legend: 
Gov_3: You would better work in another workteam 
Gov_4: You would have problems in changing your workteam 
  Gov_3 Gov_4 
 Obs. 33 32 
Villa Niccolini Mean 3.45 2.5 
 CV 0.57 0.78 
 Obs. 22 22 
Chiocciola Mean 4.1 4.41 
CV 0.54 0.53 
 Obs. 18 18 
S. Lorenzo Mean 3.06 3.8 
CV 0.6 0.51 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
 






3.4.5.6.2. Authoritarian Management 
 
Characteristics attributed to the management in V.N. are not much different from those identified 
in C. and S.L.  As Table 65 displays, most of respondents (67%) feels to be treated fairly and equally 
by the management (man_1), while 55% attributes the coordinator incentivizing capabilities 
(man_2). Caregivers recognize that she pays attention to their personal problems (mean value of 
man_5 is 2.3) and involve them in decisions that impact on their lives (mean value of man_4 is 
1.82). However, she is recognized also with an authoritarian style by 61% of respondents (man_3), 
as Table 65 and Figure 69 show. 
 
Table  65  – Evaluation of management 
Legend: 
Man_1 - Manager treats workers fairly and equally 
Man_2 - Manager is able to incentivize team spirit 
Man_3 - When at odds with you, manager closes debate relying on his/her own authority 
Man_4 - Manager involves you in decisions that impact on your life 
Man_5 - Manager lends weight to your personal problems and supports you in difficult times 
 
 Man_1 Man_2 Man_3 Man_4 Man_5 
 Obs. 33 33 33 33 33 
Villa Niccolini Mean 1.76 1.64 1.73 1.82 2.3 
 CV 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.55 0.44 
 Obs. 23 23 23 23 23 
Chiocciola Mean 1.78 1.91 1.96 1.96 2.48 
CV 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.47 0.36 
 Obs. 20 18 17 17 19 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.19 1.73 1.76 1.72 2.55 
CV 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
Table  66  – Evaluation of management 
  Man_1   Man_2   Man_3  
 Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 5 15.15 15.15 5 15.15 15.15 6 18.18 18.18 
1 6 18.18 33.33 10 30.30 45.45 7 21.21 39.39 
2 14 42.42 75.76 10 30.30 75.76 10 30.30 69.70 
3 8 24.24 100.00 8 24.24 100.00 10 30.30 100.00 
Tot. 33 100.00  33 100.00  33 100.00  
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Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 




3.4.5.6.3. Personalized Service Design 
 
Respondents in V.N. display similar values to C. and S.L. also concerning the evaluation of training 
activity, in particular about orientation (form_1) and courses required by law (form_2). To be 
noted in Figure 70 is that an important share of the sample (45%) has chosen level 0 and 1, namely 
feels to not have received sufficient education on how to relate with colleagues (form_3). 
Conversely, in case of education to improve competences with users, a low share (only 21%) 





Table  67 – Evaluation of training 
Legend: 
Form_1: You have initially received an adequate training and orientation 
Form_2: You have received training required by law 
Form_3: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with colleagues 
Form_4: You have received additional training to improve your competences in relationships with hosts and their 
families 
  Form_1 Form_2 Form_3 Form_4 
 Obs. 33 33 33 33 
Villa Niccolini Mean 2.34 2.61 1.7 2 
 CV 0.36 0.25 0.56 0.45 
 Obs. 22 23 22 23 
Chiocciola Mean 2.18 2.52 1.86 1.91 
CV 0.31 0.13 0.63 0.52 
 Obs. 20 20 20 20 
S. Lorenzo Mean 2.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 
CV 0.4 0.23 0.48 0.24 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 












Concerning accreditation, the number of answers corresponds almost to the totality of the sample 
(see Table 67), showing hence that the majority of caregivers has been working in the organization 
for a long time and is aware of the existence of this procedure. Given the important role attributed 
to the fulfillment of formal tasks in this organization, positive values for accreditation are 
understandable. Despite the mean value of accr_5 – concerning the improved ability to relate with 
patients and their family – is lower in V.N. than in C. and S.L. (see Table 68), means are not 
statistically different. Accreditation is considered as a positive procedure that helps to better 
relate with patients and their families (45% has chosen level 6 and 7) and to put users at the 
center of the service more than in the past (55% has chosen level 6 and 7). However, attention to 
relationships – maybe due to the presence of coordination capabilities - has led most of workers 
(64%) to affirm that, because of accreditation, time for personal relationships with users has 
decreased. 
Table  68 – Number of respondents knowing accreditation procedures 
Tot. of respondents 33 
Having worked ≥ 6 years 28 (85%) 
Having worked ≥ 6 years and 
knowing the procedure 
22(79%) 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
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Table  69 – Evaluation of accreditation 
Legend: 
Accr_5 – You better relate with patients and their families 
Accr_6 – User is more at the center of the service than in the past 
Accr_7 – Time for personal relationships with users has decreased 
 Accr_5 Accr_6 Accr_7 
 Obs 22 22 22 
Villa Niccolini Mean 4.41 5.23 5.14 
 CV 0.54 0.32 0.45 
 Obs 13 13 13 
Chiocciola Mean 5 4.61 4.38 
CV 0.49 0.52 0.47 
 Obs 11 11 11 
S. Lorenzo Mean 5.27 5.72 5.27 
CV 0.29 0.22 0.34 
 
Source: Author’s calc. based on survey’s data 
 
The chart below (Figure 72) shows the type of service offered in V.N. as emerging from the above 
analysis. Service is personalized concerning the approach to follow when providing support to the 
elderly. This type of coordination capability is important. In fact, not always the patient may 
accept hydration, bathing, having meal and so on. In these cases, caregivers are able to find the 
personalized approach to motivate patients, thanks also to the personalized support received by 
the psychologist, by management and, to a lesser extent, also by colleagues. However, caregivers 
are called to implement tasks required by protocols, they are not incentivized to propose new 
strategies to motivate users. For this reason, the overall service is only partly personalized. Finally, 
the evidence on this organization – representing the second category – supports the hypothesis 
about the presence of a virtuous cycle able to promote, at least to some extent, intrinsic 





Figure 72 – Service Blueprinting in Villa Niccolini 
 
 
Source: Author’s contribution 
 
 
3.4.5.7. Satisfaction analysis 
 
In this section, I investigate whether the organizational characteristics affect the level of 
satisfaction across the organizations representing the four categories. This can be considered as 
the first step of a two-steps-analysis about the role of the organizations on the level of caregivers’ 
sick leave hours, in which the second step – studying the role of satisfaction on sick leave hours – 
cannot be taken in this study because of the lack of sick leave hours data for each respondent. The 
regression analysis at individual level (122 respondents) shows that, despite the self-selection 
problem, some important variables reflecting the organizational structure affect the satisfaction 
level of caregivers, thus, providing a meaningful justification of the interpretative model. After 
having described the regression model adopted and the involved variables, I will show the results 




In order to estimate the impact of organizational characteristics on satisfaction level across the 
five organizations, I adopt the following reduced form of the regression model:  
𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽7𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
where the dependent variable (Y) is regressed on a set of independent variables which include: 
 
• Cycle is a dummy variable considering the type of organization in which the individual 
works. Two are the macro-groups in which the organizations are included; one group 
involving the organizations of the first and second categories which should experience, 
according to the model, the virtuous cycle; and another group including the organizations 
of the third and fourth categories which are expected to experience the vicious cycle; 
• Organization is a dummy variable alternatively used to the ‘cycle’ considering the five 
organizations (where the fifth is automatically implied in the regression). 
• Hierarchy corresponding to the item ‘Because of hierarchy, limit yourself to follow 
standardized procedures’ (gov_5) is a variable considering the hierarchical character of the 
governance;  
• Participative corresponding to the item ‘Workers, directly participating, reach better 
results than Union’ (gov_11) is a variable considering the participative character of the 
governance; 
• Authoritarian corresponding to the item ‘When at odds with you, the manager closes 
debate’ (man_3) displays the authoritarian character of the management; 
• Supportive corresponding to the item ‘Manager is able to incentivize team spirit’ (man_2) 
displays the supportive character of the management to the team; 
• Training corresponding to the item ‘You have received additional training to improve your 
competences in relationships with colleagues’ (Form_3) is a variable considering the role of 
training as supportive process in service design; 
• Qualitystandards corresponding to the item ‘Compiling forms takes up valuable time’ 




Among controls, I include age, worktime and a gender dummy, which may provide rival 
explanations for the level of satisfaction. The variable ‘worktime’ includes values between 1 and 
10, as the survey is focused on whether caregivers have been working for less than ‘ten years and 
over’. 
 
As dependent variable, I consider satisfaction, which is a variable obtained as sum of seven 
items72 concerning satisfaction in the organization of labor and the internal relationships. Despite 
its categorical character, it has been used as dependent variable of a OLS regression model, as it 
involves more than 5 categories and its distribution - not showing picks on the tails - can be 
approximated to a normal one, as the figure below shows.  









                                                      





Table  70 – Statistical description of the variables included in the regression model 
 
 Mean Coefficient of 
Variation 
Median Min Max 
Hierarchy 4.52 0.46 5 1 7 
Participative 4.37 0.48 4 1 7 
Authoritarian 1.53 0.74 2 0 3 
Supportive 1.65 0.59 2 0 3 
Training  1.96 0.5 2 0 3 
Qualitystandards 4.45 0.51 5 1 7 
Age 46.1 0.21 46 22 69 
Worktime 8.25 0.32 10 1 10  
Satisfaction 4.67 0.27 4.8 1 7 
 
The table represents the extraction of the linear regression done with Stata73. It summarizes the 
influences the independent variables have on the dependent one, which is in line with our model. 
 
Table  71 – Linear Regression 
Linear regression         Number of obs. =88 
          F(8, 96)              = 471.06 
          Prob > F           = 0.000 
          R-squared         = 0.976 
          Root MSE        = .828 
 
Satisfaction Coeff. Std. Err. t P>|t| (95% Conf. Interval) 
categories       
0 3.30 .58 5.64 0.000 2.13 4.46 
1 3.30 .59 5.52 0.000 2.11 4.49 
       
Hierarchy .04 .05 0.83 0.4 -.05 .12 
Participative .17 .05 3.27 0.00 .06 .26 
Authoritarian -.04 .09 -0.46 0.64 -.24 .15 
Supportive .43 .13 3.21 0.00 .16 .69 
Training .34 .11 3.15 0.01 .13 .56 
Quality 
standards 
-.01 .05 -0.16 0.87 -.1 .08 
Age .01 .01 0.67 0.51 -0.01 .02 
Worktime -.07 .04 -1.95 0.05 -.14 .00 
Gender -.21 .21 -1.00 0.32 -.64 .21 
Source: Author’s calculation based on survey’s data  
                                                      
73 The formula is ‘reg satisfaction ibn.categories gov_5 gov_11 man_3 man_2 form_3 gov_7, 
noconst robust’ 
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Results show that among control variables, only worktime is significant and is negatively related to 
satisfaction. This is an important information, as it means that caregivers with a long experience 
are less satisfied and, hence, that they lose their motivational sources over time. This effect 
suggests that the working environment plays a fundamental role in the reduction of caregivers’ 
satisfaction level as, indeed, it is confirmed by the following results. First, we can see that the 
dummy variable is highly significant at 99% level (p<0.01), which means that the type of 
organization matters in defining the level of caregivers’ satisfaction about internal relationships. 
Moreover, Table 71 shows that among the organizations, Stella Montis is the company that is 
most able to support caregivers’ satisfaction. How the organization intervenes on satisfaction is 
shown in the results about the following variables. The hierarchical character of governance and 
the authoritarian style of management are not significant. This may be partly explained by the fact 
that the high formalization of the type of service is common to all the organizations along with the 
responsibility of the service which is largely in the hand of the management, who in turn 
necessarily exerts his/her own authority. However, if we consider the participative character of 
the governance and the supportive style of the management, we can see that in case of the 
organizations Stella Montis and Villa Niccolini, greater effort has been exerted for the 
development of coordination capabilities, which are able to sustain caregivers’ satisfaction. In fact, 
the two variables are both significant. Finally, as expected, not significant is the role of standards 
in service design, as the accreditation system was applied in all the organizations. However, the 
role of training to caregivers in order to improve coordination capabilities with colleagues is an 
important supporting process in Stella Montis and Villa Niccolini. Table 71 shows a different 
specification of the regression model, which adopts as dummy variable the organizations instead 
of their related cycles. The purpose is to investigate whether some organizations’ characteristics 
are not explained by the first version of the model. Results do not reveal any additional 
information. 
In conclusion, we can argue that the evidence collected about these organizations support the 
hypothesis about an important role of governance, management and service design on caregivers’ 







Table  72 – Linear Regression 
Linear regression         Number of obs. =88 
          F(8, 96)              = 411.94 
          Prob > F           = 0.0000 
          R-squared         = 0.9766 
          Root MSE        = .83831 
 
Satisfaction Coeff. Std. Err. t P>|t| (95% Conf. Interval) 
categories       
Arsia 3.12 .59 5.25 0.000 1.93 4.31 
Chiocciola 3.34 .60 5.54 0.000 2.14 4.55 
S.Lorenzo 3.54 .65 5.45 0.000 2.24 4.83 
Stella Montis 3.42 .61 5.59 0.000 2.20 4.64 
Villa Niccolini 3.31 .61 5.44 0.000 2.10 4.53 
       
Hierarchy .03 .04 0.88 0.38 -.05 .12 
Participative .16 .05 3.19 0.00 .06 .27 
Authoritarian -.04 .10 -0.39 0.69 -.24 .16 
Supportive .42 .13 3.15 0.00 .15 .69 
Training .33 .12 2.67 0.00 .08 .59 
Quality 
standards 
-.00 .05 -0.11 0.91 -.10 .09 
Age .00 .01 0.7 0.48 -.01 .02 
Worktime -.08 .04 -2.13 0.03 -.15 -.01 
Gender -.20 .20 -1.02 0.31 -.60 .19 




In this chapter, I have developed an interpretative model to analyze the mechanism through which 
the organizational structure (by varying the level of standards and the repartition of decision 
rights) affects external efficiency over time. The four case-studies provide a first support to the 
hypothesis about the existence of a vicious or virtuous cycle between each organization’s 
structure and the related level of 𝑈𝑃𝐶2, considered as index of external efficiency. In particular, 
the case-studies involving the organizations having invested in coordination capabilities (Stella 
Montis and Villa Niccolini), support the existence of a virtuous cycle, in which the level of intrinsic 
motivations is maintained high over time and sick leave hours are low. Conversely, the other case-
studies including organizations highly focused on the fulfillment of quality standards display a high 
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level of absences and are consistent with the existence of a vicious cycle, in which the level of 
intrinsic motivation is not supported and sick leave hours are high. Moreover, the four case 
studies have allowed to understand that coordination capabilities can be developed in the IOE 
Villa Niccolini more than in the cooperative S. Lorenzo and Chiocciola, and that these capabilities 
can have a different content. Three are the coordination capabilities types identified:  
1) Spontaneous one: In C., S.L. and in A. coordination capabilities have emerged not thanks to 
an organization’s investment, but spontaneously mainly in case of friendships and thanks 
to a stock of caregivers’ personal knowledge about how to relate with others; 
2) Capabilities on the approach: in V.N. do not require a deep knowledge of team members as 
they are basically language strategies fundamental against the risk of burn-out but also 
able to sustain good personal relationships with users and colleagues. 
3) Capabilities on the content and on the approach: in S.M. require a profound knowledge of 
team-mates as shared rules concern not only the way of interaction (the approach) but 
also the content of tasks (workers have to decide which tasks to perform in coordination 
with colleagues). Here, capabilities on the approach are instrumental to the full 
participation of workers to the governance and, through that, to a full personalization of 
services. 
The study has also highlighted the crucial role of the management style on external efficiency. In 
case of hierarchical governance, it has been shown that a tolerant management can slow down 
the negative consequences of a vicious cycle.  S. Lorenzo and Chiocciola, characterized by a 
management attentive to caregivers’ personal problems, show a lower level of sick leave hours 
than in Arsia, which is characterized by authoritarian management. So, even if both types of 
organizations experience a vicious cycle, only Arsia seems to undergo a progressive worsening of 
its capabilities. Conversely, the bottom-up development of a participative governance needs to be 
nurtured by a supportive management. Despite in Villa Niccolini internal rules and training have 
supported the establishment of a virtuous cycle, its authoritarian management did not allow to 
adequately motivate caregivers to improve caregivers’ coordination capabilities. Only Stella 
Montis, characterized by a supportive management, has been experiencing a progressive 
improvement of its capabilities and, thus, a very low level of sick leave hours.   
In line with these results, the regression analysis has allowed to establish that a negative 
relationship exists between caregivers’ satisfaction level and the organizational structure among 
the five emblematic organizations, providing an additional important support to the hypothesized 
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interpretative model. In conclusion, this study can be considered as a first attempt in support of a 
careful evaluation of the LTC companies’ internal structure as this is direct responsible for external 
efficiency, an efficiency component so far neglected by organizational and management studies, 






This thesis has theorized that cooperative governance is the most effective in minimizing dynamic 
transaction costs and the related unexpected production costs due to the lack of capabilities about 
how to satisfy customers’ complex needs. 
 
The first subsection of this chapter summarizes the results and the answers to the research 
questions. The second and third subsections discuss the ways in which the results contribute to 
theory and practice. Finally, the last subsection presents the paths to future research. 
 
1.1. SUMMARIZING RESULTS 
 
The aim of this thesis was to analyse whether and how the complexity of customer’s needs 
imposes to providers a specific organizational structure in order to address them in efficient and 
effective way. In addition, this problem was addressed in case of organizations meeting a specific 
complex need, long term care. The thesis answered three research questions, which are discussed 




The first research question was: 
1) How does economic organizations efficiently face customer uncertainty in presence of 
complex needs?  
 
In the light of the Modularity Theory of the Firm (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Teece and Pisano, 
1994; Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Baldwin and Clark, 2003; Langlois, 2002; Langlois 2006), it has been 
shown that customer uncertainty is a form of environmental uncertainty that – by producing 
unexpected production cost in the production process - influences organizational efficiency. 
Customer uncertainty emerges when the customer is not able to take any consumption decision 
able to satisfy him/herself because of need complexity. In this case, the main type of unexpected 
production cost (𝑼𝑷𝑪𝟏) emerges in the productive relation between the provider and the 
customer due to the lack of providers’ capabilities in customizing the services. However, when 
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customization requires other providers’ non-standardized knowledge in the production process, 
also secondary 𝑼𝑷𝑪𝟐 may emerge. These are due to the lack of capabilities in cooperating among 
each other which are necessary to promote customization. Against 𝑼𝑷𝑪𝟏 and 𝑼𝑷𝑪𝟐, the 
organization can develop production/coordination capabilities thanks to the standards and 
incentives expressed by its system of ownership rights (source of modularity), which may favor or 
may not non-standardized knowledge transfers. In particular, the main organizational means to 
face customer uncertainty are: 
• non-stringent standards that enable non-standardized knowledge transfer with the 
customer and the exertion of professional judgement;  
• decentralized distribution of decision rights that – in presence of an asymmetric 
information problem, sustains providers’ intrinsic motivation to exchange no-standardized 
knowledge among colleagues, which, in turn, is necessary to improve customization of 
services.  
The most efficient organizational form is 1) the network (loosely coupled organization) when only 
𝑼𝑷𝑪𝟏 are involved in the production process, and 2) the firm (highly non-modular organization) 
with an internal participative governance in case also 𝑼𝑷𝑪𝟐 are included.  
 
II part 
In the second chapter, the main goal is to identify the conditions for production efficiency at the 
service design and management levels. In fact, standards and incentives provided by non-modular 
organizations, promote organizational efficiency by sustaining an efficient management of 
customer uncertainty in the production process. Thus, the second research question is: 
 
2) how does the service design and management contribute to efficiently manage customer 
uncertainty due to complex needs? 
 
In case of complex needs, the customer is involved in the production process both as input and as 
co-producer, so that production efficiency is a function of both internal efficiency (manufacturing 
based concept) and external efficiency (Gronroos, 2000), here redefined as the service quality 
promoted by the coordination/production capabilities developed by the organization to customize 
services. While customization sustains external efficiency (measured by UPC), standardization 
promotes internal efficiency (measured by traditional PC). Hence, different types of standards and 
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incentives are required or, in other words, a different modularity level. Since the platform 
approach to modularity identifies either a highly non-modular or highly modular customization 
strategy, a new approach to modularity is here developed based on the blueprinting technique 
(Shostack, 1982,1984,1987), which is reinterpreted in the light of Larsson and Bowen (1989) work 
about the participation of the uncertain customer in the service process. This technique - by using 
the visibility line to separate the front-office activities (centred on customer) from the back-office 
ones - lends itself to be used as a valuable modularization instrument in service design based on 
the customer’s need analysis. While onstage activities should be mainly customized (as they 
address customer’s complex needs), backstage activities should be oriented to standardization (as 
they are supposed to satisfy customer’s clearly defined needs). In the onstage and backstage 
environments - characterized by different standards and incentives - also the management styles 
should be different: while a supportive style should be adopted for managing front-office 
activities, an authoritarian style is considered still efficient to manage back office activities. This 
framework is, then, applied to the case of organizations addressing the customer’s LTC complex 
need. On the basis of the need analysis, services are designed above or below the visibility line. In 
particular, personal care services, nursing, animation and physiotherapy are daily activities to be 
placed above the line. Preparation of drugs and meals, user monitoring and cleaning are example 




The theoretical framework developed in the previous two chapter is further developed in the third 
chapter where – by using the theory building from case study method (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin 2003) 
– I investigate the relationship between organizational and production efficiency (in particular, 
external efficiency) in LTC organizations. An interpretative model is here developed to analyze five 
Italian LTC organizations as emblematic cases of different approaches to the management of UPC, 
considered as index of external efficiency (the greater are sick leave hours, the more continuity of 
care is hindered along with the possibility to customize the service). This study is important 
because the mechanism through which the organizational structure (by varying the level of 
standards and the repartition of decision rights) affects external efficiency over time is still an 
open question. In particular, the third research question is: 
 
 222 
3) How LTC organizations – through governance, service design and management - promote 
external efficiency (low 𝑈𝑃𝐶2) related to customer uncertainty in personal care service? 
 
Two are the main hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that the organizations investing in high levels of 
standards and low levels of coordination capabilities, experience a progressively lower level of 
external efficiency (vicious cycle). Conversely, the companies highly investing in capabilities 
experience a progressively higher level of external efficiency (virtuous cycle). In order to build the 
model, the five LTC companies have been organized in four categories that are analyzed in four 
case studies. The categories were chosen by taking into account the level of investment in 
standards (high and low) and in coordination capabilities (high and low). The first case study 
adopts literal replication logic (namely similar results are predicted) and involves two 
organizations belonging to the same category (high investment in standards and low investment in 
capabilities). This allows findings to be replicated (Yin, 2003). This case study provides a first 
support to the hypothesized sketched model. Then, the other three case studies, involving 
organizations belonging to the remaining categories, allow to enhance the generalizability of the 
model, by employing theoretical replication logic, namely contrasting results are expected for 
anticipatable reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). As expected, data show that the most 
effective organization among those under study (namely those with the lowest level of sick leave 
hours) is Stella Montis, that is the organization with a participative governance, customized front-
office services and supportive management. This organization, in fact, sustains caregivers’ intrinsic 
motivations to cooperate with colleagues (especially by increasing their empowerment and 
avoiding burn-out problems), and, this way, promotes a low level of caregivers’ sick leave hours. In 
line with the theoretical framework, what matters seems to be the internal organization of labour 
rather than the size and the legal form. On the one hand, the cooperative Stella Montis has the 
same size (60 bed spots) and legal form as Chiocciola and S. Lorenzo, characterized by a quite 
hierarchical internal governance. On the other hand, the example of Villa Niccolini, having 
developed a quite high level of cooperation capabilities, shows that an investor owned enterprise 
with 82 bed spots may be more efficient than other cooperatives with 60 bed spots. The 
evidences, thus, analyzed on the basis of the experimental model, generate considerations that 
are consistent with the interpretative model and legitimate the theoretical hypotheses developed 
in the previous chapters.   
 
 223 
1.2.  THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This thesis contributes to three areas in the academic literature.  
 
Firstly, it contributes to the study of the role of the customer in the organizational literature, by 
enlarging the MTF perspective to the study of customer uncertainty when the need to be satisfied 
is artificially or intrinsically complex.  The studies so far conducted on the role of customer 
uncertainty for the organizational structure (Bowen and Jones, 1986; Larsson and Bowen 1989; 
Pitt and Foreman, 1999) adopt a static theoretical framework, which is unable to take into account 
the role of organizational capabilities to promote an efficient relationship with the customer and, 
through that, production efficiency. In order to provide an adequate dynamic framework to study 
such issue the MTF has been on the one hand supported by behavioral studies on extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations that has allowed to identify the system of incentives the governance should 
offer in order to develop the capabilities necessary for an efficient management of CU. On the 
other hand, the MTF has been further developed towards a greater understanding of the 
relationship between organizational and production efficiency. To this regard, the research has led 
to consider the organizational capabilities to promote production efficiency as a problem of 
organizational efficiency. As a consequence, a new definition of production efficiency – no longer 
based on the concept of allocative efficiency – has been developed in order to include the lack of 
capabilities as source of - what I have defined as - unexpected production costs (waste of 
resources, legal claims etc.). In particular, these have been considered as the ‘productive side’ of 
the dynamic transaction costs and related to the lack of organizational capabilities required for the 
personalization of the production process. Based on this enlargement of the MTF framework, I 
have argued that different levels of organizational modularity, by providing different systems of 
standards and incentives, matter for the (in)efficient management of customer uncertainty, by 
supporting (limiting) the reduction of UPC. On the basis of the types of need and level of 
participation of providers– we have identified and ‘predicted’ three different efficient level of 
organization modularity; a modular organization in case of clearly specified needs, a loosely 
coupled organization in case of complex needs and participation to the production process of only 
one professional’s non-standardized knowledge; a non-modular organization  in case of complex 
need and participation to the production process of more than one professional’s non-
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standardized knowledge. As a consequence, this thesis increases the understanding of the role of 
modularity at organizational level to face customer uncertainty.  
 
Secondly, this thesis expands the extant discourse on service modularity to the problem of needs’ 
analysis in order to understand whether the management of CU requires for each client a specific 
modularization in customized, mass-customized or standardized services. In this regard, the thesis 
provides a theoretical framework that lends itself to be especially used in the service design and 
management. In fact, the main approach to the application of modularity in service design- the 
platform one (Meyer and de Tore 2001; Meyer et al. 2007; Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008, 
Baldwin and Woodard, 2008) – conceptually derives from manufacturing sector and offers a 
limited power to modularity in the management of customer uncertainty; the customer role is 
either limited to a choice option or inefficiently highly empowered even in low value-added 
activities. Even if this approach has been developed mainly in sectors characterized by low level of 
need complexity (Pekkarinen and Ulkuniemi 2008; Lin et al.2010, Zhou et al. 2010; Bask et al. 
2010; Bask et al. 2011), risks to be recklessly transferred to the service sectors in which customers 
express intrinsically highly complex needs, such as health and long-term care services. This thesis, 
along with highlighting such risk, proposes an alternative approach – the blueprinting one - to the 
application of modularity – by modularizing the service on the basis of the level of customer’s 
need complexity, allows both to involve the customer in customized activities when this is 
required by need complexity and to partially or totally exclude him/her in mass-customized and 
standardized activities when needs are clearly specified. In this way, it is possible to efficiently 
manage customer uncertainty (reach effectiveness) in front office activities without renouncing to 
promote manufacturing based production efficiency in back office ones. Moreover, the logic 
background in the MTF allows to recognize the need of two different governance structures for 
the efficient management of front office and back office activities. While a participatory character 
of governance efficiently sustains the supportive management style of onstage services, hierarchy 
favors the authoritarian management style of backstage activities. 
 
Finally, the thesis provides an important contribution to the studies on modularity applied to long 
term care services, because - by explicitly addressing CU problem – it proposes a model which 
represents a first real attempt to put the patient at the center of the service in an efficient way. 
After having shown that the platform approach -usually applied for improving coordination in the 
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care path (Meyer et al., 2007; de Blok et al. 2009, 2010a) - displays important risks for service 
effectiveness (De Block et al., 2013; Vahatalo 2016), I propose a first application of the 
blueprinting approach in residential care services. This approach allows modularizing services 
(customized, mass-customized and standardized) depending on the complexity of LTC needs for 
each patient. Some services such as reservation system and preparation of drugs and meals can be 
standardized in the back office environment. Conversely, personal care service needs to be 
customized, while animation and physiotherapy can be at least in part mass-customized. Finally, in 
the light of the enlarged MTF framework which establishes the existence of a relationship 
between organizational and production efficiency, the empirical analysis advances a first 
hypothesis - through a theory-building case study analysis – about the role of the organizational 
structure on production efficiency. This empirical study can be considered as a first attempt within 
a specific sector to understand the link among governance, service design and management levels 
for production efficiency in presence of customer uncertainty. These results could be fruitfully 
extended also to services different from long term care, namely other social and health care 
services such as children’s home, specialist educational services (for instance for autism and 
specific learning disabilities), nursery, residential and daily care services for young people with 
mental illness. In all these cases, customer uncertainty can be source of unexpected production 
costs. For instance, in maternity hospital the uncertainty of mothers feeding babies (especially 
premature newborn) can be worsen by the conflicts among neonatologists and obstetricians 
about which care strategy to follow. While doctors pay attention to the respect of growth 
standards, the obstetricians focus on the mother-infant relationship. In absence of an organization 
that supports trust and reciprocal esteem among professionals, they can propose opposite care 
strategies. In this case, mother’s uncertainty may become distress or depression with negative 
consequences on the relationship with the child and on child’s growth. 
 
1.3.  MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
With this thesis, I hope to provide some useful orientations to entrepreneurs, managers and 
policymakers engaged – from different perspective – in the organization of services aimed to 
satisfy intrinsically complex needs. First, this study, by showing that UPC and PC are driven by 
opposite levels of standardization, implicitly recognizes the possibility (and maybe also the 
necessity) of undertaking specific development strategies in case of customer uncertainty. UPC -
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reduced by existing coordination/production capabilities in the front office customized activities - 
require a few and general standards and the efforts exerted towards their reduction support 
innovations at organizational level. Conversely PC -reduced by hard standardization in mass-
customized and back office- activities - allow scale and specialization economies, which in turn 
push toward investment in automation. The recognition of these different paths of innovation is 
particularly important today as the attention of researchers, policy makers and entrepreneurs is 
largely focused on the benefits of Industry 4.0. Most of critics have highlighted the potential costs 
in terms unemployment, but not in terms of efficiency loss. This thesis represents a first attempt -
to be supported by greater investigation- to show that automation not always may be an efficient 
solution and, more importantly, that automation is not the only potential efficient solution in 
some sectors. The purpose of reaching complete control of the production process and, thereby, 
reduce PC through an indiscriminate use of standards and the related automation, in some cases 
can lead to a large increase of UPC. In fact, when the production process is aimed at satisfying 
intrinsically complex needs, the perception of control is just illusory. As seen in the first chapter, 
the way customer uncertainty reveals itself continuously changes and requires an answer that 
only human beings can efficiently give on the basis of their professional judgement and their 
flexibility. In this case, the cost of having invested in mechanization and automation is not repaid 
by savings due to increased control over the production process as UPC reasonably increase. 
Nevertheless, someone could argue that orientation to the Industry 4.0 may be repaid by large 
reductions in labour costs and increased economies of scale. Indeed, at least theoretically we can 
suppose that ‘4.0 organizations’ could be equally efficient (UPC + PC are sufficiently low) if they 
adopt a risk pooling strategy against UPC related to customer uncertainty. However, I would 
answer that they would lose the opportunity to really satisfy the customer's complex needs. Thus, 
it appears quite clear that when customer satisfaction concerns fundamental human needs such 
as health and LTC, a crucial role is played by the policy maker who can orient the investments 
towards one of the two directions. Moreover, public institutions-by defining a strict or loose level 
of quality standards - is highly responsible for organizational efficiency of LTC companies, as the 
empirical study on the accreditation system shows. There are many OECD countries, including 
Italy, which are still waiting for the reform of the LTC sector. This thesis, hence, hopes to represent 
also a new opportunity for policy makers to reflect about which direction to undertaken in the 
production of such reforms. 
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Finally, with this thesis and in particular, the empirical study, I hope to provide a first orientation 
for an efficient application of modularity in the organization, design and management of LTC 
services. Firstly, the thesis provides a criterion, the analysis of each customer’s needs, to establish 
the efficient modularity level of each service provided. To this regard, it is important to establish 
and evaluate overtime to what extent patient’s wellbeing can be promoted by standardized and 
mass-customized services (namely, some specific needs are clearly defined) or has to be sustained 
by personalized interactions (namely, some specific needs- since they are crucial for the patient’s 
health promotion, should be considered as complex). Moreover, in order to promote both 
productivity sources, external and internal efficiency, the standardized services should be 
organized in back-office, namely in coordination with but separately from mass-customized and 
customized services, which are front-office. The mass-customized services should be activated 
whenever and insofar as the patient’s need is not complex (namely, it is clearly specified and not 
crucial for patient’s health promotion). Second, the thesis suggests, as a strategy, to encourage 
good supportive processes for the management of customers’ complex needs, through training 
activities, psychological support to caregivers and by experimenting practises of participation of 
workers to the organization of labour. Moreover, the separation provided by the visibility line that 
allow to promote the different sources of efficiency can provide some orientation toward different 
innovation paths in this sector. While back office standardized services can be directed toward 
automation solutions, robotics, ICT systems in drug and meal preparation, cleaning activities etc.; 
mass-customized and customized services can be and should be innovated in combination in order 
to identify more effective and efficient strategies to promote patient’s wellbeing. This may mean 
on the one hand, promoting the development of capabilities not only in the design and provision 
of customized services but also in identifying new paths for mass-customized solutions. On the 
other hand, it may signify to establish new mass-customized solutions which provides indicators 
able to alert about the patients’ need for a different and customized solution. In other words, this 
empirical study supports, in a historical period of great uncertainty about the future sustainability 







1.4. LIMITS OF THE THESIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This final subsection briefly discusses the limits of the thesis and ideas for future studies that have 
appeared along this dissertation process.   
 
The main limit of my research is its theoretical character that, hence, requires confirmation or 
disconfirmation on empirical grounds not only in the LTC organizations. Econometric studies in 
different sectors could provide a fundamental contribution in the identification of a cause-effect 
relationship among the organizational structure, providers' intrinsic motivations and the level of 
upc indices over time such as absenteeism, customer claims etc. Indeed, it is fundamental to 
establish whether the organizational structure affects the amount and frequency of mistakes and 
loss of resources experienced over the production process and, hence, whether the UPC really 
exist. 
 
Second, the research is limited to the LTC sector. Given the increased importance of customer’s 
needs (not only intrinsically but also artificially complex) and the related customer uncertainty for 
the development of a good business model, it would be interesting to enlarge this analysis to the 
study of other sectors and evaluating whether this theoretical framework can be usefully applied 
in different contexts. 
 
Finally, since the empirical study is focused on LTC residential care services and does not take into 
account the service quality perceived by users and their families, it would be important to orient 
future research in this sector toward the development and testing of the blueprinting model in 
home care services (which today have been receiving increasing attention) with also a focus on 
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3. Qual è la tua tipologia di contratto? 
o Tempo indeterminato 
o Tempo determinato 
o Full-time 
o Part-time 
4. Qual è la tua posizione all’interno della Cooperativa? 
o Socio dipendente 
o Dipendente 
5. Da quanti anni lavori nella Residenza? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 e 
oltre 
  
6. Titolo di studio 
o Senza titolo di studio/scuola elementare 
o Scuola media inferiore 
o Qualifica professionale/media superiore 
o Diploma universitario/laurea triennale/quadriennale/specialistica 
 
II. MOTIVAZIONE  
7. Quali tra i seguenti aspetti ritieni che siano importanti per essere soddisfatto 
professionalmente? Per ogni aspetto di seguito riportato barra una sola casella della scala 
crescente: considera 1= per nulla importante e 7= importantissimo. 
 
1. Aiutare gli anziani a migliorare la propria qualità di vita  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Poter conciliare il lavoro con la vita privata (ferie, permessi, cambi turno, part-
time, aspettative) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3. Essere in grado di incidere sull’organizzazione del proprio lavoro per meglio 
rispondere alle esigenze degli ospiti 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Le condizioni contrattuali ed il trattamento economico 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Vedere riconosciuto e valorizzato il proprio impegno 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Avere un buon rapporto con gli ospiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Partecipare ad attività sociali e di animazione con gli ospiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Vivere un clima di solidarietà e collaborazione con i colleghi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Partecipare a momenti di socializzazione tra colleghi (cene, gite, feste, ecc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Poter crescere professionalmente ed imparare cose nuove 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Avere le informazioni necessarie per fare il proprio lavoro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Contribuire al raggiungimento degli obiettivi dell’organizzazione 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Avere fiducia nei colleghi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Avere fiducia nel coordinatore 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Essere trattato in modo equo e trasparente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Entrare in sintonia con l’utente e i suoi bisogni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
III. GOVERNANCE  
8. Come giudichi l’organizzazione del tuo lavoro in RSA? Per ogni aspetto di seguito riportato barra 
una sola casella considerando: 1= per nulla d’accordo; 7= completamente d’accordo. 
1. Lavori in gruppo e sei in grado di cooperare con i colleghi  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Conosci il tuo ruolo e i tuoi compiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Lavoreresti meglio in un altro gruppo di lavoro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Pensi che avresti problemi a cambiare gruppo di lavoro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Vi è una gerarchia di ruoli, perciò ti limiti ad eseguire le procedure standard e gli 
ordini che ricevi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Conosci i compiti di lavoro dei tuoi colleghi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. La compilazione delle schede sottrae tempo prezioso alla tua capacità di 
risolvere i problemi che insorgono nel rapporto con gli utenti e nella gestione 
delle altre operazioni  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Partecipi all’organizzazione del piano di lavoro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Esistono chiare figure di riferimento a cui rivolgersi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Il sindacato è importante per creare rapporti giusti ed equi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I lavoratori, partecipando direttamente, raggiungono risultati migliori del 
sindacato  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. Secondo te com’è il clima all’interno dell’organizzazione? 
       Per ogni punto indica la tua valutazione barrando una sola casella.  
 
1 Molto Freddo Freddo Caldo Molto caldo 
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2 Molto Accogliente Accogliente Poco accogliente Non accogliente 
3 Molto Istituzionale Istituzionale Familiare Molto familiare 
4 Molto Sereno Sereno Teso Molto teso 
5 Molto Pesante Pesante Leggero Molto leggero 
6 Molto Vitale Vitale Apatico Molto apatico 
7 Molto Professionale Professionale Poco professionale Non professionale 
 
10. Come consideri la formazione ricevuta dall’organizzazione? Per ogni aspetto di seguito riportato 
barra una sola casella considerando: 0= non sono d’accordo; 1= sono poco d’accordo; 2= sono 
d’accordo; 3= sono molto d’accordo. 
 GRADO DI ACCORDO 
0 1 2 3 
1. Hai ricevuto una formazione iniziale ed un orientamento adeguati     
2. Hai ricevuto la formazione richiesta dalla normativa      
3. Hai ricevuto formazione aggiuntiva per migliorare le tue competenze nelle relazioni con i 
colleghi 
    
4. Hai ricevuto formazione aggiuntiva per migliorare le tue competenze nelle relazioni con 
gli ospiti e le loro famiglie 
    
 
11. Secondo te, a cosa principalmente sono dovute le tensioni e i problemi di coordinamento tra i 
colleghi? Per ogni aspetto di seguito riportato barra una sola casella considerando: 0= non sono 
d’accordo; 1= sono poco d’accordo; 2= sono d’accordo; 3= sono molto d’accordo. 
GRADO DI ACCORDO 
 0 1 2 3 
1. Originano in particolari momenti della giornata     
2. Assenza di una chiara figura di riferimento     
3. Situazioni particolarmente difficili con alcuni residenti     
4. Cattive relazioni interpersonali con alcuni colleghi     
 
12. Com’è la relazione con il coordinatore? Per ogni aspetto di seguito riportato barra una sola 
casella considerando: 0= non sono d’accordo; 1= sono poco d’accordo; 2= sono d’accordo; 3= sono 
molto d’accordo. 
GRADO DI ACCORDO 
 0 1 2 3 
1. Il coordinatore tratta i lavoratori in modo equo     
 2. Il coordinatore riesce ad incentivare lo spirito di squadra     
3. In caso di disaccordo, il coordinatore chiude la discussione ricorrendo alla sua autorità     
4. Il coordinatore ti coinvolge nelle decisioni che hanno ricadute dirette sul tuo lavoro     
 241 
5. Il coordinatore dà importanza ai problemi personali dei lavoratori e li sostiene nei 
momenti di difficoltà 




13. Qual è il tuo livello di soddisfazione professionale rispetto alle seguenti dimensioni?Per ogni 
aspetto di seguito riportato barra una sola casella: considera 1= per nulla soddisfatto e 7= 
soddisfattissimo. 
 Livello di soddisfazione 
1. Supporto agli anziani nel migliorare la loro qualità di vita nel modo in cui vorresti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Conciliazione del lavoro con la vita privata (ferie, permessi, cambi turno, part-
time, aspettative) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Impatto sull’organizzazione del tuo lavoro per meglio rispondere alle esigenze 
degli ospiti 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Condizioni contrattuali e trattamento economico adeguati 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Riconoscimento e valorizzazione del tuo impegno  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Rapporto con gli ospiti  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Positivita’ delle attività sociali e di animazione con gli ospiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Clima di solidarietà e collaborazione con i colleghi  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Partecipazione a momenti di socializzazione tra colleghi (cene, gite, feste, ecc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Crescita personale ed apprendimento 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Crescita professionale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Circolazione delle informazioni necessarie per fare il tuo lavoro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Riesci ad aiutare l’organizzazione a raggiungere i suoi obiettivi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Fiducia nei colleghi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Fiducia nel coordinatore 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Trattamento equo e trasparente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Trattamento economico equo  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Sintonia con l’utente e i suoi bisogni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
V.  PARTE RISERVATA A CHI LAVORA DA ALMENO 6 ANNI IN RSA 
14. Sai cos’è la procedura di accreditamento? 
o Si 
o No 
15. A tuo avviso, com’è cambiato il lavoro in RSA da quando è entrato in funzione l’accreditamento? 
Per ogni aspetto di seguito riportato barra una sola casella considerando: 1= per nulla d’accordo; 
7= completamente d’accordo. 
ORGANIZZAZIONE DEL LAVORO  
1. Il lavoro in gruppo e’ migliore che in passato e la capacità di cooperare con i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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colleghi è maggiore 
2. Conosci meglio il tuo ruolo e i tuoi compiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Rispetto al passato hai maggiore autonomia decisionale riguardo al tuo lavoro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Rispetto al passato hai minore autonomia decisionale riguardo al tuo lavoro. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Rispetto al passato ti relazioni meglio con gli ospiti e le loro famiglie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Rispetto al passato l’ospite è maggiormente al centro del servizio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Rispetto al passato è diminuito il tempo per la relazione personale con l’ospite a 
causa del numero di procedure da seguire 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Rispetto al passato il sindacato è più importante per creare rapporti giusti ed equi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Rispetto al passato i lavoratori, partecipando direttamente, raggiungono risultati 
migliori del sindacato 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







INTERVISTA PRELIMINARE AL COORDINATORE DI STRUTTURA 
 
• Da quanti anni lavora in struttura? 
• Come sono i rapporti tra colleghi? 
• Com’è organizzato il piano di lavoro giornaliero per gli OSS, OSA? 
• Che tipo di formazione è stato e viene dato ai lavoratori? 
• Quale supporto viene dato loro contro il rischio di burn-out? 
 
 
 
